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CONTENTS

Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective	*Said Amir Arjomand*	383
Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Recent Soviet Reassessments	*Elizabeth K. Valkenier*	415
The U.S.S.R. and Third-World Conflicts: Domestic Debate and Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967-1973	*Dina Rome Spechler*	435
Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy	*Stephen White*	462

REVIEW ARTICLE

Explaining U.S. Policy toward the Caribbean Basin: Fixed and Emerging Images	*Robert A. Pastor*	483
The Contributors		ii
Abstracts		iii

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ABSTRACTS

Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective

By S. A. ARJOMAND

The Islamic Revolution in Iran is analyzed as the latest of the "great revolutions" in a comparative perspective ranging from the early modern European revolutions to fascism. The analysis highlights the neglected importance of reactive elements, communal solidarities, and tradition in a wide variety of revolutions and revolutionary movements. Comparative inferences bring out the serious deficiency of the Marxian theory of revolution as well as of those structural theories of revolution that focus exclusively on the state. By contrast, these inferences underline the significance of ideology, religion, and culture. Finally it is argued that the emergence of a distinct Islamic revolutionary ideology can only be understood as a part of the process of crystallization of the revolutionary ideology in Western Europe and its spread to the rest of the world.

Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Recent Soviet Reassessments

By E. K. VALKENIER

A reexamination of revolutionary processes in the developing countries indicates mounting doubts among Soviet academic specialists that radical third-world policies will redound to the U.S.S.R.'s advantage. The author investigates the following topics: the relationship of socialist orientation to socialism; shortcomings of the vanguard parties; correct foreign and domestic economic policies; the suitability of the Marxist model for Eastern societies; and the evolution of the non-aligned movement. The congruence between these academic discussions and fresh official formulations could give Western analysts and policy makers valuable insights into new Soviet proposals for reducing East-West tensions over events in the third world.

The U.S.S.R. and Third-World Conflicts: Domestic Debate and Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967-1973

By D. R. SPECHLER

Soviet foreign policy underwent a significant change in orientation in the early 1970s. Emphasis on the pursuit of a new, more constructive relationship with the United States gave way to a primary focus on competition with the U.S. for influence and strategic presence in the third world, and there was a notable reduction of traditional restraints on the conduct of that competition. The article focuses on Soviet policy in the region and the period in which this redirection of policy was first manifested—the Middle East between the June 1967 and the October 1973 wars; it explains this major change by an analysis of the divergent images of the United States and of U.S.-Soviet relations that were held by Soviet elites, and the outcome of conflict among holders of the respective images.

Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy

By S. WHITE

Unlike liberal democracies where the legitimacy of government inheres mostly in the process of competitive elections, communist regimes are widely believed to be legitimated mostly by their socioeconomic performance. The marked slowdown in the economic growth of the communist countries, particularly since the late 1970s, has suggested to many scholars that regimes of this kind are likely to experience a "legitimacy crisis" in the relatively near future. Prognoses of this kind are held to be premature and probably misconceived; they overlook the ability of the regimes concerned to maneuver politically and to generate additional support by the development of their consultative capacities. Four such "mechanisms of adaptation" are examined in detail: the electoral mechanism; incorporation into the ruling party; associational incorporation; and letters to party and state bodies and to the press.

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Explaining U.S. Policy toward the Caribbean Basin: Fixed and Emerging Images

By R. A. PASTOR

To understand the complex developments in the Caribbean Basin and the U.S. response to them, one needs an image, an interpretive framework. A review of the current literature suggests two clear and coherent images: the security thesis, best articulated by the Reagan administration, views the crisis in the region as orchestrated by the Soviet Union, and the U.S. as playing a beneficial role historically and currently; and the neodependency antithesis, more prevalent in the literature, views the U.S. as the major historical and contemporary problem for the region. Scholars, questioning assumptions that underlie the two theses, have contributed insights on the impact of local actors and middle powers on U.S. policy. A new "interactive perspective" is constructed from these insights; it differs from both the other images in viewing the region as composed of actors, not passive objects. Though U.S. power is disproportionate, local actors have other means of leverage, which makes their actions crucial in understanding the patterns and possibilities of U.S. policy.

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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

By SAID AMIR ARJOMAND*

THE object of this paper is to bring out the theoretical significance of the Islamic Revolution in Iran by focusing on the political dynamics of the radical change in Iran's societal structure of domination and the moral dynamics of reintegration and collective action that accompany it. The political dynamics of revolution primarily explain the collapse of the structure of domination, while the moral dynamics of revolution underlie its teleology—i.e., its direction and consequences. In the analysis of the moral dynamics and teleology of revolution, revolutionary ideology assumes primary importance.

Revolution can be defined as the collapse of the political order and its replacement by a new one. Modern revolutions occur in political orders dominated by the state. I will use the term "societal structure of domination" to refer to the prevalent system of authority. It comprises the state, which is paramount at the time of occurrence of modern revolutions, but it also includes other institutions and corporate entities that have some measure of autonomous authority in the religious, judiciary, or economic spheres. The most important of these other institutions is usually the hierocracy—i.e., the church or its equivalent.

Modern revolutions occur not in stagnant societies, but in those undergoing considerable social change. Social change involves social dislocation and normative disturbance. The dislocated groups and individuals need to be reintegrated into societal community and may also demand inclusion in political society. The integrative social and political movements that arise to meet these demands have often been a major contributing factor to the occurrence of revolutions.

The collapse of the societal structure of domination in revolutions is caused by two sets of factors: the structure's internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and the concerted action of the social groups and individuals opposing it. Such groups and individuals may have political motives for opposing the regime, usually arising in the context of the power struggle set in motion by the centralization of the state. They

* This paper was completed at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and has benefited from the comments of the fellow members of the Social Sciences Seminar for 1984-85. Of the colleagues and friends who have commented on earlier drafts of this paper, I especially wish to thank Lewis Coser, Jack Goldstone, Juan Linz, and James Rule.

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may also have moral motives, which usually require the preconditions of social dislocation and normative disturbance. In addition, there may be other motives, such as class interest. The degree of cohesion and solidarity within each social group is a primary determinant of its capacity for collective action; the possibility of successful revolutionary action usually depends on the formation of coalitions among opposing social groups. All of the above factors provide important points of reference for comparisons regarding the *causes and preconditions* of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Revolutions can and should be compared in terms not only of their causes and preconditions, but also of their consequences. Those integrative social movements which successfully build on the preconditions of social dislocation and moral disorder to create revolutionary movements do so by using ideology as an instrument. The ideologies that set the revolutionary struggle in motion and are shaped in its course bridge the gap between the causes and the consequences of revolutions. They cannot account for the collapse of the societal structure of domination to any significant degree. On the other hand, the value-ideas that form their normative foundation, and are often progressively defined and formulated during the revolutionary process, *do* shape the political order installed by the revolution to a significant extent.

A comparative analysis of the *teleology* of the Islamic Revolution thus requires a serious and systematic analysis of revolutionary *ideologies*. The modern political myth of revolution and the various ideologies onto which it has been grafted in the past two centuries have constituted a causal factor in motivating revolutionary opposition to the status quo, but it would be a serious mistake to stop the analysis there. Ideologies are of primary theoretical interest in that their constitutive value-ideas determine the teleologies of the respective revolutions.[1] The nature and specific content of the value-ideas that distinguish different revolutionary ideologies therefore supply the basic points of reference for comparison with the teleology of the Islamic Revolution. These latter comparisons enable us to assess the distinct significance of Iran's Islamic Revolution in world history.

I. The Causes and Preconditions of the Islamic Revolution

A. THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY

The emphasis of recent scholarship on the role of the state, its repressive capacity, and its ability to weather serious crises has brought

[1] The logic of the analysis requires that I exclude the unintended consequences of rev-

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out the fact that revolutions often owe their success more to the internal breakdown and paralysis of the state than to the power of revolutionary groups.[2] It has been argued that the decisive factor in the occurrence of a revolution is the fragility of the existing political system.[3] Centralization of monarchical states reduces the degree of pluralism in society and increases its political fragility. Among the political regimes of the modern world, monarchies are especially fragile and vulnerable to revolution because popular discontent can be focused on a single person. De Tocqueville, who considered that hatred of the Old Regime dominated all other passions throughout the French Revolution, also showed how that hatred became fatally focused on a single person, the king: "To see in him the common enemy was the passionate agreement that grew."[4] The same can be said about the Shah, whose ouster was the one common demand that brought together almost all of the disparate sections of Iranian society. Furthermore, the same property of the monarchical system in Iran goes a long way toward explaining the meteoric rise of Khomeini as anti-monarch and the Shah's counter-image.

The type of political regime we might call "neopatrimonial" is also characterized by its fragility. In contrast to the ideal-type of the absolutist state in which the king is the first servant of the state, government is extremely personal in patrimonial states. The chief executive encourages divisions within the army and the political elite in order to rule. Such neopatrimonial states are particularly subject to collapse and ensuing revolution once the ruler breaks down.[5] The Mexican Revolution that was set in motion by the death of Porfirio Díaz in 1911, as well as the Cuban and the Nicaraguan revolutions, can be cited in support of this proposition. In his regime, the Shah combined the weaknesses of the neopatrimonial states with the old vulnerabilities of monarchy.[6] He had painstakingly constructed the machinery of the state around his person; there can be no doubt that the collapse of the man preceded the collapse of the machine. This collapse was evident in the Shah's pervasive wa-

olutions and confine the points of comparison to those consequences that are prefigured in the goals of the historical actors who eventually appropriate the revolution.

[2] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolution* (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Ekkart Zimmermann, *Political Violence, Crises and Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Shenkman, 1983), 309-14.

[3] Jean Baechler, *Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

[4] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The European Revolution and Correspondence with Gobineanu*, ed. and trans. by John Lukacs (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), 82, 109.

[5] S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies* (New York: Free Press, 1978); Jack A. Goldstone, "The Comparative and Historical Study of Revolutions," *Annual Review of Sociology* 8 (1982), 196-97.

[6] The Shah was aware of these vulnerabilities, and, in 1978, knowing he had cancer, began trying to make the regime more "democratic" for the succession of his son. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, *Answer to History* (New York: Stein & Day, 1980).

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vering and indecision (for example, he could not make up his mind to appoint a prime minister for the liberal, nationalist opposition until it was far too late), in his inconsistent combination of rewards and threats, and in his highly inhibited use of force.[7]

The neopatrimonial character of his state notwithstanding, the Shah did have a disciplined and well-equipped army and police force. He simply refused to use them effectively to repress the revolutionary movement. The Shah pretended to be using the army. He declared martial law in some cities in late summer of 1978 and installed a military government in November. But after the Black Friday massacre of September 8, 1978, he had muffled the army, to the outrage of his generals. This is reflected in low casualties, about 250 in the September 8 massacre, about 750 in Tehran in the following five months, and probably three times this figure for the whole of Iran. On December 21, 1978, the Prime Minister, General Azhari—after a mild heart attack and from his bed—complained to the American ambassador of the demoralization of the army which he attributed to the Shah's orders forbidding the troops to fire except in the air, no matter how badly abused or pressed. "You must know this and you must tell it to your government. This country is lost because the king cannot make up his mind."[8]

Unlike the Czar's troops in 1917, the Shah's army remained largely intact and loyal until he departed on January 16, 1979. Khomeini's leaflets were distributed among the soldiers. There were instances of fraternization with the demonstrators and of desertion; twelve officers were killed by three rebellious soldiers of the Imperial Guard; a mutiny occurred in Tabriz in December; and there were a number of other minor incidents. There was also persistent trouble with paramilitary technicians of the Air Force, known as the Homafaran. But overall, the strain of confrontation with the people did not seriously affect the morale and discipline of the armed forces. It was only *after* the Shah's departure that the process of disintegration of the army under political pressure set in seriously. I do not wish to assert that the use of the army for massive repression would have prevented the revolution. We will never know what would have happened if the Shah had ordered his forces to be brutally repressive in October and November 1978, when they were not yet affected by the revolutionary turmoil. The army might or might

[7] *Ibid.*, 168-71; William H. Sullivan, *Mission to Iran* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 190; Jerrold J. Green, *Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 92-124.

[8] Sullivan (fn. 7), 212. The figures for Tehran are taken from a Master's thesis for Tehran University supervised by Dr. Ahmad Ashraf. I am grateful to Dr. Ashraf for this information.

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not have disintegrated or split; the fact remains that it had not disintegrated by January 16, 1979. And the opposition knew it.[9]

The army's officers had a strong sense of professional identity, but no attachment to any particular solidary social group or any organized interests. Furthermore, the Shah had carefully chosen his top generals to assure they could not act in concert against him, and he had succeeded in that. The generals could have acted under him, but he did not let them. They could not act against him, but neither could they act for themselves or any other group. In desperation, some of them finally made a deal with the clerical opposition. Tilly has correctly emphasized the importance of coalitions linking revolutionary challengers to the military.[10] Although the term coalition would be too strong, the agreement worked out by Bazargan and Beheshti through the mediation of the American ambassador with a number of the generals was of crucial importance in bringing about a split in the army and its consequent neutralization in February 1979.[11]

If the Shah's regime collapsed despite the fact that his army was intact, despite the fact that there was no defeat in war, and despite the fact that the state faced no financial crisis and no peasant insurrections, where does all this leave the usual generalizations about revolutions? Mostly in the pits. War has been called the midwife of revolution, and peasant insurrections are considered indispensable in many currently fashionable theories of revolution.[12] The inferences we can draw from the case of Iran are as follows: financial and fiscal crises—or, for that matter, the extractive capacity of the state and heavy taxation—are not necessary for the occurrence of revolution. It is possible for the societal structure of domination to collapse without the participation of the peasantry; and a major war or defeat of the army are not necessary preconditions of revolution. I will show how a political order may collapse without any of these conditions. For now, let us merely note that the Cuban Revolution was an instance of a revolution without a rebellion of the peasantry and without a major defeat in war. Skocpol, whose theory of revolution puts a great deal of emphasis on both these allegedly necessary conditions, cavalierly dismisses Cuba in half a footnote. Furthermore, she does not face the theoretical consequences of the

[9] Gary Sick, *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran* (New York: Random House, 1985), 142-43.

[10] Tilly (fn. 2), 20.

[11] Sullivan (fn. 7), 199-247.

[12] Skocpol (fn. 2), chap. 3 and p. 286; Walter L. Goldfrank, "Theories of Revolution and Revolution Without Theory: The Case of Mexico," *Theory and Society* 7 (No. 3, 1979), 153; Zimmermann (fn. 2), 315, 322, 336-42, 352-57.

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absence of these factors in her subsequent article about the Iranian Revolution. She is rightly determined to bring the state into the picture, but does so in an unsatisfactory way, largely by deploying a new pet phrase, "the rentier state." The basic idea is misleading in that the "rentier state" was actually created by Reza Shah from the early 1920s to 1941, when the revenue received by the state from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was in fact small—some 10 to 15 percent of government revenue, and minuscule compared to the oil revenue in the 1970s. She musters a modicum of other plausible but *ad hoc* subsidiary themes to account for the Iranian Revolution. However, Skocpol never faces up to the problem of reconciling the Iranian Revolution with her theoretical schema of 1979.[13]

One generalization is borne out by the revolution in Iran:[14] the Shah was seriously compromised by his close and subservient association with the United States, and the American military and economic presence and the presence of a large European work force acted as a major stimulus to mass mobilization. The antiforeign motive in challenging the legitimacy of the societal structure of domination finds parallels in the English, the French, the Russian, the Chinese, and the Cuban revolutions, and in East European fascism.

B. THE STATE, THE HIEROCRACY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN SHI'ITE IRAN

It would be a mistake to equate the societal structure of domination with the state alone. For Max Weber, its major components were the state *and* the church. He defined the two institutions of legitimate authority analogously, and took care to analyze the relationship between the church and civil society when appropriate.[15] This point is significant because the unique feature of Iran's Islamic Revolution is that it is a crucial stage in the conflict between hierocracy and state, while at the same time being a modern political revolution. It is a composite of two phenomena whose counterparts in Western history are separated by centuries. The absolutist states of Europe had already won the protracted contest with the Roman Church before the coming of the early modern European revolutions.[16] In the history of Iran, the analogous contest

[13] Skocpol (fn. 2), 318, n. 2; Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society* 11 (No. 3, 1982), 265-304. On the Cuban Revolution, see John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), chap. 8.

[14] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 304-06.

[15] Weber, *Economy and Society* (2 vols.), ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), I, pp. 54-56 and II, chap. 15.

[16] Otto Hintze, "The State in Historical Perspective," in Reinhard Bendix and others,

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between the state and the hierocracy occurred much later. Shi'ism was declared the state religion of Iran in 1501, but the hierocracy remained heteronomous and subordinate to the state for a long time, consolidating its power and autonomy only at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. The curtailment of the power of the hierocracy and the appropriation of many of its prerogatives and functions by the state took place in the 20th century. The Shi'ite religious authorities were and remained doctrinally and institutionally independent of the state, however: they retained their autonomous religious authority as well as their control over appreciable resources independent of the state bureaucracy.[17]

The Western revolutions were directed against state *and* church. The church had been anglicized in England, gallicized in France, and disestablished by Peter the Great in Russia; in all instances, it was an integral part of the monarchical regime. In the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the entire beleaguered Shi'ite hierocracy rose against the state. (This was partly due to the Shah's fateful ineptitude in not splitting the Shi'ite hierocracy in time; there is now evidence that some of the grand ayatollahs were ready for a compromise by the summer of 1978, and a split did in fact occur after the revolution.)

For analytical reasons, too, it is important to conceive of the societal structure of domination in more inclusive terms. Revolutionary situations occur because of the disintegration of central authority. With the disintegration of the authority of the state, other elements of the societal structure of domination assume greater importance. Corporations and individuals with authority in other spheres of life can extend their authority to the political sphere and assume positions of leadership. In such situations, they emerge as "natural leaders" of the people. The hierocracy and men of religion can use their traditional authority in this fashion, and have often done so—for instance, in Spanish history.[18] In

eds., *State and Society: A Reader in Comparative Political Sociology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, *The Sociology of the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 63, 110-11.

[17] Said A. Arjomand, *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

[18] We encounter this kind of situation in rebellions in Castile in 1520, where Franciscan and Dominican monks figured prominently among the leaders of the Comuneros. Similarly, as the president of the Catalan Diputacio, the priest Pau Claris assumed the leading position in the rebellion of the summer of 1640. When the Spanish people rose against Napoleon in 1808 without any king or government, they were led by the church—priests and monks. See Gerald Brenan, *The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1943), 42; Perez Zagorin, *Rebels and Rulers, 1500-1660* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), I, pp. 266-67.

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Iran, many of the high-ranking members of the Shi'ite hierocracy led the popular opposition to the monarch during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1906. In 1978, many groups and individuals who wanted the Shah out but had no interest whatsoever in a theocracy accepted Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership.

The centralization of the state necessitates the concentration of economic, coercive, and symbolic resources. It entails encroachments upon local and provincial privileges as well as fiscal and constitutional immunities; and it entails the dispossession of certain privileged social groups. It thus sets in motion an intense and continuous political struggle. The reaction of privileged groups and of autonomous centers of power against the expansion and centralization of the state is a major source of most if not all of the early modern European revolutions:[19] the revolt of the Comuneros of the cities of Castile against Charles V in 1520; the revolt of the Netherlands in reaction to the centralizing policies of Philip II in the 1560s; the French Civil War of the 16th century; the revolt of the Catalans once Olivares had consigned their "constitutions" to the devil, and of Portugal in 1640; the early phase of the English Revolution;[20] and the Fronde and the aristocratic pre-revolution of 1787-1788 in France.[21] In all these cases, estates and corporations reacted when their autonomy and inherited privileges were threatened by the state; and they usually found men of religion as their allies. The dispossessed or debt-ridden nobility of the Netherlands, for instance, found allies in Calvinist preachers and iconoclasts.[22] In the Iran of the 1970s, the preachers and the chief dispossessed solidary group capable of reaction were the same group.

Three major privileged social groups were victims of the centralization of the state under the Pahlavis. The first consisted of the tribal chiefs. The pacification campaigns of Reza Khan (later to become Reza Shah) in 1921-1925 broke the power of the tribal chiefs and eliminated many of them physically,[23] even though resistance in the most peripheral areas such as Luristan continued until the early 1930s. The land and property registry law of 1922 converted the surviving tribal chiefs into big land-

[19] Eisenstadt (fn. 5); Baechler (fn. 3), 139; Goldstone (fn. 5), 194-95.

[20] By 1640, the English Crown had alienated a large segment of the elite which included, notably, the proponents of aristocratic constitutionalism and the rising local landed gentry who resisted its increasingly statist policies. See Lawrence Stone, *The Causes of the English Revolution* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 30, 57, 92, 124.

[21] De Tocqueville (fn. 4); Alfred Cobban, *Aspects of the French Revolution* (New York: Norton, 1968); Zagorin (fn. 18).

[22] *Ibid.*, II, p. 94.

[23] Richard Tapper, Introduction to *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 26-28.

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lords.[24] As such, they became members of the city-dwelling, landowning upper class, and, as individuals, many of them entered the Pahlavi political elite.

The Shi'ite hierocracy was next to come under fierce attack by the centralizing Pahlavi state. Under Reza Shah, the state deprived it of all its judiciary functions, eliminated its prebendal, fiscal, and social privileges, and greatly reduced its control over education and over religious endowments. In the face of Reza Shah's determination and severity, it did not react in any significant fashion.

Reza Shah had reached an accommodation with the class of big landlords, "the thousand families," who predominated in the Iranian parliament (Majlis) until 1960. It was during the first—and only genuine—stage of Mohammad Reza Shah's land reform in 1962 and 1963 that the landowning "thousand families," including the tribal chiefs, were liquidated as a class. Once the Majlis was dissolved, the "feudal" landowning class had no autonomous institutional basis and could not react against its complete political and partial economic dispossession by the state. Though many of its members retained large holdings of land and became mechanized commercial farmers, thus joining the petro-bourgeoisie, and though many of them remained in the Pahlavi political elite, the traditional peasant-landlord relationship, which was the power basis of the landowning class and accounted for its prominence in the Majlis, had undoubtedly been destroyed.[25]

Relations between the hierocracy and the monarchy had improved after the resignation of Reza Shah—especially in the late 1940s and 1950s, when the monarchy was weak and the hierocracy was alarmed by the threat of communism. The state resumed its aggressive posture in the 1960s and 1970s, this time encroaching upon the religious sphere in the strict sense.[26] In contrast to the landowning class, the partially dispossessed Shi'ite clerical estate did have an autonomous institutional basis. It could react to the expansion of the state, and eventually did.

In the political struggle set in motion by the centralization and mod-

[24] Ann K.S. Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), chap. 15.

[25] Ahmad Ashraf "Dehqanan, Zamin va Enqelab" [The Peasantry, Land and Revolution], in *Kitab-e Agah* (1982/136), 1, 11-12; Eric Hooglund, *Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 79, 81; Ann K.S. Lambton, "Land and Revolution in Iran" (Review Article), *Iranian Studies* 17 (No. 1, 1984), 76-77. The destruction of the peasant-landlord relationship was completed in the 1960s, during the second and third phases of the reform, with the schemes for division of land between peasants and landlords. Though the redistributive effect of these phases was negligible, their sociopolitical effect in breaking the traditional links between peasants and landlords was profound.

[26] Said A. Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran," *Government and Opposition* 16 (Summer 1981), 293-316.

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ernization of the state, the dispossessed social groups that retain an institutional basis for reacting against the expanding state still need to create *coalitions* with other social groups and classes if they are to succeed. In the early 1960s, elements from the hierocracy, the landlords, and the tribal chiefs made poorly coordinated attempts to forge a coalition, but the separate uprisings of Khomeini's followers and the Qashqa'i and Boyr Ahmad tribes of Fars in 1963 were ruthlessly suppressed.[27] In 1978, when an effective coalition did come into being, it carried out a revolution.

Because of their common hatred of the Shah, the revolutionary coalition of 1978 included the bulk of Iran's urban population. The peasantry did not play a role in the Islamic Revolution, and neither did the industrial working class. All other segments of the population actively opposed the Shah and accepted Khomeini's revolutionary leadership. The two most important coalition partners of the militant clerics consisted of the new middle class—government employees, school teachers, the intelligentsia, and the white-collar workers in the service sector—and the traditional bourgeoisie of the bazaar.

The coalition between the Shi'ite clerics and the new middle class was highly unstable. It rested on fraudulent silence on the part of the former and on wishful self-delusion on the part of the latter. It did not last long: having ejected the Shah, Khomeini lost no time in liquidating the Westernized intelligentsia.

The coalition between the revolutionary clerics and the traditional bourgeoisie, on the other hand, rested on more tangible grievances on both sides and on a more solid historical basis. It has been more enduring. It is the latest instance of the alliance of the mosque and the bazaar, and resembles the alliance of the urban bourgeoisie and the church in the 11th and 12th centuries in Western Christendom. It was forged in the late 1970s, under the immediate impact of the Shah's destruction of the seminaries in Mashad and his massive antiprofiteering campaign against the bazaar merchants and retailers.[28]

Why did the new middle class lose out? History could have gone the other way—as it did in the case of Nasser's temporary coalition with the Muslim Brothers who had wide popular support and were in some ways much better organized than the mullahs. In 20th-century Iran, the

[27] Ann K.S. Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 102-13; Tapper (fn. 23), 29.

[28] According to Bakhash, 8,000 shopkeepers were jailed and as many as 250,000 fined during this campaign in 1975 and 1976. Shaul Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 13. The last figure seems too high.

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centralizing state had atomized society to a considerable degree. It had detached the tribal chiefs and dissolved the landowning class; and it had created an intelligentsia, a bureaucratic class, a body of army officers and, lately, an industrial/entrepreneurial group; all of these were unattached to any solidary social community, be it a tribe, an estate, or a corporation. In partial contradistinction to prerevolutionary France, however, three elements of the old civil society had escaped the atomization of Iranian society: the Shi'ite clerical estate; the bazaar and traditional bourgeoisie; and urban communities in certain older city quarters that were dominated by the previous group. To these, one should add the new urban communities created by chain migration from rural areas and small towns into the larger cities. It is not surprising, then, that the atomized new middle class proved to be the proverbial Marxian "sack of potatoes" while the other solidary social groups in the coalition were capable of remarkably concerted political action, and soon took over.[29]

The Shah had kept the new middle class under constant supervision by the secret police and had not allowed it to form associations or to gain any political experience. Moreover, its ability to act was seriously impaired because the army officers were isolated from the rest of its elements. Thus, the political representatives of the new middle class could not easily form a coalition with the army, which was too closely identified with the Shah and his regime. They therefore decided to form a coalition with the Shi'ite hierocracy.

According to Tilly, contenders who are in danger of losing their place in a polity are especially disposed to "reactive" collective action. He rightly observes that for centuries the principal form of collective action followed a "reactionary" pattern—i.e., it was "reactive" and "communal." Thanks to social evolution, however, that is no longer the case, and collective action has become predominantly "proactive" in modern times.[30] This conceptual distinction seems of dubious value: a whole set of revolutions analyzed in this paper are both "reactive" and "proactive."

[29] It is interesting to compare the heterogeneity and lack of cohesiveness of Iran's new middle class with the same features associated with its Western counterpart, which Gouldner erroneously portrays as a new class in the Marxian schema. Alvin Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (New York: Seabury, 1979).

[30] Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, III: *Macropolitical Theory* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 507-10. It is highly revealing that the period identified by Tilly as marking the transition from traditional to modern forms of collective action, the mid-19th century, coincided with the *end* of the classic age of revolutions. Charles Tilly, "How Protest Modernized in France, 1845-1855," in William O. Aydelotte, Allan G. Bogue, and Robert Fogel, eds., *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

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In reality, collective action that Tilly had typified as "reactive" does not lose its importance after the middle of the 19th century; and it usually continues to draw on communal traditional solidarities. Whenever these communal solidarities are class solidarities, they pertain not to rising but to *declining* or threatened social classes. The Islamic Revolution in Iran alerts us to the undeniable importance of reactive action in the revolutionary movements of the last two centuries, including those that Marx took to be revolutions of rising classes.

Fascinating evidence for the importance of reactive action and traditional communal solidarities in revolutionary movements has recently come to light; it concerns the very groups who inspired Marx with the theory of revolution that has distorted our understanding of the phenomenon for over a century. The myth of the middle class in the English and the French Revolutions has long been exploded, notably by Hexter and Cobban. Trevor-Roper's characterization of the English Revolution as the declining "mere gentry's" revolution of despair contains an element of truth, but also much exaggeration.[31] On the other hand, we now know that the revolutionaries of 1789 were *not* the capitalist bourgeoisie,[32] and that the revolutionaries of the first decades of the 19th century in England and of 1848 were *not* the industrial working class. The English revolutionary working class of that time in fact consisted of the artisans and craftsmen who were threatened by capitalist industrialization and were holding on to the memory of the golden age of a community of small producers based on mutual ties and cooperation.[33] A recent study of these "reactionary radicals," as one observer calls them, concludes that "commitment to traditional cultural values and immediate communal relations are crucial to many radical movements." Communal relations are seen to be important resources for mobilization as they enable traditional communities to remain mobilized for a long time and in the face of considerable privation.[34] Shopkeepers and artisans predominated in the French insurrections of the 1830s.[35] The same group of artisans reacting against industrial capitalism and proletarization, who

[31] For an assessment of Trevor-Roper's idea, see J. H. Hexter, *Reappraisals in History*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 129-31.

[32] Alfred Cobban, *Social Interpretations of the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964); Jack A. Goldstone, "Reinterpreting the French Revolution," *Theory and Society* 13 (September 1984).

[33] Krishan Kumar, "Class and Political Action in Nineteenth-Century England: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives," *European Journal of Sociology* 24 (No. 1, 1983).

[34] Craig J. Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition: Community Strength or Venerable Disguise and Borrowed Language?" *American Journal of Sociology* 88 (No. 5, 1983), 886, 897, 908.

[35] Tilly (fn. 30, 1972), cited in Zimmermann (fn. 2), 374-75.

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drew their standards and idiom of protest from the past, constituted the backbone of the 1848 revolutions in France and Germany. In France, the journeymen's brotherhoods which perpetuated the traditional corporate consciousness and solidarities of the *ancien régime* constituted the leading revolutionary element in 1848. In Germany, artisan groups were prominent in the revolutionary movement of 1848 while the proletariat was the most quiescent of all social entities.[36]

"Reactionary radicals," concludes Calhoun, "have seldom, if ever, been able to gain supremacy in revolutions. But at the same time, revolutions worthy of the name have never been made without them."[37] With the Islamic Revolution, a group of reactionary radicals under the leadership of the custodians of the Shi'ite tradition have at last gained supremacy in what is theoretically the most interesting of modern revolutions.

Let us move on to consider some movements that Marx did not study. First, there are the peasant rebellions. Generally speaking, the Islamic Revolution has this in common with peasant rebellions: it draws on corporate solidarities and communal and kinship ties, and consequently has many conservative and defensive features.[38] In Mexico, there was the massive peasant rebellion of 1810 led by Father Hidalgo and Father Morelos, both parish priests.[39] In Spain, the Carlists' aim in the 1830s has been described as the "restoration of 'monkish democracy' ": the clergy led the prosperous Basque and Aragonese yeomanry in rising to defend their local autonomy and their *fueros* against the centralizing policy of the Bourbon government.[40] In the present century, there was the revolt of Zapata in defense of the local autonomy of traditional agrarian communities against the expanding *haciendas* in Mexico. Thanks to the devout Zapatistas (laws of 1915 and 1917) and to Cárdenas (1934-1940), the Mexican Revolution established the security of the *ejido*—community-owned, inalienable individual or communal holdings in the villages. It should be added that the outcome of the Mexican Revolution would have been much less secularist and more conservative if the Cristero movement, organized by priests and lay Catholics in reaction to the anticlerical policies of central government, with the motto

[36] William H. Sewell, Jr., *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Barrington Moore, *Injustice: The Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), 126, 127.

[37] Calhoun (fn. 34), 911.

[38] Georges Lefebvre, "La Révolution française et les paysans [The French Revolution and the peasants], in *Études sur la Révolution française* (Presses Universitaires de France, 1954 [1933]), 250, 254; Tilly (fn. 30, 1975), 498; Zimmermann (fn. 2).

[39] Dunn (fn. 13), 52-53.

[40] Brenan (fn. 18), 206-11, 213, note A. In the Second Carlist War (1870-1876), monks and priests again led the guerrilla bands.

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Viva Cristo Rey (Long live Christ the King), had succeeded in 1927-1928.[41]

The pernicious idea that fascism was a movement of the petty bourgeois class has finally been laid to rest.[42] The petty bourgeoisie was somewhat overrepresented in most fascist movements, and it is undoubtedly overrepresented in the Islamic movement in Iran. But it is overrepresented in all sorts of radical movements. We find the "little people," the "*menus peuple*," in the religious riots in 16th-century France on both sides.[43] We find them among the stormers of the Bastille[44] and, as we have just seen, we find them among the 19th-century radicals who, for E. P. Thompson, *made* the English working class. Recent studies clearly show that fascist parties were supported by elements from *all* social groups, but especially the dislocated, the dispossessed, and the declassed. What is more to the point (and not disputed) is that the *leadership* of the fascist movements came disproportionately from the *declassé* and the dispossessed, from demobilized army officers, from displaced or unemployed bureaucrats (especially those dislocated by the redrawing of national boundaries), and from the occasional dispossessed aristocrat. The Nazis also did not fail to tap the traditional communal solidarities of the Protestant countryside.[45]

European fascism and the Islamic movement in Iran are similar in that they were led by dispossessed elements. But there are two important differences. First, the fascist leaders were a heterogeneous group, whereas Khomeini's militant clerics form a homogeneous solidary group. Second, the fascist leaders did not have exclusive control over any cultural assets, and had to get their ideas where they could find them. The Shi'ite hierocracy consisted of the custodians of a rich religious tradition. The consequences of these differences will become apparent presently.

[41] Dunn (fn. 13), 49, 64-69; François Chevalier, "The *Ejido* and Political Stability in Mexico," in Claudio Veliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 161-69; Guenter Lewy, *Religion and Revolution* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), chap. 16; Alistair Hennessy, "Fascism and Populism in Latin America," in Walter Laqueur, ed., *Fascism: A Reader's Guide* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 280.

[42] Stein U. Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan P. Myklebust, *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980); Richard F. Hamilton, *Who Voted for Hitler?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

[43] Natalie Z. Davis, "Religious Riots in Sixteenth-Century France," *Past and Present* 59 (1973), 85-86.

[44] George Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), cited in Zimmermann (fn. 2), 387.

[45] Francis L. Carsten, "Interpretations of Fascism," in Laqueur (fn. 41), 416-19; Juan J. Linz, "Some Notes Towards a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective," *ibid.*, 38-39; Peter H. Merkl, "Comparing the Fascist Movements," in Larsen and others (fn. 42), 764, 789; Miklós Lackó, "The Social Roots of Hungarian Fascism: The Arrow Cross," *ibid.*, 395-96; Hamilton (fn. 42), esp. 444-55.

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C. INTEGRATIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS REACTIONS TO SOCIAL DISLOCATION

We can now turn to the preconditions of revolution—the social dislocation and moral disturbance that follow rapid social change. Let us begin with normative disturbance at the most superficial level.

The conspicuous consumption on the part of Iranian high society and the abundance of *nouveaux riches* produced an acute sense of relative deprivation among the new middle-class government employees, white-collar workers in the private sector, and schoolteachers. At times, there was the added discomfort of absolute deprivation, which resulted from an acute housing shortage that was aggravated by the influx of a sizable foreign work force and American advisers.

In this context, it would be valid to speak of the widespread discontent of 1977-1978 as a confirmation of Davies's J-curve of continuous rising expectations and sudden frustrations.[46] Iran's GNP grew by 30.3 percent in 1973-1974 and by a further 42 percent in 1974-1975. Then came the economic debacle—despite, or rather because of, the massive unregulated inflow of oil revenue. Severe bottlenecks in skilled manpower and infrastructure halted economic growth in 1976.[47] The problem was more deep-rooted, however. What underlay the widespread desire for revolutionary change was a fundamental disorientation and *anomie* more than a superficial and short-run frustration of material expectation. As Durkheim has pointed out, "crises of prosperity" generate disorientation by disturbing the collective normative order.[48] There can be no doubt about the tremendous confusion and disorder created by the massive inflow of petrodollars, just as there can be little doubt about similar confusions in Nigeria and Mexico today. The consequent sense of moral disorder and desire for the reaffirmation of absolute standards should not be minimized. There was a widespread cultural malaise throughout Iranian society, ranging from general confusion and disorientation on the part of the *nouveaux riches* to sharply focused and intense rejection of foreign and antireligious cultural influences on the part of the mullahs and the merchants of the bazaar.

In Europe, the socialist and fascist mass movements were part of the extraordinary wave of mass political mobilization and national integration that swept the continent in the early decades of the 20th century.[49]

[46] James C. Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 27 (No. 1, 1962).

[47] Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (London: Croom Helm, 1978).

[48] Emile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951 [1897]).

[49] Merkl (fn. 45), 760-62.

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It is easy to recognize that these movements acted as vehicles for the integration of the recently mobilized masses into societal community. But one should not forget that religious movements have often performed the same function in the past.

Political mobilization comes about as a result of basic social change which also entails considerable social dislocation. Social change displaces a large number of persons from the strata into which they were born. These persons yearn for and demand inclusion in new forms of societal community. Religious movements and sects are age-old channels for the reintegration of such dislocated individuals. Political movements and parties are the new channels for societal reintegration. The Islamic Revolution demonstrates that the old and the new can combine.

Urbanization and the expansion of higher education in the two decades preceding the revolution are the two dimensions of rapid social change most relevant to the problem. Between 1956 and 1976, the urban population of Iran increased from 31 percent to 47 percent (from 6 to 16 million). Rural-urban migration accounts for a substantial proportion of this shift—over one-third for the decade 1966-1976, the rate being even higher for Tehran. This decade also witnessed an unprecedented expansion of higher education. The number of persons with higher education quadrupled (to about 300,000) and the enrollment in universities and professional schools in Iran trebled (to about 150,000). These factors contributed significantly to the rise of the Islamic movement. Thousands of religious associations spontaneously came into being in cities and in universities, and acted as the mechanism for the social integration of a significant proportion of the migrants into the cities and of the first-generation university students.[50] By contrast, the Shah's parallel attempt to integrate these same groups into his one-party political system proved to be a fiasco.

There is nothing new about dislocated, uprooted men and women finding new moorings in religious associations, sects, and revivalist movements. In England, for instance, many "masterless" men became sectaries in the 16th and 17th centuries.[51] As early as the 1570s, Presbyterian classes were attended by laymen, but it is in the 1620s and 1630s that Puritan lectureships took root in towns to an astonishing degree, to the dismay of the Anglican Church. Laymen became patrons and paymasters of the Puritan lecturers, and the congregations clustering around the latter became "models for ideological party organization."[52] The situation

[50] Arjomand (fn. 26).

[51] Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down* (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1975), 45-48.

[52] Stone (fn. 20), 103, 120-21.

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strongly resembles the growth of lay religious associations in Iran in the 1960s and especially the 1970s, where the mullahs preached—at first in person but later, when demand outstripped supply, through cassette players—to avid audiences of urbanites. We find an even closer parallel in the rise of Methodism. In the 18th and early 19th centuries, migrants into the new industrial towns of England flocked to the assemblies of the Methodist preachers. Here, the perspective of integration into societal community brings out the sociological cogency of Halevy's famous thesis: the Methodist Revival integrated the recently urbanized masses into societal community and thus prevented a political revolution in England.[53]

Fascism, too, acted as the vehicle of integration of rural-urban migrants into societal community. In Germany, for instance, "many of the new urbanites failed to complete their cultural adjustment to city life and instead remained curiously vulnerable to the agrarian romanticism of *völkisch* ideologues."[54] One-half of the top Nazi party leaders were born in large villages.[55]

Literacy and Puritanism went hand-in-hand. The same is true of the growth of Islamic scripturalism. Islamic fundamentalism spread in Iranian universities just as Puritanism had spread at Oxford and Cambridge.[56] Many of the Islamic activists of the 1970s, who currently form the lay second stratum of the Islamic regime, discovered "the true Islam" in university associations, just as Cromwell was reborn at Cambridge. Fascism spread at European universities in a parallel fashion. In Eastern Europe in particular, university students and young activists constituted the core of the fascist parties and their leadership. Rumanian fascism is of particular interest in this respect. In the early 1920s, its leaders, Codreanu and Mota, were founders of university associations for Christian reform and national revival in the universities of Iasi and Cluj, respectively.[57]

The *combination* of higher education and social dislocation is of particular importance for explaining the politicization of integrative movements. The key to the social composition of Islamic and university

[53] Elie Halévy, *The Birth of Methodism in England*, trans. and with an introduction by Bernard Semmel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

[54] Merkl (fn. 45), 757.

[55] Linz (fn. 45), 50.

[56] Stone (fn. 20), 96-97; Michael Walzer, *The Revolutions of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 140-43.

[57] Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, 3d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1956), 44; Carsten (fn. 45), 418; Linz (fn. 45), 48-59; Juan J. Linz, "Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer," in Larsen and others (fn. 42), 167; Zeev Barbu, "Psycho-Historical and Sociological Perspective on the Iron Guard, the Fascist Movement of Romania," *ibid.*, 385-87.

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activists of the 1970s is that they either moved from small towns to big cities to go to universities, or they were the first generation from traditional lower middle-class backgrounds to attend universities, or both.[58] These young men contributed to the revolutionary politicization of the Islamic revival of the 1960s and 1970s in the same way in which the educated country gentlemen in England had contributed to the revolutionary politicization of Puritanism. The parallel with Rumanian fascism is even more striking. As the last Iron Guard leader, Sima, put it, "in 1926-27, our universities were flooded by a big wave of young people of peasant origin ... who brought with them a robust national consciousness and were thus destroying the last strongholds of foreign spirit in our universities."[59] According to Eugen Weber, "legionary leadership came from the provincial, only just urbanized intelligentsia: sons or grandsons of peasants, schoolteachers, and priests."[60]

Max Weber once remarked that with the advent of modern mass politics, the condition of clerical domination itself changes. "Hierocracy has no choice but to establish a party organization and to use demagogic means, just like all other parties."[61] Rapid urbanization and the Shah's failure to integrate uprooted elements—especially the socially mobile, newly educated elements—into his political system offered Khomeini and the cornered Shi'ite hierocracy an unparalleled opportunity for creating a politicized revolutionary mass movement. Using the organizational network of the lay religious associations and Islamic university students, the mullahs periodically organized the massive anti-Shah demonstrations and closures of the bazaar which amounted to a general strike of unprecedented duration. Perhaps they could even have brought down a stronger regime; we will never know. What is certain is that the clerically led general strike did bring down the fragile Pahlavi regime and its vacillating ruler.

D. THE POLITICAL AND MORAL MOTIVES OF THE SUPPORTERS OF REVOLUTION AND THE MINOR SIGNIFICANCE OF CLASS INTEREST

Political motive may be defined as the motive to retain or recover political and institutional assets threatened or expropriated, and to gain political power by membership in, and maximally, control of, political society. On the negative side, the moral motive for supporting a revo-

[58] Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, "State and Social Classes and Modes of Mobilization in the Iranian Revolution," *State, Culture and Society* 1 (No. 3, 1985).

[59] Barbu (fn. 57), 392.

[60] Eugen Weber, "The Men of the Archangel," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1 (No. 1, 1966), 107.

[61] Max Weber (fn. 15), II, p. 1195.

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lution may stem from the condemnation of a regime because it is unjust, because it is servile to foreign powers, or because it is instrumental in spreading an alien culture and undermining authentic traditional cultural and religious values. The moral condemnation of the regime as unjust may, in turn, be due to its being perceived as tyrannical, or it may be due to a sense of relative deprivation. On the positive side, the moral motive for supporting the revolution may result from the acceptance of the modern myth of revolution as a redemptive collective act. Finally, class interest can act as a motive for supporting the revolution if the economic interests of a class (so defined by virtue of their position in the mode or system of production) are protected or furthered thereby. With this schema, let us examine the motives that can plausibly be attributed to the social groups who supported the revolution against the Shah.

Political and moral motives are closely intertwined in the attitude of Shi'ite hierocracy. The primary material interest of the clerical leaders was to regain the prerogatives and functions they had lost as a result of the centralization and modernization of the state. This was true of the leading clerical militants who came from traditional urban backgrounds, were in their forties or fifties at the time of the revolution, and had a keen awareness of the dispossessions of the Shi'ite hierocracy by the Pahlavi state. The younger militant clerics, who were primarily drawn from humbler rural and small-town backgrounds, saw all avenues of upward social mobility for people in their profession blocked under the Pahlavis.[62] They expected an Islamic government to guarantee them rapid social ascent and full incorporation into the political system.

Both the clerical leaders and the militant seminarians were morally indignant at the spread of immorality, libertinism, and an alien culture under the Pahlavi regime. In a significant statement, Khomeini's son identified the conservative members of the Shi'ite hierocracy who supported the revolution against the Shah as persons whose motivation was exclusively moral.[63]

The political and moral motives are also entwined for the intensely politicized lay Islamic activists. These first-generation provincial and lower middle-class university students and graduates, mostly in the applied sciences and engineering, saw themselves barred from the Westernized upper echelons of society and high government positions. They,

[62] Michael M.J. Fischer, *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

[63] Quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," *Middle East Research and Information Project* 87 (May 1980), 26.

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too, were motivated by the desire to remove these barriers to their upward social mobility. It would be absurd to attribute any class interest to this young "petty bourgeois" group other than the desire to gain power and entry into the political system, to move up on the social ladder, and to put an end to a cultural climate they found alien and resented deeply.

The motives of the new middle class were both political and moral. Many of its members—including the recently mobilized middle-class women who figured prominently in the anti-Shah demonstrations—wanted inclusion in the political society. They considered the Pahlavi regime tyrannical and unjust, and accepted the myth of revolution. It should be noted, however, that the potency of the political myth of revolution caused the new middle class, especially the women, to join the Islamic revolutionary movement against their class interests—indeed suicidally.[64]

The traditional bourgeoisie—the merchants of the bazaar, the petty bourgeoisie of distributive trades, and the craftsmen of the bazaar guilds—was the one social group for which class interest was the primary motive for overthrowing the Shah. These groups felt threatened by the developmental economic policies of the state which, among other things, excluded them from easy access to credit; they also feared the encroachment of the modern sector of the economy on their territory in the form of competing machine-made goods and new distributive networks of supermarkets and chain stores. To this motivating class interest was added a sense of relative deprivation caused by the tremendous gains made by court-connected industrialists, as well as considerable moral indignation caused by the disregard of Islam and traditional values under foreign cultural influence.

II. The Teleology of the Islamic Revolution

A. Moral Rigorism and the Search for Cultural Authenticity

The fact that integrative social movements are reactions to social dislocation and normative disorder explains the salience of their search for cultural authenticity and their moral rigorism.

[64] It was neither the first nor the last time that a social class participated in a revolution which did not further its interests. As Barrington Moore has pointed out, peasants have often been the principal victims of modernization brought about by communist governments they helped create by their participation in revolutionary movements. See Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 428-29; also see Zimmermann (fn. 2), 339-41, 356. Similarly, the outcome of the French Revolution was not especially favorable to the *petite bourgeoisie*, the *sans-culottes*, who most vigorously participated in it. *Ibid.*, 387, 407.

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"Fascism was a revolution, but one which thought of itself in cultural, not economic terms."[65] The same is true of the Islamic Revolution, which emphatically saw itself in these terms—even when not explicitly so, as in the "Islamic cultural revolution" against Westernism and (Eastern) atheistic communism inaugurated with the closing of the universities in April 1980. Since the revolution, Iran's secular judiciary sytem has been systematically Islamicized, the Shi'ite Sacred Law has been codified for the first time in history, and Islamic morals and coverage of women are strictly enforced by an especially created official vigilante corps.

Disoriented and dislocated individuals and groups cannot be successfully integrated into a societal community without the creation or "revitalization" of a moral order.[66] Walzer emphasizes that Puritanism was primarily a "response to the *dis*order of the transition period."[67] Ranulf has correctly underscored the moral rigorism of Nazism and compared it to Puritanism.[68] The intense and repressive moralism of the Islamic revolutionaries in reaction to the moral laxity and disorder of Pahlavi Iran finds a strict parallel in Puritan moralism in reaction to the moral laxity and sensuality of the Renaissance culture, and in Nazi moralism in reaction to the decadence of the Weimar period. Furthermore, the parochial rejection of cosmopolitanism is a common feature of the Islamic Revolution and Nazism, and especially of Eastern European fascism.[69] The vehement rejection of cultural Westernism in favor of revitalized Christianity in Rumania and Hungary finds a counterpart in Khomeini's more systematic and successful determination to extirpate Western cultural pollution by establishing an Islamic moral order.

B. THE REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ITS ADOPTION BY LATECOMERS

The revolutions of early modern Europe were made by men for whom restoration was the key word, and who "were obsessed by *renovation*—by the desire to return to an old order of society." The confused teleology of these revolutions was marked by an *absence of ideology* and by a corporate or national constitutionalism "which was mainly the preserve of the dominant social and vocational groups."[70] In the English Revo-

[65] George L. Mosse, "The Genesis of Fascism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1 (No. 1, 1966), 22.

[66] Anthony F.C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements: Some Theoretical Considerations for their Comparative Study," *American Anthropologist* 58 (April 1956).

[67] Walzer (fn. 56), 313, 315.

[68] Svend Ranulf, *Moral Indignation and Middle Class Psychology* (New York: Schocken, 1964 [1938]).

[69] Eugen Weber, "Rumania," in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., *The European Right: A Historical Profile* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); Istvan Deak, "Hungary," *ibid.*, 394; Barbu (fn. 57).

[70] John Elliott, "Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe," *Past and Present* 42 (1969), 42-44, 48.

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lution, "with the nature, source, and grounds of political legitimacy all up for grabs, there was almost inevitably a great effusion of claims to legitimacy on all sorts of grounds, old and new."[71] Nevertheless, two elements predominate in the teleology of the English Revolution: parliamentarianism, and Puritanism and its offshoots.

If the French Revolution instituted one thing for all subsequent revolutions, it is the presence of ideology. It gave birth to Jacobinism as the classic form of modern revolutionary ideology. The ideas of constitutional representation and national sovereignty were coupled at the beginning. As the revolution progressed, however, the source of legitimacy drifted from the representation of estates to the symbolic embodiment of the will of the people. The claim to embody the will of the nation as a single homogeneous entity could only be made through the manipulation of the maximalist language of consensus. Presumed embodiments of the will of the people became the sole and sufficient basis of legitimacy. During the period of Jacobin ascendancy, revolutionary legitimacy triumphed; and with its triumph, revolutionary ideology "filled the entire sphere of power" and "became coextensive with government itself."[72] The distillation of the Jacobin experiment was the modern political myth of revolution. Revolutionary legitimacy became an autonomous and self-sufficient category.

In the 19th century, revolutions became "milestones in humanity's inexorable march toward true freedom and true universality."[73] Leninism combined this conception of revolution with the Jacobin myth; it has become the justification for the seizure of power by revolutionaries who proclaim themselves in charge of realizing the next stage of sociohistorical development.[74] With the consolidation of Marxism-Leninism in Russia, Leninist revolutionary ideology "obtained control over the interpretation of world history."[75] It is this control that is challenged by the fascist and the Islamic revolutionaries even while they are upholding, like the Bolsheviks, the myth of revolution as an act of redemption and liberation of oppressed masses and nations.

Both fascism and the Islamic revolutionary movement are latecomers to the modern international political scene. As such, they share a number of essential features. The foremost of these is the appropriation of the

[71] Hexter (fn. 31), 178.

[72] François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, trans. by Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp. 29, 48-49, 70-74.

[73] Eugen Kamenka, "The Concept of Political Revolution," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Revolution: Nomos VIII* (New York: Atherton, 1966), 126.

[74] Dunn (fn. 13), 8-11.

[75] Jules Monnerot, *Sociology and Psychology in Communism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960 [1949]), 12.

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legitimatory political myth of revolution. The Italian fascists boasted of their "revolutionary intransigence," and the Nazis contrasted their revolution, the revolution of the German *Volk*, to the "subhuman revolution" of 1789.[76] Similarly, Iran's revolutionaries take great pride in the historic mission of the Islamic Revolution.

"Economics was indeed one of the least important fascist considerations."[77] The same is true of the Islamic Revolution. (Khomeini, responding to complaints about the state of the economy, once remarked, "we did not make the Islamic Revolution so the Persian melon would be cheap.") Furthermore, like the European fascists, the Islamic militants aim at integrating all classes, including the working class, into a national community. The fascists substituted "nation" for "class" and developed the concept of "the proletarian nations." Class conflict was thus replaced by the conflict *between* nations, rich against poor. With the Islamic revolutionaries in Iran, we have an identical transposition of the theme of exploitation of one class by another into the exploitation of the "disinherited" (*mustaz'af*) nations by the imperialist ones.[78]

"The fact that fascism is a latecomer," writes Linz, "helps to explain, in part, the essential anti-character of its ideology and appeal." Furthermore, "it is paradoxical that for each rejection there was also an incorporation of elements of what they rejected."[79] Like fascism, the Islamic revolutionary movement has offered a new synthesis of the political creeds it has violently attacked. And, like the fascists, the Islamic militants are against democracy because they consider liberal democracy a foreign model that provides avenues for free expression of alien influences and ideas. (Also like the fascists, however, the Islamic militants would not necessarily accept the label of "antidemocratic.")[80] Similarly, both groups are antibourgeois, resenting the international cosmopolitan orientation of the new middle class. Both movements are anti-Marxist—i.e., anticommunist and antisocialist—while appropriating the ideas and certainly the slogans of social justice and equality. The Islamic revolutionary movement has the considerable advantage over fascism, however, of combining this "anti-character" with strong traditionalism. Here

[76] Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York: New American Library, 1969), 281; Baechler (fn. 3), 10, n. 15.

[77] Mosse (fn. 65), 21.

[78] Linz (fn. 45), 16. Once the attempt to export the Islamic Revolution, temporarily checked by the setback in the Iran-Iraq war, is resumed fully, one may expect further resonances of the Italian fascist ideas of "an imperialism of the poor" and "proletarian imperialism." Zeev Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology," in Laqueur (fn. 41), 334-35; Joseph Baglieri, "Italian Fascism and the Crisis of Liberal Hegemony: 1901-1922," in Larsen (fn. 42), 322-23.

[79] Linz (fn. 45), 5.

[80] *Ibid.*, 20-21.

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we can see the consequence of the fact that the dispossessed leaders of the Islamic Revolution were not a heterogenous but a homogeneous solidary group and, furthermore, one that guarded the Shi'ite religious tradition. In contrast to the Nazi "Revolution of Nihilism" (and to the striking lack of reference to Japan's own intellectual tradition in the writings of the leaders of the fascist New Order Movement of the late 1930s),[81] the Islamic Revolution combines the rejection of other alien political ideologies with a vigorous affirmation of the Islamic religious and cultural tradition. I have therefore characterized it as "revolutionary traditionalism."[82]

In addition to their common anti-character and other incidental features, fascism and the Islamic revolutionary movements both have a distinct constitutive core. Racism and anti-Semitism were the most obnoxious features of European fascism, but, as Mosse and others have convincingly shown, not its core component. The constitutive core of fascism that goes beyond European fascism and continues to live in a variety of forms as a vigorous ideological force in the third world is the combination of nationalism and socialism. As George Valois put it in 1925, "*nationalism + socialism = fascism.*" The marriage of nationalism and socialism was in the cards after World War I.[83] This fact by far transcends the particular conditions of any dispossessed stratum, any European country, or, for that matter, of interwar Europe. It was arrived at by different fascist leaders in different European countries, and it has been arrived at independently by many third-world ideologues since 1945.

An enduring feature of fascist ideology has been its insistence on the reality of the nation and the artificiality of class. To the emotionally unattractive idea of perpetual class struggle, the French fascist thinker Marcel Deat contrasts the appeal of belonging to a community untainted by divisive conflict and fragmentation: "The total man in the total society, with no clashes, no prostration, no anarchy."[84] The Arab nationalist thinkers sought to utilize the appeal of belonging to a community by similarly replacing class by nation. The advocates of Islamic ideology only needed to take one step further to replace the nation by the *umma*, the Muslim community of believers.

Thus, the emergence of an Islamic revolutionary ideology has been

[81] William M. Fletcher, *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

[82] Said A. Arjomand, "Traditionalism in Twentieth-Century Iran," in Arjomand, *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* (London: Macmillan, and Albany: SUNY Press, 1984).

[83] Sternhell (fn. 78), 320-21, 326, 335-37.

[84] Quoted, *ibid.*, 335, 347.

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in the cards since the fascist era. It has been in the cards irrespective of the plight of the dispossessed Shi'ite clerical estate in Iran. The latter did have the advantage of institutional autonomy and of independence in the exercise of religious authority, something the Sunni Islamic ideologues like Rashid Rida could only dream of. But it was exceedingly slow in creating a consistent ideology in order to defend itself against the state. In fact, the Islamic *ideology* was developed elsewhere, by publicists and journalists like Mawdudi (d. 1979) in Indo-Pakistan and Qutb (d. 1966) in Egypt. Its essence consisted in presenting the secular state as an earthly idol claiming the majesty that is God's alone. When Khomeini finally rose against the Shah, he imported the Islamic ideology from Pakistan and Egypt as a free good.

In 1926, in a work that anticipates most of the ideological developments of the past two decades, the youthful Mawdudi had declared: "Islam is a revolutionary ideology and a revolutionary practice, which aims at destroying the social order of the world totally and rebuilding it from scratch . . . and *jihad* (holy war) denotes the revolutionary struggle." Mawdudi conceived the modern world as the arena of the "conflict between Islam and un-Islam," the latter being equated with pre-Islamic Ignorance (*jahiliyya*) and polytheism. Modern creeds and political philosophies were equated with polytheism and Ignorance. Their predominance necessitated the revival of Islam. A few decades later, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb adopted the contrast between Islam and un-Islam—conceived as Ignorance—from Mawdudi and made it the cornerstone of his revolutionary Islamic ideology. For accepting secular states, contemporary Muslim societies are branded as societies of Ignorance. To extirpate Ignorance from these societies, an Islamic government has to be established and the Sacred Law applied. To establish an Islamic government—that is, to establish the rule of God—Islamic revolution is necessary.[85]

The distinctively clericalist Shi'ite idea of Islamic government, to be realized after the revolution of 1979, was *not* directly influenced by the trend in Sunni Islam. It is best understood in the context of the struggle between the Shi'ite hierocracy and the centralizing monarchy discussed earlier. Though a novelty in Shi'ite history, Khomeini's idea of Islamic government, first put forward in 1970, was stated in the traditional Shi'ite frame of reference and does not betray any influence of the

[85] Abu'l-A'la' Mawdudi, *Process of Islamic Revolution* (Pathankot, Punjab: Makteb-e Jamaat-e Islami, 1947); Eran Lerman, "Mawdudi's Concept of Islam," *Middle Eastern Studies* 17 (October 1981), 500; Yvonne Y. Haddad, "The Qur'anic Justification for Revolution: The View of Sayyid Qutb," *The Middle East Journal* 37 (No. 1, 1983).

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ideological innovations of Mawdudi and Qutb. It simply extended the general judiciary authority of the jurist (*faqih*), as well as some of his very specific rights of gerency, to include the right to rule.[86]

Nevertheless, Mawdudi and Qutb were read avidly, in Persian translation and/or in Arabic, by Khomeini's militant followers, who adopted the fundamental revolutionary idea that obedience to the impious secular state—in this case the Shah's—was tantamount to idolatry. The centrality of this idea is unmistakable in the revolutionary slogans and pamphleteering, most notably in the application of the term *taghut* (ungodly earthly power) to the Pahlavi political order. Its influence has become more pronounced since the elimination of the moderates and Islamic modernists in 1980-1981, and is easily noticeable in the speeches of the political elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, Ayatollah Safi has no difficulty whatsoever in combining the advantages of the ideologies of Mawdudi and Qutb with the clericalist ideas of Khomeini. For him, the government of the jurist on behalf of the Hidden Imam is the true government of God on Earth, vowed to the implementation of His Law. All other political regimes are ungodly orders, regimes of Ignorance and of *taghut*. The Islamic Revolution will continue until the overthrow of all these regimes.[87]

C. THE OLD AND THE NEW IN REVOLUTIONARY TRADITIONALISM, AND THE TELEOLOGICAL IRRELEVANCE OF PROGRESS

The Islamic Revolution in Iran should draw our attention to the neglected importance of reactive and reactionary elements in all revolutions. The ideology of proletarian revolution, as Mannheim has shown, incorporated many of the elements of the romantic, reactionary critique of the Enlightenment.[88] On the other hand, Nazism, as both its ideologues and its historians (notably Bracher) have insisted, contained revolutionary as well as reactionary elements.[89]

The Islamic Revolution constitutes a wry comment on the debate among historians as to whether the early modern European revolutions were conservative or liberal, reactionary or progressive. It also demonstrates that revolutionaries often act in defense of traditional values. Baechler is right when he notes, "contrary to appearances and accepted

[86] Said A. Arjomand, "Ideological Revolution in Shi'ism," in Arjomand, *Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism* (forthcoming, 1987).

[87] Lotfollah Safi, *Nezam-e Emamat va Rahbari* [Regime of Imamate and Leadership] (Tehran: Bonyad-e Be'that, 1982/1361), 16-18.

[88] Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thought," in *Essays on Sociology and Psychology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953).

[89] Karl D. Bracher, *The German Dictatorship* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 7-13; Carsten (fn. 45), 428.

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belief, conservative revolutions are supported less by the elite than by the people."[90] Not surprisingly, some important teleological elements in the clerically led popular uprisings such as Carlism and the Cristero movement[91] find resonance in the Islamic Revolution in Iran: repudiation of foreign and cosmopolitan influences and values, and vehement opposition to anticlerical policies of modernizing governments, including, of course, atheism. Marx's famous idea that the French revolutionaries parodied the Roman republicans because they had not yet developed a political language of their own should not automatically be generalized. The revolutionaries who draw on traditional imagery can vary greatly in their knowledge of and professional identification with tradition. The Ayatollahs were the official custodians of the Shi'ite tradition and knew their methodology of Shi'ite jurisprudence. In the past six years, they have proved this by their sustained efforts to Islamicize Iran's judiciary system, by institutionalizing substantial political functions for the Friday prayer leaders, and by presiding over the strict enforcement of Islamic morals.

Islamic revolutionary traditionalism does have its modern trappings. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic pays lip service to equality and especially to social justice, and it guarantees freedom of the press, of the expression of political opinion, of political gatherings and groups—provided, needless to say, that they are not contrary to the interests of Islam. Finally, there is another modern element that is more than a trapping: the Majlis, or parliament. The constitutionalism of the early-modern European revolutions was the idealization of practice, and closely linked to the aim of preserving local liberties. In Iran, even though constitutionalism entered as an imported panacea in 1905-1906, the mullahs used the constitutionalist ideology when opposing the Shah. Consequently, the Majlis is an enduring feature of the Islamic regime. Its legislation, however, is rigorously supervised by the clerical jurists of the Council of Guardians. In addition, both the ruling clerics and the lay Islamic second stratum of the regime have a keen interest in technology. They love broadcasting, being televised, and being interviewed by the press, and they love organizing seminars and congresses and using modern-sounding phrases such as "political-ideological bureaus."

When the notions of revolution and progress are linked, as they were in the 19th century and as they still are today, a line can clearly be drawn between revolution and counterrevolution. The evidence offered in this paper makes it impossible to draw such a line. It has been pointed

[90] Baechler (fn. 3), 108.

[91] Hennessy (fn. 41), 258.

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out that all revolutions contain counterrevolutionary elements. The obverse is also true: all counterrevolutions must incorporate revolutionary innovations in order to restore what they consider to be the traditional order. This is clearly the case with Islamic revolutionary traditionalism in Iran. As I have argued elsewhere, it has in fact brought about a revolution *within* Shi'ism.[92] Furthermore, the Islamic Revolution has stimulated considerable growth in the size of the state and the number of persons employed by it. One can legitimately see these factors as the continuation of a trend in modernization. It is, however, best treated as a universal trend making for continuity with the past rather than as specific to the teleology of this revolution as distinct from others.

D. THE TELEOLOGICAL RELEVANCE OF RELIGION

Comparative evidence not only requires that we sever the conceptual link between revolution and progress, but also suggests that we link revolution and religion. Religion was an important factor not only in the Puritan Revolution, but in all early-modern European revolutions except the Fronde.[93] Walzer is right in considering the Puritan Marian exiles of the 1550s to be forerunners of modern revolutionary ideologues.[94] But the same is true of the clerics of the Catholic League thirty years later.[95] In 1640, the Puritan preachers were calling the House of Commons God's chosen instrument for rebuilding Zion.[96] In the same year, their Catholic counterparts in Catalonia were also engaged in revolutionary activity. Here is the commander of the Spanish king's forces in Rossello complaining of the sedition and licentiousness of the clergy:

> In the confessional and the pulpit they spend their entire time rousing the people and offering the rebels encouragement and advice, inducing the ignorant to believe that rebellion will win them the kingdom of heaven.[97]

There are striking parallels between the Puritan Revolution and the Islamic Revolution. For Cromwell as Moses, we have Khomeini as Abraham and Moses in one; for the Puritan Saints, we have the militant mullahs; and for the fast sermons of 1642-1649,[98] we had, under the

[92] Arjomand (fn. 86).
[93] Zagorin (fn. 18), I, p. 741.
[94] Walzer (fn. 56), 92-113.
[95] Roland Mousnier, *Social Hierarchies, 1450 to the Present*, trans. by Peter Evans (New York: Schocken, 1973), 50, 61; Zagorin (fn. 18), II, chap. 10.
[96] Stone (fn. 20), 90.
[97] John Elliott, *The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain (1598-1640)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 487.
[98] Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Fast Sermons of the Long Parliament," in Trevor-Roper, *Religion, the Reformation and Social Change*, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1972).

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Shah, the gatherings at forty-day intervals to commemorate the "martyrs"; after the revolution, we have the Friday sermons at congregational prayers. Important differences, however, affect the teleologies of these respective revolutions. There were strong anarchic elements in Puritanism—especially Independency, which considered itself the true Church within the corrupt church. Such anarchic innerworldly millenarian precepts of the Independents militated against their acceptance of a Presbyterian national church government. These precepts could also lead in the direction of the Levellers' conception of man as a rational being in the image of God, and hence to natural rights. The corporate solidarism of the militant Shi'ite clergy contrasts as strongly with the factionalism of the Puritan Saints as methodologically grounded legalism contrasts with the Saints' millenarian idea of Christ as the Lawgiver. Finally, the revolutionary Shi'ite clericalist theory of the sovereignty of the jurist is in sharp contrast to the idea of congregational representation—especially in Presbyterianism.[99]

The situation *is* different with regard to the modern revolutions; but let us see how. De Tocqueville knew that the French Revolution had produced a new religion. It aimed at

> nothing short of a regeneration of the whole human race. . . . It developed into a species of religion, if a singularly imperfect one, since it was without a God, without a ritual or promise of a future life. Nevertheless, this strange religion has, like Islam, overrun the whole world with its apostles, militants and martyrs.[100]

The terms "secular religion" and "political religion" have aptly been used to describe communism and fascism.[101] Modern revolutions *do* require political religions. The crucial issue is whether there is any necessary incompatibility between religion and political religion.

The Bolshevik Revolution was militantly atheistic. But before we draw any conclusions, let us think of its totally imported ideology and of the exceedingly narrow social base of its political elite. What about the French Revolution? De Tocqueville did not see any incompatibility between Christianity and the political religion of the revolution. Anticlericalism and the campaign against religion stemmed from the identification of the Church with the *ancien régime*, and not from any wide-

[99] Tai Liu, *Discord in Zion: The Puritan Divines and the Puritan Revolution 1640-1660* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 50-51, 94-97, 146-60; Zagorin (fn. 18), II, p. 166.

[100] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, new trans. by Stuart Gilbert (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1955), 13, 156.

[101] Monnerot (fn. 75); Eric Voegelin, *Science, Politics and Gnosticism: Two Essays* (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1968). It is interesting to note that in 1949 Monnerot described communism as "the twentieth-century Islam."

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spread anti-Christian sentiment.[102] What about the fascist revolution? European fascism was often associated with anticlericalism, but this association is neither general nor fundamental. The Nazis glorified the mythical pre-Christian German tradition and were anti-religious. The same is true of other fascist movements in Western and Northern Europe. At the other end of the spectrum, however, the Rumanian, the Hungarian, the Slovak, and the Croation fascist movements were emphatically Christian and aimed at establishing Christian corporatist states.[103]

Clerical leadership and participation in the Slovak Republic established by Father Hlinka's People's Party (presided over by Father Tiso) and in the Ustasha movement in Croatia offer interesting points for comparison with Iran.[104] But the most illuminating parallel is between Shi'ite revolutionary traditionalism and the Rumanian Iron Guards, the Legion of Archangel Michael. Both movements are characterized by extraordinary cults of suffering, sacrifice, and martydom. Priests figured prominently in the legionary movement, side by side with university students. Legionary meetings were invariably preceded by church services, and their demonstrations were usually led by priests carrying icons and religious flags. The integral Christianity of the Legionaries differentiated them from the Nazis and the Italian Fascists. This they knew. As one of their leading intellectuals explained, "Fascism worships the state, Nazism the race and the nation. Our movement strives not

[102] It was "a spectacular but transient phenomenon . . . in no sense basic to its program." Therefore, the antireligious features faded as the true political teleology of the revolution unfolded. De Tocqueville (fn. 100), 5-7. On the vitality of religious sentiment among the insurgent masses during the French Revolution, see Albert Soboul, "Sentiment religieux et cultes populaires pendant la révolution: Saintes patriotes et martyrs de la liberté" [Religious sentiment and popular cults during the revolution: patriotic saints and martyrs of liberty], *Archives de sociologie des religions* 1 (No. 2, 1956).

[103] These variations become intelligible in the light of Linz's demonstration that the extent of organized preemption of the political space by Christian-democratic or Catholic-conservative parties was a decisive factor in inhibiting the growth of fascism (as in Spain and Belgium). Where such parties existed and had carved up electoral territories for themselves, fascism found a formidable rival. Fascism would also tend to be anticlerical in order to differentiate itself from the rival religious party (as were the Belgian Rex and the Nazis vis-à-vis the Zentrum party). See Linz (fn. 45), 16-28, 52, 84; Linz (fn. 57), 156; Hamilton (fn. 45), 37-41.

Mexican fascism, the Sinarquism of the late 1930s and early 1940s, also fits Linz's pattern. The movement declined when its middle-class supporters defected to the Catholic Accion National. See Hennessy (fn. 41), 280-82. Linz's account of cases in which fascism was not anticlerical but intensely Christian is unsatisfactory, however; see Linz (fn. 45), 16, and Linz (fn. 57), 164, 184, n. 51. The reverse side of Linz's argument is well put by Merkl: "There is ample evidence that religious decline and confrontations played a role in fascist development . . . , creating a massive reservoir of confused quasi-religious fears and longings open to exploitation by fascist demagogues." Merkl (fn. 45), 757.

[104] Yeshayahu Jelinek, "Clergy and Fascism: The Hlinka Party in Slovakia and the Croatian Ustasha Movement," in Larsen and others (fn. 42).

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merely to fulfill the destiny of the Rumanian people—we want to fulfill it along the road to salvation." The ultimate goal of the nation, Codreanu and others emphasized, was "resurrection in Christ."[105]

Finally, we must consider Brazilian Integralism, the most important fascist movement in Latin America. Its founder, Plinio Salgado, met Mussolini in 1930. The meeting made a deep impression on him, and he certainly saw no incompatibility between the fascist political religion and Catholicism. He returned to Brazil to "Catholicize" Italian fascism. Taking advantage of an extensive network of lay religious associations, which had been brought into existence by Cardinal Leme, he founded the Brazilian Integralist Action with the aim of creating a corporatist, integralist state. Integralism appealed to Catholic intellectuals because of its promise of a "spiritual revolution" and of an Integral State "which comes from Christ, is inspired in Christ, acts for Christ, and goes toward Christ." Salgado accordingly criticized the "dangerous pagan tendency of Hitlerism" and lamented the lack of a Christian basis in Nazi ideology.[106]

Few would find the statement that political revolutions are a modern form of millenarianism objectionable. Russian communism was the secular millenarianism of the Third Rome, and Nazism was the secular millenarianism of the Third Reich, "the Thousand Year Reich of national freedom and social justice."[107] As was the case with religion and political religion, political and religious millenarianism are by no means mutually exclusive. The religious chiliastic element may predominate, as in the Taiping Rebellion which aimed at establishing the Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace;[108] or it may play an important subsidiary role, as in the Puritan Revolution in England and the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

In the Puritan Revolution we encounter two forms of millenarianism: the milder, more inner-worldly millenarianism of the Independent divines, and the better known, activist one of the men of the Fifth Mon-

[105] E. Weber (fns. 60 and 69); Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, *The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1970), 247, 266-70.

[106] Stanley Hilton, "Acaõ Integralista Brasileira: Fascism in Brazil, 1932-1938," *Luso-Brazilian Review* 9 (No. 2, 1972), 12; Margaret T. Williams, "Integralism and the Brazilian Catholic Church," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 54 (No. 3, 1974), 436-40. In this typical search for "a third way," Salgado also sought to "Brazilianize" Italian fascism. He considered the two aspects of his project fully compatible, and declared, "My nationalism is full of God." *Ibid.*, 434-36.

[107] Monnerot (fn. 75), chap. 3; Nicholai A. Berdiaev, *The Russian Revolution* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961); James M. Rhodes, *The Hitler Movement: A Modern Millenarian Revolution* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), 79.

[108] Lewy (fn. 41), chap. 7.

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archy. There can be no doubt that revolutionary political millenarianism played a crucial role in the motivation of the Iranian intelligentsia and other groups. But in addition, the Shi'ite doctrine contains an important millenarian tenet: the belief in the appearance of the Twelfth Imam as the Mahdi to redeem the world. This belief was as convenient for Khomeini's revolutionary purpose as it had been for the founder of the Safavid Empire in 1501.[109] Although Shi'ite millenarianism played an important role in the Islamic Revolution, it did not have any of the divisive and anarchic consequences of Puritan millenarianism because the clerics were firmly in control of its interpretation, and in fact partly derived their legal/juristic authority from it.

Conclusion

The success of the Islamic revolutionary ideology is the novel and teleologically distinct mark of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The ideology is a powerful response to the contemporary politicized quest for authenticity. It has been constructed through the unacknowledged appropriation of *all* the technical advantages of the Western ideological movements and political religions, with the added—or rather, the emphatically retained—promise of other-worldly salvation. In a sense, it has a considerable ideological advantage over Nazism and communism, both of which clashed with religion. Rather than creating a new substitute for religion, as did the communists and the Nazis, the Islamic militants have fortified an already vigorous religion with the ideological armor necessary for battle in the arena of mass politics. In doing so, they have made their distinct contribution to world history.

[109] Arjomand (fn. 17), 269-70.

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REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN THE THIRD WORLD:
Recent Soviet Assessments

By ELIZABETH KRIDL VALKENIER*

SOVIET officials and analysts are taking an increasingly sober and far-ranging view of third-world radicalism and its relation to scientific socialism. This marks a significant change in their perceptions about the U.S.S.R.'s ability to manipulate anti-imperialism to its advantage. The reexamination, which dates from about 1980, is related to Moscow's difficulties in imposing a Marxist regime on Afghanistan, the unexpected turn of the Iranian revolution from anti-American upheaval to Islamic fundamentalism, and the mounting concern for the performance of the Soviet economy.

Official statements provide only partial and conflicting evidence of an altered outlook. In the past three years, for example, the May Day slogans, which reaffirm the regime's domestic and foreign policy objectives, have given up many of the ritualistic claims about revolutionary change in the third world. They no longer single out the radical states—i.e., the noncommunist countries that have chosen a socialist orientation—as exemplary; the adjective "invincible" has been dropped from the reference to the Soviet Union's alliance with national liberation movements; and the "struggle against imperialism" is not mentioned as the goal of international solidarity. These contentions have not, however, disappeared altogether from other pronouncements.

To get a better sense of the ongoing reassessment, one must turn to the writings of Soviet experts on the third world. Many of them are prominent in academic and party institutions that help formulate foreign policy. Among these people, the change of mood is unmistakable. It is far different from the high expectations for the prospects of socialism in the developing countries and the resulting shift in the "world balance of forces" in favor of the U.S.S.R. that was first evident under Khrushchev and surfaced again in the mid-1970s after the collapse of the Portuguese empire.

In addition to the fact that Soviet research institutions work for various government agencies, the skeptical reevaluation of the conduct of Soviet

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foreign policy is relevant for three reasons: (1) Prominence and publicity are given to the questioning of the old assumptions and to the new, undogmatic interpretations; they are not buried in small academic publications, but also appear in the pages of the party's daily and theoretical press. (2) There is a certain congruence between the concerns and arguments advanced by the skeptical experts and those of Gorbachev. The new Soviet leader also favors a pragmatic approach that underscores the primacy of economic imperatives over ideological desiderata, as he urges his countrymen to "look without prejudice into the face of reality."[1] (3) The new draft of the CPSU program has dropped the facile assumptions about the revolutionary potential of the third world, as well as the offers of ready Soviet support that suffused the 1961 document it is to replace.

This article outlines the various components of the recent reassessment and briefly discusses the implications for Soviet policies toward the developing countries.

Socialist Orientation and Socialism

The evident loss of confidence in the prospects for "socialist orientation" illustrates the nature and extent of Moscow's disenchantment with the course of revolutionary change.

"Socialist orientation" is more or less synonymous with the earlier term "noncapitalist path." It was first used in the late 1960s to show how the radical noncommunist LDCs were progressing toward socialism. At the start, the theory and practice of socialist orientation were analyzed almost exclusively in *political* terms. Appropriate political institutions—especially a disciplined revoluntionary democratic or vanguard party—were deemed essential for devising, implementing, and sustaining a program of progressive socioeconomic change. The question of appropriate *economic* policies was either bypassed or ignored, as shown in the proceedings of an academic conference held in 1970:

> A characteristic feature of every type of non-capitalist development is that socialist transition starts with the superstructure. . . . The political superstructure subsequently creates conditions for restructuring the socio-economic base.[2]

By the end of the 1970s that formulation had been reversed. Analysts now recognized that the gap between political aspirations and socio-

[1] *Pravda*, October 16, 1985, p. 2.

[2] "The Theory and Practice of the Non-Capitalist Way of Development," *International Affairs*, No. 11 (November 1970), 13.

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economic realities impeded the construction of socialism in backward countries. The dilemma was well stated in a monograph published in 1978:

> The political goals demand the speediest possible subordination of the economic basis to the revolutionary democratic superstructure through the all-around development of the state sector, the elimination of foreign and local enterprise from the national economy. But the economic circumstances dictate a different political line—attracting foreign and local capital for the development of the national economy.[3]

Recognition of this gap and of the ensuing difficulties spawned a myriad of conferences, studies, and publications which sought to redefine the concept of socialist orientation in terms that were more convenient to the U.S.S.R. The checklist of genuine Marxist-Leninist features that were lacking in the radical states grew longer at the same time as the proper relationship between them and the Soviet Union was specified.

A collective volume published in 1982 provides an authoritative guide to the results of the reassessment.[4] The galaxy of authors alone—K. Brutents and R. Ulianovsky (who serve under B. Ponomarev in the Central Committee's International Department), and A. Gromyko and E. Primakov (who are directors of the African and the Oriental Institutes, respectively), among others—assures its importance. Moreover, the book continues to be cited as furnishing a definitive interpretation of "socialist orientation," and its theses are seen to be as solidly applicable in 1985 as they were in 1982.[5]

The work is noteworthy for the care with which it spells out by how far states of socialist orientation fall short of genuine socialism, the difficulties they face along their progressive course, and the nature of their relations with the Soviet Union.

To begin with, it states unequivocally that although a socialist orientation signifies a progressive form of statehood, it can in no way be equated with the actual establishment of socialism. At best, it designates policies oriented toward socialism; it is definitely a preparatory, presocialist stage.[6]

The enumeration of the obstacles that beset the noncapitalist path

[3] A. V. Kiva, *Strany sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii* [Countries of socialist orientation] (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 28. All translations from Russian-language journals are by the author.

[4] *Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiya osvobodivshikhsia stran. Nekotorye voprosy teorii i praktiki* [Socialist orientation in the developing countries: Some problems of theory and practice] (Moscow: Mysl', 1982).

[5] See, for example, references in a collective review: *Kommunist*, No. 1 (January 1985), 115-25.

[6] *Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiya* . . . (fn. 4), 33-35.

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makes it clear why the Soviets now regard a socialist orientation as representing only the first, tentative steps in the direction of socialism. The book is explicit about the numerous interrelated problems posed by the economic, social, and political underdevelopment of most of the radical states. (Significantly, rather than acknowledge the advances scored by countries like Algeria, the authors prefer to focus on far weaker states like Afghanistan or the Congo People's Republic.) Social conditions, such as widespread illiteracy and the lack of sharp class differentiation, make it difficult to attain high productivity, to introduce progressive economic reforms, and to organize a vanguard party with close links to the masses.[7] Because of these domestic realities, it is wellnigh impossible to impose radical changes without incurring catastrophic consequences for gross national output and the consumer. The fact that the radical states remain tied to the world capitalist market creates additional restraints on the leftist measures that can be introduced.[8]

The enumeration of embedded obstacles substantiates another argument—namely, that the choice of socialist orientation is a process that is reversible.[9]

Concerning the relationship of the states of socialist orientation to the U.S.S.R. and the rest of the socialist community, there is a revealing assertion—one that has not been elaborated before. The authors draw a clear distinction between the early travelers on the noncapitalist path (Mongolia and the Soviet Asian Republics) and radical states of the present as to the support they may expect from the U.S.S.R.:

> The peculiarities of current-day noncapitalist development . . . include [the fact] that the countries which follow socialist orientation are not as closely tied, geographically, economically, and politically, to the victorious socialist revolution . . . or to the world socialist system, as were the pioneers of the noncapitalist development.[10]

A comparison of Boris Ponomarev's guidelines for third-world radicals at a conference in 1980 (which was also attended by Brutents, Gromyko, and Primakov) with the 1982 analysis shows the evolution in Soviet reconsiderations.[11] While Ponomarev's speech indicated that the CPSU was worried about the prospects for socialist orientation, it

[7] *Ibid.*, 190, 91, 94-95.

[8] *Ibid.*, 36, 91.

[9] *Ibid.*, 36-37.

[10] *Ibid.*, 35-36. Another important collective volume, *Vostok: rubezh 80-kh godov* [The East: The threshold of the 80s] (Moscow: Nauka, 1983), written by E. Primakov, G. Kim, G. Shirokov, N. A. Simoniya, V. Li, and other members of the Oriental Institute, furnishes a similar list of obstacles in its chapter on socialist orientation. But it does not define the relationship of these states to the U.S.S.R.

[11] The text of Ponomarev's speech was reprinted in *Kommunist*, No. 16 (November 1980), 30-44.

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concentrated on detailing the steps that would help the developing countries to avoid mistakes and overcome difficulties. Two years later, the brunt of the argument fell on the obstacles. Similarly, while Ponomarev discussed economic preconditions that would help to steady the leftist course, he nevertheless stressed ways to strengthen the political apparatus. At that juncture, the Soviet leaders still believed that firm political control was the determining factor. Contributors to the collective volume, by contrast, held that economic and social conditions in many radical LDCs made political control quite problematic. Finally, Ponomarev emphasized the knitting of ties with the socialist countries as one of the seven preconditions for the successful preservation of "progressive positions." By 1982, the precondition of close ties was being thoroughly redefined.

The Vanguard Parties and Society

By 1980, a general apprehension developed that the states of socialist orientation were proceeding too precipitately in building socialism, and that their state apparatus was malfunctioning.[12] Uneasiness about the radical parties' claim to be full-fledged socialist parties surfaced soon after, and became quite pronounced under Andropov.

One article, written on the anniversary of the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party, concluded:

> It seems to us that it would be correct to consider the ruling parties of the socialist-oriented states as parties of the working people in the sense that they (1) consist basically or exclusively of the representatives of the working masses, (2) reflect the interests of the urban and rural working people, and (3) arm themselves with the ideology of scientific socialism. At the same time, these are not yet fully formed proletarian parties—in their composition, structure, experience, political consciousness—but parties completing the transition from revolutionary-democratic to Marxist-Leninist.[13]

It is symptomatic of the recent trends that Soviet specialists have started systematically to examine the shortcomings of the vanguard

[12] In October 1980, for example, Boris Ponomarev enjoined scholars at the Oriental Institute to explore causes for the setbacks suffered by various radical regimes; see *Aziya i Afrika segodnia*, No. 12 (December 1980), 2-5.

[13] A. V. Kiva and P. M. Shastitko, "Istoricheskii opyt bol'shevizma i revoliutsionnaya demokratiya afro-aziatskikh stran" [The historical experience of bolshevism and the revolutionary democracy of Afro-Asian countries], *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6 (November-December 1983), 11. See also V. Maksimenko, "Leninskaya kontseptsiya politicheskikh partii i osvobodivshiesia strany" [Lenin's concepts of political parties and the liberated countries], *Aziya i Afrika segodnia*, No. 8 (August 1983), 2-5.

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parties. For most authors, the basic difficulty derives from the nature of society in these states, or, to put it in Soviet terms, "the incomplete process of class formation."[14] Thus, at the July 1983 conference on the working class in the LDCs, only a minority argued that a "more or less" sizable modern working class had been formed in the countries of Asia and Africa. Most participants took issue not only with this contention, but also with the assertion that the proletariat in the third world was becoming the vanguard of the nationwide struggle. Instead, critics of the old dogmatic notions objected to the mechanistic application of Western models and pointed to the pitfalls in delineating the proletariat by purely economic or numerical indicators. They held that such an approach ignored cultural traditions and the "social psychology" of this stratum in the liberated countries.[15]

In the absence of the requisite class basis, the mere proclamation of adherence to Marxism-Leninism is not sufficient to turn a vanguard party into a genuine and correctly functioning socialist party.[16] Some authors emphasize that it will take a long time for socioeconomic preconditions to ripen so as to assure an adequate level of organizational maturity. Significantly, they stress this factor more than the inclusion of communists in the party.[17] Others point out the need for immediate preparatory steps: First, the party's ranks must be broadened with members from the working class that is being formed, and from the cooperative peasantry. Second, intensive educational and ideological work must be undertaken to eradicate the traditional (i.e., tribal or religious) outlook of the members. Third, cadres must be trained who can correctly evaluate both the achievements and the mistakes of the revolutionary struggle.[18]

Freer discussion of the social realities in the radical states raises questions about the character of their leadership. Some writers stress that the social structure makes it difficult for leaders to communicate effectively with the population and to carry out ambitious reform programs.[19]

[14] *Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiya* (fn. 4), 124. Or, according to *Vostok: rubezh 80 godov*, the revolutionary goals outdistance the class content. (Fn. 10), 177-78.

[15] "Problemy formirovaniya rabochego klassa osvobodivshikhsia stran" [Problems of class formation in the liberated countries], *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir*, No. 6 (November-December 1983), 162-65.

[16] In this connection, the collective volume on socialist orientation notes that the Labor Party of the People's Republic of the Congo is riddled with tribal factionalism. *Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiya* (fn. 4), 124-25.

[17] *Ibid.*, 134-37.

[18] *Vostok: rubezh 80 godov* (fn. 10), 192-93.

[19] A. Butenko, "Nekotorye teoreticheskie problemy perekhoda k sotsializmu stran s nerazvitoi ekonomikoi" [Some theoretical problems of the transition to socialism by countries with underdeveloped economies], *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5 (September-October 1982), 70-

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Others discuss the distortions of power inherent in a situation where there is a marked gulf between the masses and the ruling group. In this connection, while some specialists draw attention to the "predominant role of strong personalities,"[20] others examine the wider implications of elitism. For example, Vladimir Li's recent book-length analysis is outstanding in investigating the processes that result from the misuse of power: how the political gap between the masses and the ruling elite is filled by the proliferating bureaucracy.[21]

Reassessment of the prospects for the vanguard parties is not limited to analyzing problems and excesses. A further topic, with practical policy implications, has surfaced in print. Significantly, it was raised by Rostislav Ulianovsky, a conservative expert in charge of relations with third-world radicals in the Central Committee's International Department, who had previously not been critical of the revolutionary democrats. By 1984, he too showed exasperation with the "leftist" political excesses perpetrated by third-world radicals.[22] He singled out those leaders who, scorning the multifaceted nature of national or revolutionary democracy, had reduced socialist orientation to a single variant—that of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This advocacy of greater political pluralism was adumbrated with the familiar arguments about noncapitalist development being a long, transitional stage requiring adaptation to what was feasible. But there was also a novel warning: in view of President Reagan's pronouncements, transgressing the feasible could threaten world peace.

Appearing at a time when several radical regimes faced serious counter-insurgencies—as in Nicaragua and Angola—Ulianovsky's article may well signify that some leading figures in the U.S.S.R. are not averse to seeing the radical leaders share power with other political forces in order

79, is probably the most forthright statement about the various problems posed by backward social conditions to radical transformation. For an even more outspoken article (by a Hungarian expert), see Barna Talas, "Specific Prerequisites for the Transition to Socialism in the Socio-economically Underdeveloped Countries," *Development and Peace* (Budapest) 4 (Autumn 1983), 208-20.

[20] *Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiya* (fn. 4), 125.

[21] Li, *Sotsial'naya revoliutsiya i vlast' v stranakh Vostoka* [Social revolution and power in the countries of the East] (Moscow: Nauka, 1984). Li presents an even clearer argument in "The Formation and Evolution of Bureaucracy in Developing Countries of the East," *Development and Peace* 3 (Autumn 1982), 32-45.

[22] Ulianovsky, "O natsional'noi i revoliutsionnoi demokratii: puti evoliutsii" [On national and revolutionary democracy: paths of evolution], *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2 (March-April 1984), 9-18. It is instructive to compare these 1984 arguments with those Ulianovsky expressed in 1971: "The important thing is not so much the fact that the national democracy is still a non-Marxist trend, as [is] its actual fight against imperialism, against capitalism as a social system, and the revolutionary democrats' constuctive effort to build a new society." *World Marxist Review*, No. 9 (September 1971), 125.

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to build greater support at home and to gain wider acceptance abroad. Political pluralism was certainly not envisioned in earlier Soviet discussions of the vanguard parties.

Foreign Economic Policies

Current Soviet views on the foreign economic policies of the developing countries indicate that here, too, an awareness of the gap between ideological formulas and harsh realities has led to important revisions. It is now acknowledged that radical states have remained tied to capitalist markets. Indeed, their adherence to the old economic order even while they set off in a new political direction is considered to be one of the new trends in the world revolutionary experience. Thus, recent scholarly monographs have argued that the socialist-oriented states should adjust their development plans and expectations to an efficient and effective utilization of the international division of labor.[23]

These views constitute a significant modification of notions prevalent in the early 1970s, which held that it was desirable and possible for the LDCs to distance themselves from capitalist markets and to start forming an alternative economic order—a socialist international division of labor with the Soviet-bloc countries. Unable to build an alternate system, the Soviets have been forced to concede the inescapable condition of global interdependence.

This recognition, in turn, has caused Soviet experts to become critical of the radical third-world economists. Until about 1976, specialized Soviet writings supported the economic claims of the developing countries against the West. It was simply assumed that the LDCs' views dovetailed with Soviet theories about the operations of imperialism. (In part, the Soviet outlook stemmed from ignorance, for there were no detailed studies of Latin American and other radical economists; in part, these views did not really affect international relations until the formation of the Group of 77.) But, when the LDCs became an articulate and effective pressure group in the 1970s, Soviet scholars began to pay attention to economic thinking in the third world.

The first studies were largely descriptive, and any critical observations they contained were directed at discrete issues and topics. A collective volume issued by the Institute of Africa, for example, criticized Samir Amin's proposals for a substantial upward revision of raw material prices. Although Amin considered the issue a simple matter of political

[23] *Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiya* (fn. 4), 35-36; *Vostok: rubezh 80 godov* (fn. 10), 195-96.

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will, the Soviet economist argued that "price formation [is] part of an international economic mechanism and subject to its objective laws."[24] By 1982, Boris Slavnyi analyzed Amin's theories and the entire dependency school in terms not of partial deviations, but of being wholly juxtaposed to Marxism. Moreover, Slavnyi found the radical third-world economists deficient because they were "outdated." They

> did not take into account the most recent trends [in international economics] which seem to demonstrate that, as the process of internationalization progresses, the developing world will attain technological independence and the external factors [making for underdevelopment] will cease to prevail over the domestic factors.[25]

Revealingly, the book's concluding chapter summarized the arguments of various Western economists who reject the "extremism" of the dependency school with its contention that interaction with the advanced capitalist states results in nothing but "plunder." It also drew attention to Western interpretations of the role of monopolies as the consequence of the emergence of supra-nation-state processes and a worldwide economic system.

The U.S.S.R.'s responses in the NIEO debates showed an evolution that parallels the novel thinking in the community of specialists. When one looks behind the customary rhetoric, it is evident that the substantive portions of Soviet proposals at the United Nations no longer treated the international market as an imperialist cabal to safeguard capitalist exploitation, but as an evolving network of dependencies.[26] Thus, the Soviet bloc's declaration to the V UNCTAD in 1979 held that it was possible to "democratize" international economic relations even before the "inherent defects of capitalism" have been eliminated from the operations of world economy.[27] The aim of Soviet policy in international trade now is to eliminate "discrimination" against *all* nations (a neutral, universalistic term) and not merely "exploitation" of the developing countries

[24] *Zarubezhnye kontseptsii ekonomicheskogo razvitiya stran Afriki* [Foreign concepts of the economic development of African countries] (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), 153.

[25] Slavnyi, *Nemarksistskaya politekonomiya o problemakh otstalosti i zavisimosti v razvivayushchemsia mire* [Non-Marxist political economy on the problems of backwardness and dependence in the developing world] (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), 195. The book's "original" contents were subject to favorable commentaries in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6 (November-December 1984), 141-66.

[26] The shift in Soviet policy was undoubtedly related to the change in the LDCs' behavior: beginning with the IV UNCTAD in May 1976, they stopped differentiating between the capitalist West and the socialist East, presenting the same set of demands on all the advanced states.

[27] "Evaluation of the world trade and economic situation and consideration of issues, policies and appropriate measures to facilitate structural changes in the international economy," UNCTAD, TD/249 (April 19, 1979), point 22.

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(a particular, systemic notion). Aleksei Manzhulo, Deputy Foreign Trade Minister, stated on the eve of the VI UNCTAD that the U.S.S.R. "always believed ... that all trade flows are in one way or another interconnected." Therefore, he proposed that UNCTAD should establish universally observed procedures for conducting trade, and that the LDCs' demands should be discussed in the context of a general review of all the principles, rules, and norms of international trade.[28]

Criticism of the LDCs' "local" or "parochial" policies for the NIEO is the obverse of Soviet advocacy of universal principles in international trade. Among various comments on the results of the VI UNCTAD, objections to the demands for preferential or concessional treatment of the developing countries ranked high.[29] Soviet specialists criticized the notion of an automatic distribution of income from the developed to the developing countries, for this contradicted all the laws of international trade as well as theoretical principles of economics. Furthermore, they did not endorse LDC recommendations for developing South-South cooperation or self-reliance, on the grounds that such undertakings could create barriers to a free flow of trade.

The changing Soviet views on exploitation in international trade naturally touch upon ideological principles. It is interesting to note that new formulations on the nature of imperialism are on the agenda of the current discussions related to the new edition of the party program (to be adopted in 1986). One revision suggests, against the traditional interpretation, that the capacity to innovate and adapt, and not the exploitation of the LDCs, sustains the imperialist system.[30]

Domestic Economic Policies

On the domestic situation of the developing countries, Soviet experts have also come to terms with various aspects of the once-reviled oper-

[28] Manzhulo, "Shestaya sessiya Yunktad: tseli i zadachi" [The sixth session of UNCTAD: its goals and tasks], *Vneshniaya torgovlia*, No. 4 (April 1983), 15-20.

[29] E. Obminsky, "Proponents and Opponents of Restructuring International Economic Relations," *International Affairs*, No. 7 (July 1984), 81-88; "Bor'ba za mezhdunarodnyi ekonomicheskii poriadok: itogi desiatiletiya" [Struggle for the international economic order: results of a decade], *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [hereafter cited as *MEMO*], No. 7 (July 1984), 101-16; I. Karpov, "Razvivayushchiesia strany i demokratizatsiya mezhdunarodnykh ekonomicheskikh otnoshenii" [The developing countries and democratization of international economic relations], *Vneshniaya torgovlia*, No. 11 (November 1984), 46-50.

[30] L. Abalkin, "Leninskaya teoriya imperializma v svete sovremennoi real'nosti" [Lenin's theory of imperialism in the light of current-day realities], *MEMO*, No. 5 (May 1985), 61-73. For a conservative reiteration of the old verities, see the editorial in *Kommunist*, No. 8 (May 1984), 3-13.

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ations of capitalism. Capitalist institutions, it is now acknowledged, are a necessary prerequisite for development and growth; capitalist forms of ownership, labor discipline, and work habits, for that matter, also fulfill economically valid functions.[31]

Well before the Soviets became perceptibly concerned about economic performance in states of socialist orientation, they had come to accept the need for the LDCs in general to pursue pragmatic rather than strictly systemic (i.e., anticapitalist or anti-imperialist) policies. But, for the radical states, economic rationality was not as readily prescribed. By and large, most writers advocated or condoned a more or less speedy elimination of the multinationals and other foreign capital, of local big-business and feudal elements. At present, such policies are criticized as harmful "leftist" excesses that endanger not only the future of a national economy, but the socialist perspective as well. Soviet specialists in effect endorse a long period of coexistence with capitalist structures.

To begin with, it is now recognized that the states of socialist orientation should come to terms with foreign investment. Most recent books maintain that it is necessary to attract foreign capital in order to stimulate economic development, to increase employment, and to satisfy the consumer. The ideal means, it seems, is through mixed enterprises.[32]

A similar tolerance toward private capital has emerged in the specialized Soviet literature. At first, only petty traders and small-scale private enterprises were tolerated as consistent with socialist orientation—largely because of persisting local traditions and the needs of the service sector. By now, large modern capitalist enterprises are also accepted by some authors on the grounds that such operations are essential for genuine economic development.[33]

What about the state sector, whose size alone used to be considered the indicator of how close a country was getting to socialism? At present, its economic performance, rather than its extent, is of primary interest. Hence, Soviet specialists argue that only a few, better-advanced states

[31] For a good example of the present disposition not to absolutize socialist institutions, see the round-table discussion on the future of capitalism in the LDCs, *MEMO*, No. 1 (January 1985), 81-94.

[32] *Vostok: rubezh 80 godov* (fn. 10), 194-95. The fact that Soviet writers have not charged that independent Angola was being exploited by the international oil cartel operating in Cabinda indicates acceptance of the benefits accruing to a socialist-oriented state from participating in a capitalist international enterprise. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. is not averse to doing business with the multinationals in the radical states. The biggest Soviet aid project in Angola—the Cuanza river development—is a trilateral venture in which Portuguese capital participates.

[33] E. Primakov, "Strany sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii: trudnyi no real'nyi put' perekhoda k sotsializmu" [States of socialist orientation: a difficult but workable path for transition to socialism], *MEMO*, No. 7 (July 1981), 16.

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(Egypt before 1973, Algeria) can have an efficient and effective public sector. The far more numerous backward states cannot afford that political luxury: for them a large state sector entails deficit operations that can eat up all that private enterprise manages to accumulate. Similar strictures are now applied to other government controls, such as state planning. The less developed a country, the less rigorous the direct state interference it can afford to sustain.[34]

Most of the radical states are agrarian countries in which the majority of the population lives off the land. Here, there has also been a change in the Soviet attitude toward private ownership. In the past, much was written about the need of progressive states to move to the more advanced form of cooperative farming prior to full collectivization. Some recent publications concede that this is not the optimal solution and that, for a long time to come, a highly differentiated structure of ownership will have to remain.[35] This means countenancing not only small but also large-scale private farming before conditions are ripe for introducing general cooperative farming. For the present and the immediate future, it has to be recognized that cooperative labor cannot be truly productive. Hence, one specialist recommends "a policy oriented at the decisive role . . . of private factors in production and stimulating the individual labor of the peasantry."[36]

Eastern Tradition and Civilization

In the mid-1970s, some scholars started to question the optimistic scenario of a revolutionary future in the third world by calling attention to the uniqueness of the socioeconomic processes in the developing countries.[37] These experts, however, represented a minority view that was in conflict with the mainstream opinion in academic and political quarters. Accordingly, their writings were severely criticized for departing from the universal and unilinear Marxist version of historical development.

Because of the turn of events in Afghanistan and Iran, the situation changed completely after 1979. Unfulfilled revolutionary expectations for both countries produced a veritable revolution in Soviet third-world studies, giving credence to the less orthodox scholars. As a result, concepts like the multistructural (*mnogoukladnyi*) society and economy have

[34] *Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiya* (fn. 4), 178-79; *Vostok: rubezh 80 godov* (fn. 10), 177-79.
[35] *Ibid.*, 198.
[36] Butenko (fn. 19), 76.
[37] See N. A. Simoniya, *Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiya* [Countries of the East: paths of development] (Moscow: Nauka, 1975).

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gained legitimacy and are freely used even by prominent political figures. Attention now centers on the importance of "tradition," and some authors who only a few years earlier had to defend their views against vicious attacks from Marxist purists are being vindicated. They are key speakers at various symposia, they head new research projects, and their innovative studies are being published. More than that, these monographs are reviewed at length, with full exposition of the once controversial and disparaged concepts. The obvious intent of the publicity seems to be to inform and educate the public.

The burgeoning discussion of "civilization" and its relationship to Marxist "formations" is a fascinating aspect of the Soviets' sudden discovery of the interaction of tradition and development. It is symptomatic of the degree to which the deterministic Marxist interpretation of history is being qualified with factors that belie the rigid socieconomic scheme. When a book on Toynbee appeared in 1976, it did not elicit much notice;[38] by 1983, there were numerous references to his writings. What interests Soviet scholars in Toynbee's work are his theories about the essence of civilizations—the role of spiritual values and other non-economic factors—rather than what he said about their cycles.[39]

Two recent books are representative of the less deterministic views on the process of change in the third world that are closely tied up with the new-found appreciation for tradition and civilization. The first, whose title may be translated as "The Developing Countries: Economic Growth and Social Progress," appeared in late 1983.[40] In the preceding few years, V. L. Sheinis, one of the editors, published several articles on the specificity of third-world cultural patterns. This 650-page volume presents an integrated argument about the complex and distinctive interactions among the economic, social, and cultural factors as they shape events in the third world. It broadens the Soviet framework of development or growth indicators by including the role of non-economic factors. Two lengthy reviews praised the book for enriching Soviet scholarship with an innovative system of analysis. The critics commended both its thesis, that backwardness arises from specific local sources and is not solely the heritage of imperialism, and its argument,

[38] Evgenii Rashkovsky, *Vostokovednaya problematika v kul'turno-istoricheskoi kontseptsii A. Dzh. Toinbi* [Oriental problems in A. J. Toynbee's concepts of history and culture] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976).

[39] See "Kruglyi stol: o sootnoshenii poniatii 'tsivilizatsiya' i 'kul'tura'" [Round table: on the relationship between 'civilization' and 'culture']. *Nova i noveishaya istoriya*, No. 4 (July-August 1983), 68-89.

[40] A. Ya. Elianov and V. L. Sheinis, eds., *Razvivayushchiesia strany: ekonomicheskii rost i sotsial'nyi progress* (Mosow: Nauka, 1983).

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that resolutions of the most elemental social tasks will require "entire historical epochs."[41]

The second book, with the title "Evolution of Eastern Societies: Synthesis of Traditional and Modern Structures," appeared in late 1984—the product of a study group set up by the Oriental Institute after 1979 to investigate the role of tradition.[42] The volume posits three models of capitalist development and the preconditions each creates for a socialist revolution: the "classic" West European, the Russian, and the Eastern variants. The third, or Eastern, model presents the most difficulties, producing unexpected—and at times crippling—reversals. Because of markedly different sociocultural conditions, the third model must accommodate unprecendented variables and hence will not retrace the path traversed by Western Europe. (Nor, incidentally, could the West European pattern be reproduced in Imperial Russia because of the distinctive background of the latter.)

Both publications are pathbreaking for the U.S.S.R. They argue the complex case of how local conditions conspire against expectations that the models devised in the West are more or less automatically applicable to the East. Both exemplify the current, increasingly vocal and better substantiated pessimism about the future evolution of the third world toward progressive patterns that would bring it closer to the Soviet bloc.

A changed attitude toward Islam goes hand in hand with the heightened appreciation for the tenacity of traditions. Much has been written in the West on how the initial Soviet interpretation of Islam's revolutionary potential misread the actual course of domestic and foreign policies in Iran after the fall of the Shah. But it should be noted that, among Soviet scholars, opinions were divided from the outset. G. Kim, the deputy director of the Oriental Institute, saw nothing but revolutionary promise, while E. Primakov, the Institute's director, pointed out the possibility of two variants—the regressive and the revolutionary.[43]

It is instructive to outline the evolution of Kim's interests after his original euphoria. In early 1983, Kim presided over a round table conference on tradition and modernity, held at the Oriental Institute.[44] In

[41] See the two lengthy reviews in *MEMO*, No. 3 (March 1985), 115-33. The volume was also included in a composite review of important publications in *Kommunist*, No. 1 (January 1985), 115-25.

[42] L. I. Reisner and N. A. Simoniya, eds., *Evoliutsiya vostochnykh obshchestv: sintez traditsionnykh i sovremennykh struktur* (Moscow: Nauka, 1984).

[43] Kim, "Social Development and Ideological Struggle in the Developing Countries," *International Affairs*, No. 4 (April 1980), 65-75; Primakov, "Islam i protsessy obshchestvennogo razvitiya zarubezhnogo Vostoka" [Islam and the processes of social development in Eastern countries abroad], *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 8 (August 1980), 60-71.

[44] Proceedings reproduced in *Aziya i Afrika segodnia*, No. 7 (July 1983), 33-41.

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handling the proceedings he was eager to clarify whether Islam offered a third model. There was no agreement among the participants. V. Sheinis gave a detailed description of the third world, advancing an alternate paradigm based on the rise of fundamentalism and hence unrelated to the existing socialist or capitalist models. N. Simoniya denied that a third model based on tradition was possible, while V. Khoros argued that the persistence of tradition in the East did not preclude modernization.

In 1984, *Aziya i Afrika segodnia* published two articles on Islam that elaborated on the theme of a "third model." As editor in chief of the journal, Kim was responsible for choosing the type of argumentation that appeared in print; the publication of the articles can therefore be taken as an indication of his interests and concerns.

In the issue of May 1984, S. L. Agaev, a specialist on Iran from the Institute of the International Workers' Movement, considered the essence of the Islamic revolution.[45] He was incensed that a recent Soviet handbook on Islam had presented it in terms of "vulgar sociology" or class struggle, and argued that the Islamic revolution was not limited to the overthrow of the Shah and anti-imperialist goals: as a movement steeped in a long history and cultural traditions, it offered a total model (one that embraced all aspects of social life—economy, politics, family relations, etc.). Moreover, it reached far beyond Iran's borders.

The following month, L. Reisner contributed an article on civilization and formation in Western and Eastern societies, which probed the relevance of Marxist tenets to the third world.[46] Although Reisner noted the conflict between Western and Eastern civilizations—between the "revolutionary" thrust of Marxist formations and the "immobilism" of the East—he did not posit further growth in cultural isolationism among the LDCs; resolution lay in the emergence of a new global civilization that was all-inclusive and no longer restricted to the West, thereby accommodating the changing Eastern societies with their distinct cultural and social structures.

It seems significant that, simultaneously with a growing concern about the sharp turn in the third world toward economic separatism and

[45] Agaev, "O poniatii i sushchnosti 'islamskoi revoliutsii' " [On the concept and essence of "Islamic Revolution"], *Aziya i Afrika segodnia*, No. 5 (May 1984), 27-31. See also Agaev's review of L. P. Polonskaya and A. Kh. Vafa, eds., *Vostok: ideii i ideologiya* [The East: ideas and ideology] (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), for similar arguments about the *sui generis* nature of Islam, in *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir*, No. 6 (November-December 1983), 177-80.

[46] Reisner, " 'Tsivilizatsiya' i 'formatsiya' v obshchestvakh Vostoka i Zapada" ["Civilization" and "formation" in Western and Eastern societies], *Aziya i Afrika segodnia*, No. 6 (June 1984), 22-25.

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political-cultural fundamentalism, there is a growing opinion among Soviet scholars that these unforeseen challenges can be defused through a global rather than a systemic approach.

The Non-aligned Movement

Long-held assumptions about the anti-imperialist thrust of third-world diplomacy are also being reassessed. The Soviet Union has considered the positive, pro-Soviet neutralism of the LDCs as an integral part of the common anti-imperialist front it formed with the newly liberated countries. Although this is still a rhetorical assertion in many official statements from Moscow, specialists have started to express doubts about the course of third-world diplomacy, implying that it is no longer as predictable and useful a tool for the U.S.S.R. as it has been in the past.

The first article to raise explicit reservations appeared prior to the non-aligned summit held in New Delhi in March 1983. Its author, N. A. Simoniya, elaborated on the 26th CPSU Congress's dictum concerning the complex differentiation among the developing countries by discussing their variegated domestic and foreign policies.[47] At that time, the article seemed to be part of the general post-Brezhnev stocktaking of the prospects for Soviet interests in the third world. Simoniya provided a general typology of the foreign policies pursued by LDCs, noting the lack of unity in the non-aligned movement: it was composed of the left, and consequently anti-imperialist, wing; the moderate center; and the conservative wing, ready to make important concessions to the West (including some of a strategic nature). Simoniya argued that the diffusion of third-world anti-imperialism was acquiring special importance at the present time. In that context, he drew attention to the retrogressive, "medieval" strain (obviously Iranian) whose evolution toward the revolutionary-democratic (i.e., pro-Soviet) type was by no means a foregone conclusion.

After the New Delhi conference, sober stocktaking gave way to guarded expressions of pessimism and disappointment. An article by Yu. Alimov in *Kommunist* was fairly typical.[48] It did admit that the movement was facing difficulties caused by the renewed cold war; the

[47] Simoniya, "Natsional'no-gosudarstvennaya konsolidatsiya i politicheskaya differentsiatsiya razvivayushchikhsia stran" [National-state consolidation and the political differentiation among developing countries], *MEMO*, No. 1 (January 1983), 84-96.

[48] Alimov, "Dvizhenie neprisoedineniya na vazhnom rubezhe" [The non-aligned movement at a significant juncture], *Kommunist*, No. 7 (May 1983), 99-110.

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Iran-Iraq conflict; the disagreements among the OAU, the Arab countries, and OPEC; the debt crisis; and rising trade protectionism. But the weight of the argument put the blame on the United States for trying to capitalize on these difficulties in order to change the character of the non-aligned movement and to convert its position to one of equidistance. In its conclusion, the article rather weakly asserted that the Soviet Union, as well as the March 1983 Conference of the Communist and Working Class Parties, welcomed the New Delhi decisions for having "on the whole" given clear anti-imperialist and antimilitarist answers to current international problems.

Such caution did not mark Karen Brutents's article on non-alignment, which appeared a year later.[49] In his opinion, the New Delhi proceedings witnessed the establishment of the equidistant position. In addition to stating the fact openly, Brutents elucidated the reasons for the shift. His explanation, like many recent Soviet interpretations of untoward developments in the third world, found the causes to be economic ones: all the LDCs remained part of the capitalist world market, dependent for their survival on the advanced capitalist states. Their economic vulnerability precluded the principled anti-imperialist stand that had characterized the movement in the past.

The article was remarkable for its candor, based on pragmatic analysis. Beyond the already familiar arguments about the LDCs not pursuing uniformly anti-imperialist policies, it demonstrated that these countries promoted their own interests (i.e., those of self-reliance or South-South cooperation), which did not necessarily conform to Soviet interests. In addition, there was the strong implication that the U.S.S.R. did not have the economic wherewithal to influence the non-aligned movement. Brutents acknowledged that, by contrast, the United States had the power to foster and support policies of equidistance.

Such is the sober analysis of someone who is not merely an academic specialist. Brutents's high position in the Central Committee's International Department (as deputy chief) implies that doubts about the congruence of Soviet and third-world radical foreign policies have some operational significance. Moreover, the 1984 article was in keeping with the tone of other of his recent writings. Ever since 1979, Brutents has been promoting disengagement from too close an identification with the radical states on the grounds that their rulers do not follow a steadfast course on international issues. He has been urging that Moscow expand

[49] Brutents, "Dvizhenie neprisoedineniya v sovremennom mire" [The non-aligned movement in the contemporary world], *MEMO*, No. 5 (May 1984), 26-41.

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ties with *all* categories of countries, including those that are firmly in the Western camp.[50]

Conclusion

What are the implications of the changing tone and content of the specialists' analysis for the conduct of Soviet foreign policy in general, and for prospective developments under Gorbachev?

The evident pessimism and attendant scaling-down of the U.S.S.R.'s former support for radical solutions indicate a definite change of mood. I have heard it described in Moscow as the "post-Afghan syndrome." If equated with the U.S. "post-Vietnam syndrome," it may be taken as a loss of confidence, which qualifies the country's readiness to get involved in risky, far-away interventions or initiatives.

The predisposition to seek disengagement from risky ventures is likely to be reinforced by Gorbachev's goal of concentrating on economic reforms and performance at home. As a matter of fact, there is a connection between the new leader's priorities and those of the innovative experts. Some of the more pertinent questions about the readiness of backward countries for socialism and about the appeal of the current (economically limping) Soviet model for the third world have been raised by academics who also advocate far-reaching economic reforms at home.[51]

It remains to be seen to what extent the arguments of the skeptics will surface in Gorbachev's pronouncements on the third world and in the new edition of the party program to be adopted at the 27th Congress in February 1986. Rather than predict specific moves or reformulations, we can speculate on the broad implications of the new mood.

If we keep in mind the components of the emergent realization of what accounts for the Soviets' perceptions of their weakness or vulnerability in the third world (ranging from economic deficiencies, through the unpredictability of radical clients, to the American resolve) we may interpret Soviet responses or proposals not so much as atypical or *ad hoc* acts, but as falling into a pattern. Seen in this light, Moscow's acquiescence to Mozambique's rapprochement with South Africa in 1984 is a highly significant development. The caution that the U.S.S.R. is ex-

[50] See, for instance, Brutents, *Osvobodivshiesia strany v 70-e gody* [The liberated countries in the 70s] (Moscow: Izd. Politicheskoi literatury, 1979), and "Sovetskii Soyuz i osvobodivshiesia strany," *Pravda*, February 2, 1982, pp. 4-5.

[51] See, for example, Butenko (fn. 19), and Yu. Novopashin, "Vozdeistvie real'nogo sotsializma na mirovoi revoliutsionnyi protsess" [The influence of genuine socialism on the world revolutionary process], *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 8 (August 1982), 3-16.

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ercising in its relations with Nicaragua is equally indicative. More recently, Gorbachev's proposal that every permanent member of the Security Council undertake "to strictly observe the principle of non-interference, non-use of force or threat of force in relations with countries [of Asia, Africa, and Latin America], and not to draw them into military blocs" may be weighed as more than mere rhetoric. Significantly, Gorbachev's code of conduct omitted the customary reference to the inalienable right of the developing states to pursue anti-imperialist policies.[52]

The new mood not only affects the U.S.S.R.'s willingness to indulge in high-risk behavior in the third world; it also spells out some positive promise for Soviet-American relations. The less systemic (i.e., less ideologized) analysis of various processes will not necessarily reduce Moscow's presence in the developing countries. The Soviets are there for reasons other than ideology. But the new look might well influence the modalities with which Soviet policy is conducted and justified—i.e., less in terms of exclusive and elusive ideology (which is subversive in the eyes of the United States) and more in terms of generally accepted (and hence negotiable) standards of national interest.

Here, again, the experts' writings are an indicator of what the less ideologically charged components of Soviet-American consultations or negotiations could be. Many of the more moderate, and less ideologically confrontational, concepts—such as global interdependence, the complex multisectoral nature of third-world societies, and the rules of conduct that constrain the superpowers from projecting their interests unilaterally—were formulated by academic experts before they appeared in official speeches or proposals. Specialized publications also explain more fully the new reasoning behind the new formulas.

To be sure, Western negotiators can never be certain which set of principles—the old, ideological or the new, pragmatic—will prevail in a given case. Still, there exists in the U.S.S.R. a novel, alternate way of looking at the third-world situation—in generally understood categories and not merely in terms of Marxist revolution. American analysts and policy makers should thus be alert to a wider range of possibilities for conducting a reasonable dialogue. For example, the fact that Soviet academic experts have written that the situation in Afghanistan in the fall of 1979 presented a security threat to the U.S.S.R. could be a basis for entertaining the idea that Moscow might view Washington's concern

[52] *Pravda*, May 22, 1985, p. 2. Gorbachev's formulation differs from Brezhnev's. It omits mention of "full recognition of these states' sovereignty over their natural resources . . . [and] support of their efforts to eliminate remnants of colonialism, to uproot racism and apartheid." See *Pravda*, April 28, 1981, p. 2.

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with Central America in a similar light—i.e., in terms of legitimate interests or spheres of influence.

In sum, the knowledge that universally recognized terms have gained currency and recognition in the writings of many Soviet foreign policy specialists gives us clues about changing Soviet perceptions of international relations and behavior.

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THE U.S.S.R. AND THIRD-WORLD CONFLICTS:
Domestic Debate and Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967-1973

By DINA ROME SPECHLER*

EXPERTS and laymen agree that Soviet foreign policy underwent a significant change in orientation in the early 1970s. At the beginning of that decade, Moscow placed much emphasis on the pursuit of a new, more constructive relationship with the United States. The Kremlin leadership devoted considerable effort and attention to a search for means to mitigate and regulate U.S.-Soviet competition. It evinced great eagerness to inject into that competition a substantial element of collaboration for the sake of avoiding confrontation and war. In subsequent years, however, that quest was gradually deemphasized and eventually largely abandoned.[1] At the same time, there began to be a notable lessening of restraint in the conduct of competition with the United States, particularly in the third world. Soviet military involvement in the third world escalated sharply, becoming much more frequent, direct, and larger in scale. Despite the potential risks in doing so, the Soviets came to rely far more heavily on force to influence the outcome of third-world conflicts than in the years before 1970.[2]

There can be no more critical question for the student of Soviet international behavior than why this major redirection occurred. An important and unique insight into the reasons for this development can be obtained by examining Soviet conduct in the region and period in which this change was first and most vividly manifested: the Middle East between the June 1967 and October 1973 wars. Near the end of

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[1] See, for example, Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 137-222, and Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II* (New York: Pergamon, 1984).

[2] See Bruce D. Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1-35, 216-45; Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts* (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1983), 53-124.

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this period, a crucial shift occurred in Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. In retrospect, it appears that this shift constituted a turning point in the evolution of Soviet foreign policy, not only toward the region, but toward the third world and the United States as well. An understanding of why the change in Soviet Middle Eastern policy took place will therefore be helpful in explaining the broader, more general reorientation of Soviet policy in the 1970s. Moreover, a method of analysis that is essential for comprehending Soviet actions in the Middle East will also shed considerable light on Soviet conduct vis-à-vis the United States, and in the third world as a whole.

I. Soviet Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Crucial Change

A substantial body of evidence indicates that Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict underwent a major change in the first months of 1973. Immediately after the Six-Day War, the chief thrust of Moscow's policy was to restrain the Arabs—to attempt to keep them from using force to "liberate" the territories occupied by Israel. However, sometime early in 1973, a decision was made to end that restraint and, in effect, to "unleash" the Arabs. After briefly summarizing the available evidence, I will address two questions: why was this restraint exercised in the first place, and, more important, why was it ultimately lifted—why did this sudden and dramatic reversal take place?

Although the U.S.S.R. quickly rebuilt the devastated war machines of Egypt and Syria after their 1967 defeat, and though it ultimately came to Egypt's assistance in the 1969-1970 War of Attrition, it strongly opposed that war and repeatedly pressed—even tried to compel—the Egyptians to discontinue, and refrain from renewing, their attacks on Israeli positions. Most important, the Soviets took great pains to see to it that the equipment they provided would not be used to launch an assault across the Suez Canal.[3]

After June 1967, the Kremlin leaders exerted considerable diplomatic pressure on the leaders of the "confrontation" states to relinquish their

[3] Mohamed Heikal, *The Sphinx and the Commissar* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 193-94; Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 196-97; Lawrence L. Whetten, *The Canal War: Four-Power Conflict in the Middle East* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), 154; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 163; Jon D. Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 196. For a more detailed discussion of Soviet Middle Eastern policy in 1967-73, see Dina R. Spechler, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East: The Crucial Change," in Paul Marantz and Blema Steinberg, eds., *Superpower Involvement in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985), 133-71.

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ambition of recovering the territories by force and to accept instead a negotiated solution which the U.S.S.R. would help to arrange and guarantee.[4] What is even more significant, the Soviet Union adopted a number of critical measures or rules of restraint in order to prevent Egypt and Syria from undertaking an offensive against Israel: (1) while it occasionally affirmed the Arabs' right to use "any" or "diverse" means to regain their territories, it consistently denied them permission to use Soviet weapons for that purpose, enforcing this denial through the presence of Russian advisers in every unit of the Egyptian armed forces down to the battalion level;[5] (2) it kept the majority of the most highly advanced weapons it supplied under Soviet operational control;[6] (3) it denied the Arabs what they (especially the Egyptians) considered a sufficient quantity of ammunition, spare parts, and crucial weapons to enable them to launch an attack on Israel; (4) it refused to provide its Middle Eastern allies with offensive weapons that could wreak significant damage upon the Israeli heartland.

The last two of these rules were the most significant ones. When Sadat came to power in September 1970, he concluded, as Nasser had before him, that in order to launch a successful offensive action against Israel, his country must obtain much more in the way of weapons than the Soviets had hitherto provided. Egypt needed greatly strengthened air and coastal defense systems, a much larger supply of equipment and weapons for tactical offensive use (i.e., for crossing the Suez Canal and engaging in combat in the Sinai), and offensive weapons of regional strategic significance (which would give Egypt the capability of retaliating in kind against Israeli bombing of Egypt's interior, and would thus deter such bombing).[7] The Soviet Union's failure to supply these items had forced Nasser to resort to a war of attrition rather than the full-scale attack he would have preferred.[8] When Sadat assumed the

[4] Heikal (fn. 3), 186-87, 193, 195, 216-17, 222; Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, in *Al Ahram*, July 10, 1968, quoted in *Middle East Journal* (Autumn 1968), 493; Cairo Radio, July 24, 1972 (Sadat speech); Sadat (fn. 3), 249; "The Soviet Attitude to the Palestine Problem: From the Records of the Syrian Communist Party, 1971-1972," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 2 (Autumn 1972), 188-89; Alexander Prlja, "A Reappraisal in Soviet-Egyptian Relations," *International Affairs* (Yugoslavia) 23 (November 5-20, 1972), 29; Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 204.

[5] *Pravda*, April 30, July 14, and October 19, 1972; Cairo Radio, April 3, 1974 (Sadat speech); Glassman (fn. 3), 84. Only after expelling the Soviets did Sadat feel free to go to war. (Sadat, fn. 3, p. 232.)

[6] Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Books, 1975), 161-63; Glassman (fn. 3), 105, 111.

[7] Heikal (fn. 3), 220, 249-50; Sadat (fn. 3), 198; Lt. General Saad el-Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez* (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), 159; Glassman (fn. 3), 96, 104-07.

[8] Glassman (fn. 3), 108-10.

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presidency, he pressed the Soviets relentlessly to make good these deficiencies. Yet throughout 1971-1972, despite mounting evidence of an impending crisis in its relations with Egypt, the U.S.S.R. failed to deliver defensive and tactical offensive weapons in the quantities Egypt deemed necessary, and provided no weapons at all with strategic offensive capability. While the Egyptians from time to time received assurances that some of the most critical items, including strategic weapons, would be forthcoming, these promises, with a few exceptions, were not kept.[9]

However, even though the Soviets continued almost until the outbreak of the war in October 1973 to express a strong preference for a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and even though they continued to try to persuade the Arabs to take this path, their policy seems to have undergone a significant change by February 1973.[10] Between February and October of that year, they broke all four rules of restraint that had governed their behavior in previous years.

In February 1973, the Soviets, apparently for the first time, gave the Egyptians (and thus indirectly the Syrians) to understand that the U.S.S.R. would not oppose an offensive aimed at reconquering the lost territories and would, moreover, provide aid and diplomatic support in time of war.[11] At the same time, the Soviets promised—and shortly thereafter began to deliver—the amounts of ammunition and parts and the numbers and types of weapons and equipment that the Arabs considered necessary for going to war—weapons that met all three of Egypt's most crucial needs.[12] Most important, the Egyptians finally obtained what they considered essential for an offensive: weapons that would present a strategic threat to Israel. Among these were *Scud* high-explosive surface-to-surface missiles able to hit its coastal cities. Moreover, even the most advanced of the weapons provided were placed under Arab operational control.[13]

In other words, in February 1973 the Soviet Union gave Egypt and

[9] Cairo Radio, July 24, 1972 (Sadat speech); *Newsweek*, August 7, 1972 (Sadat interview); Cairo Radio, April 3, 1974 (Sadat speech); Sadat (fn. 3), 187, 198, 212, 219-21, 225-28; Heikal (fn. 3), 249-51; Shazly (fn. 7), 28-29, 102, 106, 141, 157-58, 160-62; Glassman (fn. 3), 90-94, 102, 111-12.

[10] Sadat complained that, between February and October 1973, the Soviets never abandoned their preference for a negotiated solution and never ceased to pressure the Egyptians to "rule out" military means. See Cairo Radio, May 1, 1973, May 14, 1973, and April 3, 1974 (Sadat speeches); *Time Magazine*, March 25, 1974 (interview with Sadat). Cf. Galia Golan, *Yom Kippur and After* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 47-55.

[11] Cairo Radio, April 3, 1974 (Sadat speech); Kissinger (fn. 4), 469.

[12] Shazly (fn. 7), 197-98; *Newsweek*, April 9, 1973 (Sadat interview); Cairo Radio, July 23, 1973, and April 3, 1974 (Sadat speeches).

[13] Shazly (fn. 7), 197-98; Heikal (fn. 3), 253-54; Glassman (fn. 3), 105-07, 112-14.

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Syria a green light to go to war, and in the period between February and October 1973 it proceeded to supply what they considered the necessary requirements for doing so. Egypt's Chief of Staff at the time, Lt. General Saad el-Shazly, relates that equipment started pouring into Egyptian ports in vast quantities.[14] By the beginning of April 1973, Sadat was able to state: "The Russians are providing us with everything that's possible for them to supply. And I am now quite satisfied."[15]

The U.S.S.R.'s new policy appears to have played a critical role in precipitating the October War. It was precisely in April 1973—when Sadat declared himself "quite satisfied" with the arsenal he was getting—that he definitely decided to go ahead with his previously tentative war plans. Moreover, he set the date for the attack after receiving the first shipment of *Scuds* in the summer of 1973.[16]

The lifting of the Soviet restraints was an important step, which was to have major consequences for the U.S.S.R.'s position in the Middle East and the future of U.S.-Soviet relations. The 1973 War resulted in a marked increase in United States prestige in the region and set back for a decade Moscow's efforts to expand its influence there. More significantly, perhaps, the Soviet role in facilitating the war, along with Soviet conduct during the hostilities, did much to sour U.S. public and congressional opinion on détente, and thereby helped to doom it.[17]

II. Explaining the Change: The Rational Actor Paradigm

To explain this extraordinary, dramatic change in Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict it is necessary to consider first why the policy of restraint was conceived and implemented at all, in view of its high cost for Soviet-Arab, and especially for Soviet-Egyptian, relations. Nearly all who have investigated this matter suggest two reasons for this course of conduct: the Soviets wished to avoid a military confrontation with the United States and, particularly from 1969 on, to develop and preserve détente with the West. This interpretation is supported by the testimony of Arab leaders who held lengthy discussions with Soviet officials.[18]

[14] Shazly (fn. 7), 199. See also Heikal (fn. 3), 253-54.

[15] *Newsweek*, April 9, 1973 (Sadat interview).

[16] *Ibid.*; Cairo Radio, April 3, 1974 (Sadat speech); Glassman (fn. 3), 102, 113; Golan (fn. 10), 66.

[17] Cf. Alexander L. George, "The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973: Origins and Impact," in George, ed., *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), 148, 150; Glassman (fn. 3), 2.

[18] E.g., Glassman (fn. 3), 3-4, 93, 103-04; Golan (fn. 10), 21; George (fn. 17), 140; Cairo Radio, August 29, 1967 (comments by Heikal); Heikal (fn. 4), 493; "The Soviet Attitude to the Palestine Problem" (fn. 4), 188.

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It is less clear, however, why these vital objectives ceased to govern Soviet Middle Eastern policy in early 1973. The explanations of this change that can be gleaned from the work of Western scholars tend to fall into two schools. One of them analyzes the decision in terms of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The other focuses primarily on Soviet relations with regional actors and considers the U.S.S.R.'s global concerns only indirectly. What both schools have in common is that, like nearly all studies of Soviet conduct in the Middle East, they rely exclusively on what Graham Allison has called a "strategic actor" or "rational actor" paradigm.[19]

A. EXPLANATIONS FOCUSING ON SOVIET GLOBAL POLICY

1. Revealed preference. According to one interpretation, the Soviets had never really been serious about pursuing détente. That is, they had never really been prepared to sacrifice anything for it. They had certainly never intended to forgo, for the sake of détente, any foreign policy gain in the third world. They had never really been interested in cooperating with the United States to resolve third-world conflicts and prevent the development of situations that could lead to confrontation between the superpowers. It had always been their policy to exacerbate and exploit such conflicts whenever that promised to yield some advantage in their geostrategic competition with the U.S. The true nature of their attitude, however, was revealed to the West only in 1973.[20]

The problem with this explanation of Soviet behavior is that it does not square with the restraint demonstrated by the U.S.S.R. before February 1973. By the time they made the decision that led to the October War, the Soviets had already sacrificed something very significant for détente. They had done a great deal to uphold their commitment to work toward preventing a superpower confrontation. Their quest for a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict had been undertaken and sustained with the awareness that it could well cost them their position in Egypt.[21]

[19] Allison, *The Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

[20] This is the thrust of the argument in Robert O. Freedman, "Detente and U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Middle East During the Nixon Years (1969-1974)," in Della W. Sheldon, ed., *Dimensions of Detente* (New York: Praeger, 1978), 84-121.

[21] Particularly after Sadat came to power, Egypt's constant demands for weapons and repeated reproaches for the U.S.S.R.'s failure to deliver them created substantial tension between the two countries. For this reason, the Soviets made a major effort in 1971-1972 to diversify their bases of influence in the Middle East. (Glassman, fn. 3, pp. 96-97; Whetten, fn. 3, p. 216; Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970*, 3d ed. [New York: Praeger, 1982], 51-84.) By 1972, Sadat was already issuing thinly veiled warnings that if the Soviets were not more forthcoming, he would "have to act—a decision [would] have to be taken." (Sadat, fn. 3, p. 228.) That the Soviets understood what he had in mind

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2. *Changed calculus.* Another interpretation of Soviet behavior suggests that, by early 1973, the perceived benefits of restraint had become too small as compared with the perceived costs. The Soviets had become disillusioned by and pessimistic about American behavior, especially in the Middle East. They were angered by American unilateralism—by U.S. efforts to resolve the Middle East crisis without Soviet participation either in the process of negotiating a settlement or in the ultimate arrangements for guaranteeing one. They were disappointed by Washington's unwillingness to reciprocate Soviet pressure on the Arabs with similar pressure on Israel to make concessions for peace.[22] As a result of their experience with the United States in the Middle East, they no longer expected much from détente. Moreover, their felt need for détente was no longer so acute. The developing U.S.-Chinese relationship, as well as repeated Chinese armed provocations and a massive military buildup on the border with the U.S.S.R. had been a major spur to the Soviet quest for détente. But by 1973 the Soviets were confident of their ability to deter a major Chinese attack and had realized that there were many obstacles to a Sino-American alliance.[23]

This interpretation, too, has its problems. If the Soviets were dissatisfied with U.S. policy in the Middle East, it is also probable that they understood that American efforts to induce Israel to make compromises were likely to be more successful after the elections in that country, which were scheduled for October 1973. It is likely that they were at least somewhat mollified by Washington's assurance that the U.S. would undertake a major peace initiative after the new Israeli government had been chosen.[24] At the same time, the Soviets were pleased with the strong American support for ratification of the German treaties, with their access to the U.S. grain market, with the SALT I agreement signed at the Moscow summit in 1972, and with apparent U.S. recognition of the U.S.S.R. as a global power. There were many signs that they were very

is indicated by Brezhnev's rejoinder: "the presence of Soviet advisers in Egypt [is] an international necessity." (Shazly, fn. 7, pp. 161-62.) Mohamed Heikal, editor of the influential Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram*, notes on the basis of his contacts with high Soviet officials that the Soviets were not surprised by the expulsion and, indeed, "had prepared themselves in advance for something of the sort." (Heikal, fn. 6, p. 175.) Even Henry Kissinger acknowledges that the Soviets had been prepared to sacrifice their relationship with Egypt in order to preserve détente. (Kissinger, *White House Years* [Boston: Little, Brown, 1979], 1297; Kissinger, fn. 4, p. 204. Cf. Glassman, fn. 3, p. 3.) Kissinger likewise notes that the Soviets had sacrificed the goodwill of their Vietnamese allies and would make significant compromises in domestic policy, such as rescinding the exit tax on Soviet Jews, for the sake of their developing relationship with the United States. (Kissinger, fn. 4, pp. 252-53, 287.)

[22] See George Breslauer, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1967-1972" in George (fn. 17), 89-95.

[23] See Freedman (fn. 20), 102.

[24] See Kissinger (fn. 4), 460.

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eager for the détente process to go forward.[25] There is no indication that, by early 1973, they were generally disillusioned with détente or had ceased to expect that it would bear valuable fruit.[26]

3. *Misperception*. According to this view, the Soviets misread the attitudes of the American administration and public. In so doing, they reached the mistaken conclusion that neither a war in the Middle East nor their role in bringing one about would affect détente. They were aware of impatience with Israel on the part of some administration officials, increasing skepticism in the U.S. about Israel's willingness to withdraw from the territories it occupied, and growing American doubts about the justice of Israel's positions. They therefore thought that the United States would not regard the Arabs' resort to force or Soviet facilitation of it as entirely unreasonable.[27] The Soviets may also have thought that President Nixon's position had been so weakened by the Watergate scandal that, no matter what they did, he could not afford to jettison détente—regarded by many as one of his administration's few successes.[28]

There are two major flaws in this argument. On the one hand, it is hard to see how the Soviets could have misinterpreted the administration's position on Israel and the Middle East. True, a number of State Department officials had voiced sympathy for the Arabs' dilemma. However, Kissinger—whom the Soviets viewed as the authoritative foreign policy spokesman for the administration—had made clear to the Kremlin leadership how firmly the U.S. supported Israel and how much importance it attached to preserving peace in the Middle East. He had also emphasized on numerous occasions that détente "would not survive a foreign policy challenge."[29] The message, moreover, had gotten through. Even after the policy change of February 1973, the Soviets apparently continued to tell the Egyptians that they must not go to war because that would jeopardize détente.[30] With regard to Nixon and Watergate, on the other hand, such considerations could have affected Soviet calculations only later in the year. Watergate did not reach the proportions of a national scandal until mid-April 1973. At the beginning of the year, when the Soviets made their critical decision concerning the

[25] Kissinger (fn. 21), 1141-42; Kissinger (fn. 4), 231, 247-49, 268, 274-76, 986.

[26] Their disillusionment set in only in the autumn of 1973—after the U.S.-supported coup in Chile and the passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment by the House Ways and Means Committee. (Glassman, fn. 3, pp. 118-19; Kissinger, fn. 4, pp. 990-98.)

[27] Glassman (fn. 3), 119.

[28] Freedman (fn. 20), 102; Freedman (fn. 21), 137.

[29] Kissinger (fn. 21), 1246-48; Kissinger (fn. 4), 247.

[30] This is the way Sadat understood Soviet statements at the time. (See *Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1973, p. 489.)

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Middle East, they could not have known how deeply preoccupied Nixon was with the affair.

B. EXPLANATIONS FOCUSING ON SOVIET RELATIONS WITH REGIONAL ACTORS

1. Egyptian compromise. It has been argued that the Soviets waited to give Egypt sufficient means to go to war until they had received a firm commitment from Sadat that he would wage only limited, rather than total, war against Israel. Such a war, they assumed, would not require Soviet intervention and thus would carry no risk of a superpower confrontation.[31]

This explanation, too, is problematic. Shazly states that, from the time he became Chief of Staff in spring 1971, the Arabs had had only a limited offensive in mind and had made this clear to the Soviets long before the beginning of 1973.[32] Moreover, the weapons the Soviets supplied, even after February 1973, were completely inadequate for the Arabs to attempt total war. The U.S.S.R. therefore did not have to wait for an Egyptian pledge before supplying those weapons. Even if such a pledge was given, it is unlikely to have been a critical factor in the Soviet decision, since a commitment of this kind could have had very little value for the Soviets. The Kremlin leaders apparently assumed to the last that the Arabs would lose any war they began unless they were aided during the hostilities.[33] Thus the Soviets must have recognized that, whatever their allies' intentions, the U.S.S.R. would probably have to intervene to mount a rescue operation. One could not, therefore, rule out a confrontation with the United States on the basis of a promise from Sadat.

2. Miscalculation. It has been hypothesized that the Soviets either assumed that Sadat was bluffing and wouldn't really go to war, or thought that by cooperating with the Egyptians, they could exert more influence over them and ultimately prevent them from launching an offensive.[34]

Although Sadat had been threatening to go to war for some time without actually doing so, it would appear that the Soviets had not taken these threats lightly—hence their restraint in supplying him with weapons. It is hard to see why they should suddenly have changed their assessment of the Egyptian leader's intentions and (if they wanted to

[31] Glassman (fn. 3), 98.
[32] Shazly (fn. 7), 28-29.
[33] Heikal (fn. 3), 256-57.
[34] Freedman (fn. 21), 136; Rubinstein (fn. 3), 235; Golan (fn. 10), 41.

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prevent war) have tempted him to carry out his program at last. As for the notion that they expected to be able to control the Egyptians, they had already failed to do this despite (or because of) extensive arms aid in 1967 and 1969-1970. With their advisers gone, the Soviets could not expect to exert more influence over the Egyptians than they had in the past, especially since they were relinquishing their most effective lever of control.

3. Egyptian blackmail. The third and final account of Soviet conduct that emphasizes the U.S.S.R.'s perceptions of the situation in the Middle East is the counterpart to the "changed calculus" argument outlined earlier. This explanation, however, focuses on the allegedly increased perceived costs, rather than diminished benefits, of restraint. The Soviets, it is asserted, were badly hit when Sadat, as part of the expulsion, ordered all the U.S.S.R.'s military facilities in the country to be turned over to Egyptian control. This move was followed by an Egyptian threat to sever all relations with the U.S.S.R., to abrogate the Treaty of Friendship between the two countries, and to deny the Soviets use of valuable port facilities unless they supplied the long-sought weapons. Fearing the loss of their entire political-military position in the Arab world, the Soviets caved in.[35]

Although there are some helpful insights to be found in this analysis of Soviet behavior, it is, like the interpretations previously examined, by no means free of difficulties. It is true that in August 1972 Sadat wrote to Brezhnev, warning (somewhat vaguely) that if the Soviets failed to respond positively to the Egyptians' requests by October 31, he would "take the decisions [he] deemed fit."[36] This threat does not, however, appear to have precipitated a change in Soviet policy. Although the U.S.S.R. apparently did make some significant pledges of weapons in mid-October, these pledges were withdrawn a month later, and the promised items were not delivered.[37]

By the fall of 1972, it had become clear that Sadat's position was weakening, and this greatly diminished his ability to stand up to the Soviet Union. The Egyptian President had tried and failed to purchase the arms he needed in Western Europe. His National Security Adviser had been unable even to arrange a meeting with Kissinger. And there was growing domestic pressure on him to restore the alliance with Moscow.[38]

[35] Rubinstein (fn. 3), 246; George (fn. 17), 145.
[36] Sadat (fn. 3), 233-34; Heikal (fn. 3), 251-52.
[37] Shazly (fn. 7), 172; Golan (fn. 10), 35, 268, n.84.
[38] Rubinstein (fn. 3), 212, 224; Kissinger (fn. 21), 1300; Radio Amman, October 23, 1972, and *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), October 31, 1972; both quoted in *The USSR and the Third World* 11 (No. 10, 1972).

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These developments must have reassured the Soviets that Sadat would be unable to carry out his threat. Any doubts they may have had on this score were surely dispelled in December, when Sadat, on his own initiative, renewed the agreement on Soviet use of Egyptian port facilities, which had been due to expire in March 1973.[39] Thus, without making any concessions, without altering their policy of restraint, the Soviets had secured continued access to the facilities they desired.

Even if Sadat had not yielded on this score, moreover, the Soviets' position in the Arab world would have been far from desperate. In the previous two years they had succeeded in strengthening their political, economic, and military ties with nearly all the "progressive" regimes in the area.[40] Most importantly, Soviet relations with Syria had in no way been damaged by the expulsion from Egypt, and in the fall of 1972, the U.S.S.R. was granted bases in Syria for reconnaissance operations against the U.S. Sixth Fleet. These replaced the bases it had earlier lost in Egypt.[41]

In sum, while Sadat did use the threat of severing relations and withholding port facilities, and while his bold expulsion of Soviet military advisers gave that threat credibility, his ultimatum was withdrawn and port facilities guaranteed to the U.S.S.R. *before* the Kremlin made the decision to change course. The Soviets were not faced with the likely loss of their political-military position in the Arab world. That position, in fact, was quite strong and did not have to be salvaged by a major policy reversal.

III. An Alternative Paradigm

Both the difficulty of explaining this critical decision by using the rational actor paradigm and the puzzling inconsistencies in Soviet behavior before and after the decision (initial opposition to, yet eventual support for, the War of Attrition; critical aid during that war, along with strong pressure to conclude and observe a ceasefire; repeated promises of weapons, but repeated failure to deliver them; refusal of permission to use Soviet equipment in an assault across the Canal, accompanied by occasional references to the Arabs' right to use force to liberate their territories; eventual authorization to go to war, followed by renewed expression of opposition to such a course) make it seem likely that what changed early in 1973 was not a leadership consensus about the optimal means of pursuing global objectives or regional interests.

[39] Cairo Radio, April 3, 1974 (Sadat speech); Sadat (fn. 3), 237-38.
[40] See fn. 21.
[41] Glassman (fn. 3), 97.

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Rather, what changed was probably the balance of influence among competing conceptions of Soviet foreign policy held by competing political actors.[42] The decision to end the vital restraints imposed since 1967 probably reflected a shift in the relative power of various domestic forces holding differing views and priorities concerning U.S.-Soviet relations, Soviet Middle Eastern policy, and the relationship between the two. In other words, the Soviet foreign policy process, like its American counterpart, should be seen as an ongoing conflict among elite actors, many of whose views are related to their differing functions or institutional allegiances.[43]

What kind of data would enable one to test the hypothesis that there is conflict over foreign policy among Soviet elites? If such conflict does exist, how can one determine the nature of the debate, the participants in it, and the influence of their respective positions at any given time? Although Soviet officials do not generally publish revealing memoirs or give informative interviews on matters of foreign affairs, there is a rich alternative source of alternative data: the principal organs of the national media. These do contain extensive discussions of foreign affairs, often articulating general outlooks that are the basis of specific positions. Moreover, testimony of émigrés who have worked in the Soviet media suggests that each of these organs tends to be controlled by or associated with a powerful individual or group that speaks for a broad elite "constituency" and enjoys a major voice in policy formulation. Thus, taken together, these newspapers are likely to reflect the array of elite opinions that are represented in the top leadership.[44]

[42] The inconsistencies in Soviet behavior, if taken alone, might be explained simply by the existence of two contradictory goals that could not both be adequately served by any single policy. However, it would still be necessary to explain why one goal was given primacy until January-February 1973, and the other, contradictory, objective was clearly emphasized after that time. Taken together with the dramatic change in policy, the inconsistencies strongly suggest elite conflict.

[43] Although elite conflict paradigms have been employed frequently by students of Soviet domestic policies, they have been far less widely used for the analysis of Soviet foreign policy. The prevailing view among scholars working in this area is that such paradigms are of limited—indeed, quite dubious—utility for the study of Soviet decision making in external affairs. See Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior," Adelphi Paper No. 101 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1973), 6-7; Karen Dawisha, "The Limits of the Bureaucratic Politics Model: Observations on the Soviet Case," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 13 (Winter 1980), 300-46; Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet National Security Decisionmaking: What Do We Know and What Do We Understand?" in Jiri Valenta and William Potter, eds., *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 273-74. Studies of Soviet foreign policy decisions that have focused on elite conflict are noted in Dawisha, 304ff., and Meyer, 275-76. Also see Ilana Kass, *Soviet Involvement in the Middle East: Policy Formulation, 1966-1973* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978), and Robert Cutler, "Domestic and Foreign Influences on Soviet Policy-Making," *Soviet Studies* 37 (January 1985), 60-89.

[44] In 1975-1982 the author interviewed Soviet émigrés who had served as or been in

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Once various media organs have been analyzed, émigré sources, official speeches, and the testimony of non-Soviet participant-observers can be useful for linking the organs examined and the views expressed with identifiable individuals, groups, and sometimes institutions. Finally, an analysis of authoritative resolutions, formal communiqués, and the timing of policy and personnel changes at or near the top can help in ascertaining which set of views is dominant at a given time.

To determine whether the paradigm of elite conflict can be applied to the Soviet foreign policy process, I undertook an intensive study of the foreign policy positions articulated by the six major Soviet newspapers in 1973.[45] For the purpose of the present article, this study was supplemented by an examination of the other sources enumerated above, and the findings were checked for relevance to the period 1967-1972. The results are summarized below and are then used to explain the 1973 decision and the inconsistencies in Soviet behavior before and after that decision.

A. ELITE IMAGES OF THE UNITED STATES AND POSITIONS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was possible to ascertain four distinct viewpoints among Soviet leaders and political elites with regard to both Soviet policy in the Middle East and Soviet global policy. Moreover, the views expressed on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict by each media organ were related to and seemed to be derived from different images of and attitudes toward the United States and U.S.-Soviet relations. Each of these images or sets of attitudes embodied, on the one hand, a distinct view of the nature of the United States and Soviet relations with it, the rationale for détente (if any), the importance of détente to the U.S.S.R, and the need to make concessions or compromises in order to preserve détente. At the same time, associated with each image was a position regarding the need for and desirability of a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The four images were

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frequent contact with journal or newspaper editors or party officials responsible for supervising the media. The results of this research are reported in Dina Rome Spechler, *Domestic Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1978); Dina Rome Spechler, *Permitted Dissent in the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1982); Dina Rome Spechler, *Russian Nationalism and Political Stability in the USSR* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and Center for International Studies, MIT, 1983). Cf. Cutler (fn. 43); Alexander Yanov, *The Russian New Right* (Berkeley: Institute of International Relations, University of California, 1978).

[45] The papers were *Pravda, Izvestiia, Komsomol'skaia pravda, Trud, Krasnaia zvezda*, and *Sovetskaia Rossiia*. A more detailed description of this study and its findings may be found in Spechler (fn. 44, 1978).

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cooperative, competitive, antagonistic, and a hybrid of cooperative and antagonistic. The first three, which appear to have had the greatest impact on foreign policy, will be discussed here.[46]

1. *The cooperative image* was expressed in the Central Committee newspaper, *Pravda*. It was articulated by General Secretary Brezhnev and seems to have represented the views of an influential segment of the central party apparatus. According to this image, the United States could be described as an *adverse partner*. While still an adversary, it was a potential partner of the U.S.S.R. in solving key international problems. Those who subscribed to this image saw the possibility of "international relations of a new type"—a situation in which adversaries recognized certain common interests and worked together to promote them. The holders of this image perceived the prevention of a military confrontation with the United States as the most acute problem facing the Soviet Union. They thought that the Soviet Union should give the highest priority to solving this problem, working with the United States to reach agreements that would decrease the probability of such confrontations. Another important objective was the reduction of international tensions that made confrontation more likely and cooperation more difficult. They saw this effort to construct a new relationship with the United States, in which possibilities for cooperation would be developed and residual conflicts of interest would be diminished as far as possible, as the meaning and purpose of détente.

The holders of the cooperative image were impressed by the inherent fragility of détente: they recognized that it was necessarily an effort to transcend—not to eliminate—an underlying adversary relationship. They did not want events in the Middle East (or in any other region) to cause or deepen mistrust and hostility between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. As they saw it, superpower involvement in and commitment to the Middle East and other third-world regions should be limited in order to prevent military confrontation. The U.S.S.R. should not withdraw from the Middle East or other vital third-world areas, but its presence and activities in those areas must not cause needless alarm to the United States. The superpowers should come to an agreement specifying the activities permitted to each, or establishing, in some other form, rules of the game governing their behavior in the Middle East and elsewhere. They should strive for de-escalation of conflicts between their regional allies. A political agreement in the Middle East was particularly urgent.

[46] See *ibid.*, 17-70, for a fuller description of and evidence for the four images.

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2. *The competitive image* was expressed in *Izvestiia*, the organ of the Council of Ministers. Articulated by Prime Minister Kosygin, it apparently embodied the views of many officials involved in the consumer-goods sector, technological development, and state administration. According to this image, the United States should be viewed as a *realistic competitor*. It was not a partner, but a rival in an economic contest. Soviet victory in that contest would be greatly facilitated if the U.S.S.R. could induce the United States to provide technology, investment capital, and consumer goods on favorable terms. This was, ironically, very much in America's interest, since its economy constantly required new markets and investment outlets.

For the holders of this image, the possibility of obtaining technology and capital was the chief rationale for détente. Although they thought it important to cultivate détente, they did not consider major concessions necessary for this purpose, as the U.S. leaders and public realized how great America's stake was in economic exchange with the U.S.S.R.[47]

It was desirable, from the standpoint of those who held this image, to find a political solution to the Arab-Israeli and other third-world conflicts. These conflicts generated tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and these tensions created a poor climate for developing an economic relationship. However, since economic relations were potentially so beneficial to both countries, it was expected that they would ultimately be sustained even if superpower competition in the third world intensified and political relations deteriorated.

3. *The antagonistic image* appeared in *Krasnaia zvezda, Komsomol'skaia pravda*, and *Trud*, the newspapers of the Ministry of Defense, the youth organization, and the trade union organization, respectively. The speeches and writings of Admiral Gorshkov (the head of the Soviet navy), Defense Minister Grechko, Party Secretary Suslov, KGB Chairman Andropov, and Trade Union head Shelepin articulated this image. It also appears to have reflected the ideas of influential factions in the military, of substantial numbers of party *apparatchiki* concerned with ideology and propaganda, and of many officials who exercised functions of control and supervision of the Soviet population (police, trade union, and youth officials).

According to holders of this image, the United States was an *unalterable antagonist*, necessarily hostile and threatening to the Soviet

[47] Until 1971, *Izvestiia* had espoused a different line which was more antagonistic to détente. It is probable that in the earlier period, the newspaper was controlled by a different group, consisting of state officials from the defense and producer-goods sectors. The pro-détente group probably became more influential as the possibilities of and need for a highly profitable economic relationship with the West began to loom larger in the early 1970s.

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Union because of its economic and military power and aggressive intentions. The U.S. must be actively countered and restrained, both militarily and politically. Highest priority must therefore be given to expansion of Soviet military power and political influence on a global scale. The U.S.S.R. must acquire friends and military facilities and maintain loyal allies wherever these would help to combat, contain, or undermine American power. It must also sustain a high level of vigilance at home in order to counteract American efforts at political and ideological subversion. Détente was an American scheme to distract Soviet citizens and officials and to lure them into lowering their guard. Reduction of international tensions was an illusory objective. Tensions would always persist because of America's inevitable enmity to the U.S.S.R.

Those who held this image contended that it would not be tragic—indeed, it might be fortunate—if events in the Middle East or elsewhere in the third world were to disrupt or prevent détente. The inevitability of U.S.-Soviet antagonism would then be demonstrated more clearly to Soviet citizens, and they could be better trained to cope with it. Necessary measures could be taken to ward off U.S. subversion within the U.S.S.R. There was little reason to restrain the Arabs or demand that they seek a peaceful resolution of their conflict with Israel. Indeed, a settlement was desirable only if it was likely to weaken American influence in the Middle East (e.g., by requiring Israel to accept millions of Palestinian returnees, a step which would drastically alter the character of the country and undermine its ties to the United States).

B. ELITE DEBATE AND SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

By keeping in mind the different images of the United States held by Soviet elites and the different attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict associated with and derived from these images, one can better understand the important change in Soviet behavior that occurred early in 1973. Moreover, by taking these competing images and disagreements over policy as a starting point, one can also explain the inconsistencies and contradictions in Soviet conduct prior to and after that change. Arab and Soviet sources provide substantial evidence to support an explanation of this kind.

It may be argued that, by the late 1960s, those who held the cooperative and competitive images of the United States had become the dominant force in shaping Soviet foreign policy. The quest for détente—reflected in the negotiations on the status of Berlin, the SALT talks, and the effort to obtain most-favored-nation status and U.S. trade credits—was

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undertaken at their insistence.[48] At no time were they completely in control, however, and in the formulation of regional policy, especially policy toward the Middle East, their views sometimes did not prevail. This was true, for example, of the decisions in 1969-1970, first to allow Nasser to undertake the War of Attrition, and later to commit thousands of Soviet personnel to direct combat roles in that war.[49] Still, until January 1973, the holders of the cooperative and competitive images were able both to determine the basic direction of and relationship between Soviet global and regional policies, and to enforce their policy priorities by imposing critical limits on the nature of Soviet arms transfers. After that, they began to be less influential, especially in the formulation of policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, although their views continued to have an impact on and were reflected in important aspects of Soviet behavior during and after the October War.

In the years preceding that war, holders of the cooperative image, fearful of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation and anxious to preserve détente, were responsible for the extensive Soviet efforts to reach agreement with the United States on a formula for a Middle East peace settlement.[50] In addition, those who held the cooperative and competitive images were the chief source of the constant Soviet pressure on the Arabs to reach a peaceful solution.[51] From the viewpoint of the cooperativists, the con-

[48] Cf. Breslauer (fn. 22), 88.

[49] Heikal, Nasser's close confidant, gives an account of the Egyptian President's meeting with the Soviet leaders in January 1970. When Nasser begged the Soviets to assume responsibility for the air defense of Egypt, Heikal writes, Brezhnev put up stiff resistance, declaring that such a step "would provide all the makings of a crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States." (Heikal, fn. 6, p. 86.)

[50] Heikal, who participated in many high-level talks between the Egyptians and the Soviets, writes that the Politburo was split on the question of whether Kosygin should meet President Johnson after the June 1967 War to attempt to reach agreement on the terms of a settlement. Brezhnev's defense of the plan was decisive. (Heikal, fn. 3, pp. 188-89.)

[51] Heikal recalls that almost as soon as the guns stopped firing in the 1967 War, the Soviets began pressuring the Arabs to come to terms with Israel, even if this required diplomatic recognition. The two Politburo figures most involved in this effort, Heikal notes, were Brezhnev and Kosygin. (*Ibid.*, 186-87, 194.) Apparently Kosygin had initially taken the lead in this area. Even before the June War, he had tried to bring the Arabs to the bargaining table with Israel, suggesting to Nasser in 1966 that he consider an "Arab-Israeli Tashkent" to resolve the conflict. (*Ibid.*, 280.) But Brezhnev appears to have been equally, if not more, eager for a peaceful solution. When Presidents Aref of Iraq and Boumédienne of Algeria went to Moscow shortly after the June War to plead for greater assistance to the Arab cause, Brezhnev was not sympathetic. He reportedly told his guests that he spent sleepless nights worrying about a new war in the Middle East. Such a war, the General Secretary declared, "would bring the whole world to the brink of catastrophe." (Heikal, fn. 6, p. 48.) When the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian armed forces, Mohamed Sadek, visited Moscow for the same purpose in June 1972, Brezhnev's response was similar but more pointed. Sadek was told that Egypt and the U.S.S.R. must work together within the framework of U.N. Resolution 242. If the Egyptians did not cooperate in this effort and tried to go to war, the Soviet Party Chief warned, they could not expect the U.S.S.R. to rescue them. (Shazly, fn. 7, pp. 161-62.)

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sequence of a probable superpower collision in the Middle East were far more grave than the possible adverse effects of Soviet weapons restraint on Soviet-Egyptian and Soviet-Arab relations.[52] It was the holders of the cooperative image, therefore, who insisted that Egypt must not receive the advanced offensive weapons it repeatedly requested.[53]

Those who subscribed to the cooperative and competitive images were, however, continually criticized by elites who held the antagonistic image. Ideologues in the party apparatus disliked the appearance of superpower condominium that any joint U.S.-Soviet peace plan would be sure to generate. They thought all efforts to arrive at a U.S.-Soviet agreement on the Middle East were futile in view of the sharp contradiction between American and Soviet interests in the area, and they strongly opposed pursuing such efforts because of the unfavorable impression they created in the third world.[54] Influential military leaders saw Egypt and the Middle East as strategically vital. They wanted to give priority to the Soviet-Arab alliance, not to détente, and were ready to do whatever was necessary to maintain that alliance. Hence, they advocated both a more sympathetic attitude toward Arab use of force and deeper Soviet military involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.[55] They were ready, even eager, to "unleash" the Arabs and were not concerned by the possibility that this might lead to direct Soviet intervention and U.S.-Soviet confrontation.[56]

The holders of the antagonistic image were at no point completely

[52] Brezhnev made no attempt to disguise his impatience with the Egyptians over their repeated requests for more and better arms. He told Sadat more than once that he was "sick and tired of being asked for new aircraft and refused to discuss it anymore." (Heikal, fn. 6, p. 158.)

[53] Brezhnev reportedly told Sadat that he personally, "and nobody else," decided to delay the delivery of the strategic weapons promised on several occasions prior to February, 1973. (*Ibid.*, 158-59.)

[54] Nasser learned, for example, that Party Secretary Suslov had vigorously attacked the proposed Kosygin-Johnson meeting in 1967, declaring that no good could come of it. (Heikal, fn. 3, pp. 188-89.)

[55] On the occasion of the visit of Egypt's Commander-in-Chief, Mohamed Sadek, to Moscow in June 1972, Soviet Defense Minister Grechko took the extraordinary step of telling the Politburo in Sadek's presence that the policy of restraint must be abandoned. The Egyptians should prepare for war, Grechko declared, and "Egypt must be supplied with the weapons to insure victory." (Shazly, fn. 7, pp. 161-62.)

[56] Grechko said as much on at least two occasions. When the Egyptian Minister of War was about to leave Moscow just prior to the June 1967 War, his Soviet counterpart admonished him, "Stand up to them! The moment they attack you, or if the Americans make any move, you will find our troops on your side." Two years later, after the Israeli raid on an Egyptian military post at Ras Zafarana on the Red Sea, Grechko complained to members of the Egyptian mission in Moscow, "You should be more daring. You should have stopped them. ... Why are you afraid? The Soviet navy in the Mediterranean is following the American Sixth Fleet like a shadow. They can't do anything. If the Americans put their marines into Israel, we are ready to land our troops on your territories." (Heikal, fn. 3, pp. 28, 194.)

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without influence on Soviet weapons transfer policy. Not only did they prevail with regard to the War of Attrition; their persuasion probably accounts for the important new commitments of weapons which the Politburo made or reiterated to the Arabs on at least half a dozen occasions in 1971-1972.[57] It was they who travelled to the Middle East to confirm these promises or to make other concessions: they wished to make sure that the firmness of the U.S.S.R.'s friendship was fully and properly communicated to its vital third-world allies.[58] Until February 1973, however, holders of the cooperative image were sufficiently powerful to see to it that most of these promises were not kept.[59]

Pressure for a policy shift from holders of the antagonistic image became much more intense after the expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt in July 1972.[60] As they saw it, the expulsion had dealt a major blow to the U.S.S.R. It had deeply embarrassed and humiliated the Soviets, demonstrating to the entire world the fragility of the Soviet position in the Middle East. It had deprived the U.S.S.R. of what some viewed as uniquely important strategic facilities, vital not only to the Soviet Union's presence in the Mediterranean, but also to its operations in Africa and the Persian Gulf. Sadat's explanation of his action had created an image of the U.S.S.R. as an unreliable ally for third-world countries and had left the Soviets vulnerable to Chinese accusations of superpower collusion to obstruct the forces of national liberation. A number of military leaders maintained that if the U.S.S.R. failed to come through, Egypt and Syria would completely cut their ties with the Soviets and turn to the Americans to negotiate the return of their territories.[61] The disintegration of the entire Soviet position in the Arab world—maybe even the third world as a whole—might follow unless Arab demands were met and Soviet willingness to support progressive forces were demonstrated.

It would appear that the expulsion greatly strengthened the hand of those who viewed the United States as an unalterable and dangerous antagonist. They were now able to argue more convincingly than before that too much was being sacrificed for détente. As might be expected, their arguments did not persuade the cooperativists. When Egyptian

[57] Cf. Karen Dawisha, "Soviet Decision-Making in the Middle East: The 1973 October War and the 1980 Gulf War," *International Affairs* (London) 57 (Winter 1980/81), 47.

[58] E.g., Shelepin in January 1969; Grechko in February and May 1972; Gorshkov in May 1972. (Heikal, fn. 6, pp. 67, 164; Kass, fn. 43, pp. 208-09; Shazly, fn. 7, pp. 156-57.)

[59] See fn. 53.

[60] *Krasnaia zvezda* initiated a campaign following the expulsion to convince the leadership of the importance of the Soviet-Arab alliance. (Kass, fn. 43, pp. 210-11.)

[61] Heikal (fn. 3), 253; Heikal (fn. 6), 164.

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Premier Sidky visited Moscow in October 1972, Brezhnev refused even to see him. Other holders of the cooperative image used the occasion to emphasize once again that Egypt must seek a peaceful solution.[62] But there were signs that support for this approach was weakening in the Politburo, that holders of the antagonistic image had won some crucial allies. While Premier Kosygin referred to a peaceful settlement as a "feasible goal" in his speech honoring Sidky, he also affirmed that the Arabs had the right to use "any means" to liberate their territories.[63]

Those who subscribed to the competitive image of the United States had never been as deeply committed to a peaceful settlement as the cooperativists. There is evidence to suggest that they now agreed to support Arab use of force—and to supply the needed weapons—on condition that the Arabs would no longer be given easy credits and allowed to pay in local goods and produce, but would be required to pay in cash for what they received.[64] Such payments would provide the hard currency eagerly sought by the competitivists to finance the purchase of Western technology and consumer goods. Perhaps because of their shift, Sidky seems to have gone home with assurances that Sadat would be provided with what he most wanted: surface-to-surface missiles capable of striking Israeli cities.[65]

The holders of the cooperative image were able to prevail one last time. As we have seen, the promises made in October were withdrawn in November, when an Egyptian military mission arrived in Moscow to discuss the details of the Soviet commitment.[66] But the position of those who gave priority to avoiding confrontation and developing détente was now weaker than before the expulsion. It would seem that in the eyes of many in the political elite, the events of July 1972 had discredited not only the policy of restraint itself, but also to some extent those who advocated that policy. These events appear to have set in motion a gradual shift in the balance of power and influence among holders of the various images in favor of those who viewed the United States as an unalterable antagonist, and the third world as a crucial arena for combating this deadly foe.

A top-level reappraisal of Soviet-Egyptian relations was initiated in late December 1972. The outcome was not at the outset a foregone conclusion, since the policy of restraint still had strong support within

[62] Prlja (fn. 4), 29.
[63] *TASS*, October 16, 1972.
[64] Reports that such a demand had been made of the Egyptians circulated in the West in September 1972. (*Le Monde*, September 2-3, 1972, cited in Golan, fn. 10, p. 40.)
[65] Shazly (fn. 7), 172.
[66] Golan (fn. 10), 35, 268, n.84.

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the Politburo.[67] But when a large amount of Persian Gulf money was made available to Egypt for arms purchases at the end of December and beginning of January, it became virtually inevitable that at least some of those who held the competitive image would support the sale of the weapons requested.[68] A dramatic change of course was apparently decided upon sometime near the middle or end of January.[69] The decision did not meet with universal approval among the political elite generally.[70] Nor were all important Politburo members ready to accept it.[71] Indeed, for a time it seemed as though some cooperativists had resolved to do all they could to confuse and antagonize the Egyptians and thereby obstruct the new policy. When the Egyptian Minister of War, Ismail Ali, came to Moscow in February 1973, Grechko and other military leaders were prepared to discuss a path-breaking military package, but Brezhnev pressed him to make peace and warned him that if Egypt went to war, he could not expect the Soviets to intervene to save it.[72]

In contrast to previous years, however, holders of the cooperative image were now unable to prevent the arms transfers they had steadfastly

[67] Knowledgeable East European diplomats concluded at the time that the U.S.S.R. had decided not to resume an active role in Egypt. *New York Times*, December 20, 1972.

[68] On the money made available in December-January and its impact on Soviet decision making, see *ibid.*, and Rubinstein (fn. 3), 242. That Kosygin was among those who supported the sale is indicated by his assertion in Stockholm a few weeks later that "we consider that Egypt is entitled to have a strong army at the present time in order to . . . liberate its own lands." *New Times*, No. 15 (April 1973). That Kosygin's "defection" was a decisive factor is suggested by Kissinger's observations on the Soviet leadership in action in May 1972. Although Brezhnev was "clearly the top man" Kissinger notes, he "appeared to need the support of Kosygin and Podgorny to carry the Politburo with him." (Kissinger, fn. 21, p. 1214.)

[69] Although Sadat had begun making serious preparations for war as early as August 1972, it was only in January 1973—evidently on the basis of reports of Moscow's changed position—that he concluded he would be able to go through with his plans. *Ahbar al Yom*, August 3, 1972 (Sadat interview); Middle East News Agency, October 8, 1974 (Sadat interview); both cited in Golan, fn. 10, p. 37. Toward the end of January 1973, the Soviet propaganda apparatus began to issue militant statements about the Middle East which justified and affirmed the new policy. The propaganda weekly *New Times* accused Israel of preparing for war against the Arabs; Moscow Radio, commenting on the visit of a Vietnamese delegation to the U.S.S.R., suggested that Vietnamese use of "resolute military action, together with different forms of political and diplomatic struggle," should be a model for the Arabs. *New Times*, No. 4 (January 1973) and No. 7 (February 1973); Moscow Radio (in Arabic), January 27, 29, and 31, 1973; both cited in Golan (fn. 10), 38-39.

[70] Even some holders of the competitive image apparently were not persuaded of the merits of the new course. *Izvestiia* drew a very different analogy between the Middle East and Vietnam, maintaining that U.S. experience demonstrated that arms were irrelevant for obtaining solutions, and even the most difficult conflicts could be resolved. (March 8, 1973, cited in Golan, fn. 10, p. 39.)

[71] Brezhnev's speech to the Vietnamese reiterated his longstanding fear of a superpower confrontation in the Middle East and stressed that U.S.-Soviet cooperation would make possible a peaceful settlement of the crisis there. *TASS*, January 30, 1973, cited in Golan (fn. 10), 39.

[72] Cairo Radio, April 3, 1974 (Sadat speech).

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opposed. In the new circumstances that had emerged since the expulsion from Egypt, they could no longer maintain the priorities they wished to be accorded to the various regional and global objectives of the U.S.S.R. For the first time since the inception of détente, therefore, U.S.-Soviet relations were given second place to the preservation of the Soviet position in the Arab and the third world.[73]

IV. Conclusion: Elite Conflict and the Redirection of Soviet Foreign Policy

February 1973 marked a turning point in the course of Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the aftermath of the 1967 War, the U.S.S.R. had become more deeply involved in military support for the Arabs, not only massively rearming them, but assuming a more direct role in the operation of their armed forces. At the same time, however, the Soviets had made extensive efforts to achieve a settlement of the conflict, repeatedly attempting to cooperate with the United States for this purpose, bringing considerable pressure on the Arabs to negotiate, and exercising notable restraint and caution in the transfer of arms.

In February 1973, the Arabs were informed that the Soviets would not oppose—and would, indeed, support—a war to liberate their territories. Between February and October 1973, weapons essential to such an undertaking, which had hitherto been carefully withheld, were delivered to the Arabs and placed under their operational control. During this period, moreover, contradictions in Soviet policy intensified: the

[73] That the reversal of Soviet policy in January-February 1973 was the result of a gradual increase in the power and influence of holders of the antagonistic image who opposed détente is confirmed by several developments in the following months: (a) In April 1973, Minister of Defense Grechko and KGB head Andropov, both leading subscribers to the antagonistic image who had expressed serious reservations about détente, were elevated to the Politburo—indicating a major political victory on their part. See Karen Dawisha, *Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Egypt* (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), 147. The appointment of Foreign Minister Gromyko to that body at the same time does not appear to have represented a gain for the proponents of détente. Gromyko was known not so much for his support for any particular line or set of priorities as for his technical expertise on a wide range of subjects, especially relations with the United States. (Cf. Kissinger, fn. 4, p. 230.) He was probably placed on the Politburo to allow his expertise to be more fully exploited. (b) Also in April 1973, resolutions issued by the Party Central Committee began to express similar reservations about détente, emphasizing "the need for constant vigilance and readiness to rebuff any provocations of the aggressive reactionary imperialist circles." (*Pravda*, April 28, 1973.) (c) At the beginning of August 1973, for the first time since the mid-1960s, the Politburo issued a public statement echoing those sentiments: "In contemporary international conditions, as before, vigilance is necessary against the intrigues of the reactionary forces. . . ." (*Izvestiia*, August 5, 1973.) (d) Soon after, Brezhnev's speeches on détente began to take on a defensive tone, as if he now felt it necessary to contend with the arguments of a more powerful opposition. (See, for example, *Pravda*, September 25, 1973.)

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U.S.S.R. authorized a major war and made it possible, while at the same time insisting that such a war must not be waged.

Until February 1973, the Soviet attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict was shaped primarily by the requirements of Soviet global policy at the time—i.e., by the desire to avoid a superpower military confrontation and to develop the new relationship of détente. The decision to end the policy of restraint appears to have been taken with full knowledge that both a confrontation and the rupture of détente could result. It is difficult to provide a satisfactory explanation of this decision by using the traditional "rational actor" paradigm. Use of a paradigm that assumes not only a diversity of views but conflict over policy priorities and objectives among the Soviet political elite, greatly assists in the effort to understand Soviet behavior. Both the change in February 1973 and the inconsistencies in Soviet policy that preceded it can best be explained if one focuses on (a) the diverse images of the other superpower held by various elites whose views were represented in the top leadership, (b) the conflicting priorities and objectives with regard to both global and regional policies—including policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict—derived from these different images, and (c) the gradual shift in power and influence among holders of those various images, brought about by what Soviet elites perceived as a major setback to the Soviet position in the third world. The inconsistency in Soviet policy that continued after February 1973 can likewise be explained by the persistence of divergent elite images and policy positions and the enduring (although diminished) political influence of leaders and elites who had hitherto prevailed in policy debates.

What changed in February 1973, in other words, was that the dominant voice in the formulation of Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict ceased to be that of individuals and groups who gave high priority to the avoidance of confrontation and the development of détente and became that of key elites who were concerned almost exclusively with expanding Soviet influence and building positions of strength in the Middle East and throughout the third world.

In the light of this finding, we are in a better position to understand not only Soviet behavior toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also the more general redirection of Soviet policy that occurred in the early 1970s—the shift in emphasis from collaboration and détente with the United States to more aggressive competition for political influence and strategic presence in the third world. The years since 1970 witnessed both a major escalation of Soviet military involvement in regional conflicts and a marked erosion of traditional restraints on such involvement.

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After 1970, the frequency of Soviet military intervention in third-world disputes rose significantly.[74] At the same time, there was a notable increase in the scale of direct Soviet military participation in such conflicts.[75] The size of Soviet arms deliveries to third-world combatants also grew perceptibly, and the U.S.S.R. began to provide substantial military support not only to friendly regimes, but also to Marxist-Leninist groups seeking to seize and retain power throughout Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.[76]

In even sharper breaks with precedent, top-level Soviet commanders began directing the course of hostilities in regional conflicts, and the Soviets, without invitation, sent soldiers into a third-world country in order to topple the regime in power.[77] Along with their greater activism, the Soviets manifested a greater propensity to take risks in the conduct of their third-world interventions.[78] They also displayed a new willingness to undertake formal military commitments to countries outside the Warsaw Pact. Since 1971, the Soviet Union has signed twelve Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation pledging long-term military aid to third-world regimes involved in protracted conflicts.

The escalation of the Soviet military role in third-world disputes can be explained, at least in part, as the outcome of elite conflict within the U.S.S.R. Undoubtedly, other factors are also important in accounting for this phenomenon: the intensification in the 1970s of the expansionist impulse of the U.S.S.R.'s communist allies in the third world; the significant increase in this period in Soviet air- and sea-lift capabilities; downward revision in Soviet assessments of the risk of superpower confrontation in the third world because of America's post-Vietnam opposition to foreign military involvement, and the shift in the conventional and strategic military balance in favor of the U.S.S.R. However, these factors had a major impact on Soviet policy as a result of the arguments by and the growing influence of leaders and elites who viewed the United States as a dangerous and implacable antagonist, and who

[74] Data in Stephen Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981), indicate that the U.S.S.R. conducted 29 "political-military" interventions in third-world conflicts between 1970 and 1979, as against 16 in the previous decade. The U.S.S.R. intervened in 21 distinct conflicts in 1970-1979, 8 in 1960-1969. (Blechman and Kaplan define intervention in such a way that there can be more than one in a given conflict.)

[75] Compare Hosmer and Wolfe (fn. 2), 129, 246, n.5, with *Strategic Survey, 1970* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), 47; see also *The Economist*, October 27, 1984, p. 42.

[76] Hosmer and Wolfe (fn. 2), 131-32; Kaplan (fn. 74), 89, 160-61; Donald S. Zagoria, "Into the Breach: New Soviet Alliances in the Third World," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Spring 1979), 733-38.

[77] Colin Legum, "Angola and the Horn of Africa," in Kaplan (fn. 75), 623-24; Hosmer and Wolfe (fn. 2), 117, 121.

[78] See Porter (fn. 2), 232, and Kaplan (fn. 74), 170-72.

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were increasingly prepared to use military means to undermine or contain American influence.[79]

The tendency toward more frequent, more extensive, and less cautious use of force in the third world was already in evidence by 1970; it was held in check for some time by those within the Soviet political establishment who believed that to fuel and exploit regional conflicts was less in the interest of the U.S.S.R. than to cooperate with the U.S. in managing and resolving such conflicts. Developments in the third world and in U.S.-Soviet relations in the years after 1973, however, made it impossible for holders of the cooperative image to continue to restrain Soviet policy. A series of American actions had the effect of validating the arguments and decisively strengthening the hand of those who held the antagonistic image of the United States and were in favor of countering American power by the use of force in the third world.

The first of these actions was the C.I.A.'s involvement in the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile in September 1973. The U.S.-backed military coup, deposing the first head of state ever freely elected on a Marxist-Leninist program, did enormous damage to the position of the cooperativists. They had cited the success of Allende's "Popular Unity" government as the prime example of the way in which détente would serve to restrain imperialist forces in the West and would thus open up new opportunities for third-world states to maintain "independent" (i.e., pro-Soviet) domestic and foreign policies.[80] Allende's demise completely undercut this argument and placed the supporters of détente on the defensive. They could no longer argue that Soviet restraint in the third world would be reciprocated.

C.I.A. paramilitary aid to the FNLA and UNITA in Angola, initiated prior to the large-scale Soviet-Cuban intervention on behalf of the MPLA in September-October 1975, further served to confirm the arguments of those who held the antagonistic image of the United States. The hesitation and vacillation in Soviet policy toward Angola in 1973-1975 strongly suggest elite disagreement. However, despite the clear warnings repeatedly issued by Washington that Soviet intervention in that country would threaten the entire spectrum of U.S.-Soviet relations, Brezhnev and his supporters do not seem to have insisted as strongly on restraint as they did in the matter of arming the Arabs. Rather, they appear to have gone along with proponents of intervention in the military, the

[79] See Mark Katz, *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 11ff.

[80] See, for example, Dmitry Volsky, "Soviet-American Relations and the Third World," *New Times*, No. 36 (September 1973), 4-6.

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party apparatus, and the K.G.B. The cooperativists now seem to have felt that, in order to keep détente alive, they had to go to some lengths to demonstrate to its detractors that it would not be an obstacle to Soviet global activism and would not prevent the U.S.S.R. from aiding its third-world allies.[81]

By November 1979, when the decision to invade Afghanistan appears to have been taken, American behavior had made it completely impossible to "sell" a vision of superpower cooperation and mutual restraint to the Soviet political establishment. Many Soviet observers had reached the conclusion, not only that the Senate would reject the SALT treaty if it came to a vote, but also that "hardliners" surrounding President Carter were working to obstruct its passage, and that even the President himself had "done everything to sabotage the agreement."[82] The administration had recently announced its intention substantially to increase military spending, to create the Rapid Deployment Force, and to deploy the MX and Trident sytems. In addition, it had sought and obtained a well-publicized agreement from other NATO countries to place 572 new medium-range strategic missiles in Europe by mid-1983. The Kremlin leaders perceived these actions as highly threatening and provocative. It appears that Brezhnev and other cooperativists initially opposed the invasion, still hoping to save the SALT agreement and to revive détente. However, the General Secretary seems to have yielded to holders of the antagonistic image who advocated the operation.[83] In the political climate that American policy had helped to generate, he could no longer argue convincingly that the cooperative image was a sound basis on which to formulate policy.[84]

This analysis suggests that the dramatic shift in Soviet Middle Eastern policy which occurred early in 1973 was not an isolated event, but the

[81] See Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Decision-Making on the Intervention in Angola," in David E. Albright, ed., *Communism in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 109-10.

[82] Interview with V. Fedin, First Deputy Director of the International Information Department of the Party Central Committee, *Stern* (Hamburg), January 31, 1980, cited in Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," *Orbis* 24 (Summer 1980), 209.

[83] In sharp contrast to *Krasnaia zvezda, Pravda* spoke favorably of Hafez Amin, the Afghan leader whom Soviet troops deposed, up to the day before Soviet forces entered the country. High military officers and prominent ideologues appear to have been key supporters of the invasion. See *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, November 23, 1979 (speech by Aleksei Epishev); Mikhail Agursky, "Nitzim v'yonim nusach hapolitbiuro" [Hawks and doves in Politburo form], *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv), February 7, 1982; Valenta (fn. 83), 210-12; Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion," *International Security* 57 (Fall 1980), 123-27; Dimitri Simes, "The Military and Militarism in Soviet Society," *International Security* 6 (Winter 1981/82), 135-36.

[84] The actions of the Carter administration, Brezhnev complained shortly after the invasion, had demonstrated that the United States was "an absolutely unreliable partner." (*New York Times*, January 13, 1980.)

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first manifestation of a redirection of the entire Soviet approach to relations with the United States and the third world. The intensification and expansion of the U.S.S.R.'s involvement in third-world conflicts which followed its change of course in the Middle East indicate that the 1973 decision was a major turning point in the evolution of Soviet foreign policy generally. Moreover, both that decision and the critical shift in priorities that it reflected can be fully comprehended only through the use of an elite conflict paradigm. By employing such a paradigm we can understand the dynamics of the process by which developments in the U.S.S.R.'s international environment—in the policies and relative capabilities of other actors in the international system—come to have an impact on Soviet policies and behavior, both at the regional and at the global level.

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ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND COMMUNIST LEGITIMACY

By STEPHEN WHITE*

I. Introduction

IT is generally agreed that all regimes, from naked tyrannies to pluralistic democracies, seek to legitimate themselves. In other words, they try to generate a belief in the obedience-worthiness of their rule, which will in normal circumstances secure the acceptance of their decisions without resort to overt coercion.[1] One of the earliest attempts to classify the forms of legitimacy—and still the most influential in the contemporary literature—was that of Max Weber. Regimes, Weber suggested, might seek to legitimate themselves in three main ways: on "rational-legal" or procedural grounds, based upon a belief in the "legality" of a given set of political institutions; on "traditional" grounds, sanctified by long-established usage; or on "charismatic" grounds, based upon a belief in the exceptional qualities of the ruler or of the institutions approved by him.

Although Weber made clear that these "ideal types" did not necessarily exhaust the repertoire of means of political legitimation, his classification has remained central to most modern discussions of legitimacy. Its influence is apparent in more recent accounts: the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, for instance, distinguishes between "numinous" and "civil" legitimacy (broadly speaking, Weber's second and third forms of legitimacy and his first form, respectively). At least one modern author has argued that Weber's threefold typology "has the same status in social science that an older Trinity has in Christian theology."[2]

* An earlier version of this paper was presented to seminar audiences at the Universities of Essex and Edinburgh and at St. Antony's College, Oxford; I have benefited from the discussions that followed.

[1] A good general discussion of legitimacy in contemporary politics is available in Bogdan Denitch, ed., *Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks for Analysis* (London and Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979). A useful selection of more recent papers may be found in William Connolly, ed., *Legitimacy and the State* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984). On political legitimation in communist countries, see particularly T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher, eds., *Political Legitimation in Communist States* (London: Macmillan, 1982), and Paul G. Lewis, ed., *Eastern Europe: Political Crisis and Legitimation* (London: Croom Helm, 1984).

[2] David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IX (New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1968), 244-45; John H. D. Schaar, *Legitimacy in the Modern State* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981), 15. Related discussions are in Gianfranco

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Of Weber's three modes of legitimation, it is perhaps the rational-legal or procedural that has the most obvious relevance to contemporary nation-states in the Western world, where legality generally inheres in the process of competitive election by which governments are formed. Legitimacy of this nature has normally been sufficient to secure acceptance of the decisions of governments established in this manner in the liberal democracies, even when (as has often been the case in the 1970s and 1980s) the interests of many citizens have been adversely affected.

In states whose regimes are not legitimated in this way, as in the communist countries, the claim to rule is generally based upon other grounds: to some extent upon traditional and charismatic grounds, but particularly upon a source of legitimacy to which Weber gave no direct attention: socioeconomic performance, or what has been called "social eudaemonic" legitimation (from the Greek word for happiness).[3] This mode of legitimation is based upon the role of government in providing social and economic benefits for its citizens—a role generally assumed by governments to a significant degree only some time after Weber's death. For communist and other authoritarian systems, socioeconomic or "performance" grounds of this kind have typically been seen as the single most important basis upon which they may seek legitimation.[4]

It has been suggested that this distinctive legitimation formula, and the political-economic tradeoff upon which it is based, may be described as a "social contract," "social compact," or "social compromise."[5] The regimes concerned provide few of the civil liberties that citizens of the liberal democracies take for granted: free speech, an independent press, a rule of law, and genuine rather than plebiscitary elections. On the other hand, communist regimes do generally provide a high level of social welfare: a comprehensive educational and health care system, security of employment and stable prices, modest but steadily rising living standards and upward career mobility—all of them sustained by

Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (London: Hutchinson, 1978), 132-34, and Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: System. Process and Policy*, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 30-34. Weber's discussion of legitimacy is most conveniently available in his *Economy and Society*, ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), I, 212-99.

[3] Arnold Gehlen, *Studien zur Anthropologie und Soziologie* (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1963), 255.

[4] See, however, Christel Lane, "Legitimacy and Power in the Soviet Union through Socialist Ritual," *British Journal of Political Science* 14 (April 1984), 219-32.

[5] See, respectively, Vladimir Kusin, *From Dubcek to Charter 77* (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1978), 179; Alex Pravda in Rudolf L. Tökés, ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1979), 226-27, 250-52; and Ferenc Feher, Agnes Heller, and Gyorgy Markus, *Dictatorship over Needs* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 104, 277-79.

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high and steady rates of economic growth within a framework of public ownership and central planning. This has not always been an entirely successful legitimation formula: uprisings in the G.D.R., Poland, and Hungary during the 1950s, for instance, showed the limitations of the social compact as a basis for regime authority, particularly in countries in which communist rule was an alien imposition and in which socialist institutions have never enjoyed the support of popular consensus. What has mattered more in the 1970s and 1980s, however, is that communist governments have found it increasingly difficult to deliver their side of the politico-economic contract; in particular, they have suffered from generally declining rates of economic growth, making it more and more difficult for them to provide the socioeconomic benefits on which the social compact was premised. In the absence of alternative (particularly rational-legal) grounds for legitimation, it has widely been agreed that the stability or obedience-worthiness of many communist regimes must be seriously and perhaps critically affected.

One of the first to point to such difficulties, even before the growth rate in communist countries had begun to falter, was Richard Löwenthal. Basing himself mainly upon the experience of the Soviet Union, China, and Yugoslavia, Löwenthal pointed out that, although communist regimes had generally performed satisfactorily in social and economic terms, no regime—communist or otherwise—could guarantee a continuously successful performance in these or any other respects. Communist regimes, in other words, could only temporarily and precariously be legitimated by their socioeconomic performance; in the long run, there was "no alternative to legitimacy based upon institutional procedures."[6] Seweryn Bialer, writing more recently on the "politics of economic stringency" in the U.S.S.R., has noted that the Soviet leadership will face difficult choices in the remainder of the 1980s in view of demographic, national, military, and other pressures, and the absence of an agreed procedure for setting priorities among them. A relatively high growth rate of perhaps 3 percent per annum, he suggests, might enable the Soviet leaders to "muddle through" until at least the end of the decade; a lower growth rate of perhaps 1 or 1½ percent might precipitate a "socio-political crisis of major proportions."[7]

[6] Löwenthal, "The Ruling Party in a Mature Society," in Mark G. Field, ed., *Social Consequences of Modernization in Communist Societies* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 81-118, at 107. Löwenthal takes a similar view in his chapter on "Political Legitimacy and Cultural Change in West and East," in *Social Change and Cultural Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

[7] Bialer, *Stalin's Successors* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 295, 298.

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A similarly apocalyptic view is taken in a wide variety of other works—for instance, in Marshall Goldman's *Crisis in the Soviet Union: The Failure of an Economic System* (1983), Stephan Hedlund's *Crisis in Soviet Agriculture* (1984), and Jan Drewnowski's edited symposium, *Crisis in the East European Economy* (1982). R. V. Burks has also pointed to declining rates of economic growth, an alcoholism problem of "epidemic proportions," and problems of energy and labor supply; he argues that "all the ingredients for some kind of explosion are increasingly in place."[8] Richard Pipes maintains that all the communist systems are in the "throes of a serious economic crisis"; the Soviet system, in particular, is suffering not only from an economic slowdown, but from an indecisive and unpopular leadership and the strains of its multinational empire. Pipes concludes that the Soviet Union today fits Lenin's definition of a "revolutionary situation."[9]

To some extent, these views may reflect a tendency toward wishful thinking on the part of scholars with a particularly strong personal antipathy toward the communist states and the ideology with which they are associated. The views that have been quoted, however, represent a fairly wide spectrum of academic opinion, and the issues that have been raised are real, not imaginary ones. Serious economic difficulties—which have been acknowledged by the regimes themselves—are bound to have some kind of effect, if not perhaps a cataclysmic one, upon the stability or legitimacy of communist rule as such. In the remainder of this paper, I propose to consider, first, some of the broad parameters of the economic deterioration in the communist countries to which all commentators have drawn attention and which underlies what is taken to be the "crisis" in their legitimacy. I will then examine some of the deterministic conclusions for the stability of communist systems that have been drawn from the deterioration in economic performance. Finally, in the main part of the paper, I will outline four "mechanisms of adaptation" by which the effects of the deterioration in economic performance upon the political systems of those countries may be mediated.

II. Economic Performance and the "Social Compact" in Communist Systems

The political consequences of the economic performance of the communist countries, not their economic performance as such, constitute

[8] Burks, "The Coming Crisis in the Soviet Union," *East European Quarterly* 18 (Spring 1984), 61-71.

[9] Pipes, "Can the Soviet Union Reform?" *Foreign Affairs* 63 (Fall 1984), 47-61, at 50.

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the main concern of this paper. It is necessary, at the outset, nonetheless, to indicate some of the main features of the recent economic performance of the communist countries. The period since the late 1950s or early 1960s, it would be widely agreed, has seen, if not a crisis, at least a significant and still continuing economic slowdown in the communist countries. There has obviously been considerable variation from year to year, and from country to country. The broad trends, however, are remarkably similar (see Table 1). In the Soviet Union—the largest communist economy and one whose performance has a major impact upon all others in the communist world—annual rates of economic growth (by the Soviets' definition) averaged 11.4 percent in the early 1950s, 9.1 percent in the later 1950s, 6.5 percent in the early 1960s, 7.7 percent in the later 1960s, 5.7 percent in the early 1970s, 4.4 percent in the later 1970s, and a planned 3.4-3.7 percent in the first half of the 1980s.[10] These last figures, the lowest planned increases in Soviet history, are nonetheless unlikely to be achieved; 1981 and 1982 were particularly poor years, with 1982 registering a 2 percent growth rate—the lowest in Soviet

TABLE 1
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, 1950-1983
(Annual average percentage increase in produced national income)

	1950-1955	*1956-1960*	*1961-1965*	*1966-1970*	*1971-1975*	*1976-1980*	*1981-1983*
Bulgaria	15.6	11.7	7.7	10.4	9.1	6.9	4.3
Czechoslovakia	9.6	7.9	1.6	7.9	6.1	3.9	0.8
Hungary	6.4	6.8	4.4	7.8	7.1	3.0	1.8
G.D.R.	17.0	8.2	3.8	5.7	6.0	4.5	4.1
Poland	10.2	7.5	6.9	6.7	11.9	1.3	−4.0
Romania	18.8	7.5	10.9	9.0	14.4	8.1	2.9
U.S.S.R.	14.2	10.9	7.5	8.9	6.3	4.7	4.0
Unweighted average	13.1	8.6	6.1	8.1	7.7	4.6	1.9

Source: Calculated from *Statisticheskii ezhegodnik stran-chlenov SEV 1971* and *1984* (Moscow, 1971 and 1984), 21-28, 17-24.

[10] See Jan Drewnowski, ed., *Crisis in the East European Economy* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 158; *Guardian* (London), July 14, 1983, p. 19. Alternative data based upon utilized national income are presented in Radio Liberty Research Bulletin RL 484/84, December 19, 1984; they show an annual average of 7.1% in 1966-1970, 5.1% in 1971-1975, 3.9% in 1976-1980, and 3.2% in 1981-1984. The complex methodological considerations involved in such calculations are considered in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950-80* (Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O., 1982).

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history. Although 1983 was somewhat better (3.1 percent), 1984 resumed the earlier trend with a recorded increase in net material product of just 2.6 percent.[11]

The picture is more varied in Eastern Europe. Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic have been performing relatively successfully, while Poland has performed particularly badly; but the broad trend is similar in all these countries. According to C.I.A data, for instance, average growth rates of 4.7 percent were attained in Eastern Europe in the early 1970s, but the annual figures for 1976-1981 were 3.2, 2.8, 1.0, -0.6 and -0.9 percent. The figures were still worse when considered on a per capita basis.[12] Of the other communist countries, China has performed variably, with just 1.5 percent growth in 1981, but much better in 1983 and 1984.[13] Yugoslavia, however, has done perhaps worst of all, with just 1 or 2 percent growth in the early 1980s, an officially recorded inflation rate of 60 percent, 10 percent nonagricultural unemployment, a massive foreign debt, and an average fall in living standards of 40 percent over the past five years.[14] It is perhaps not surprising that a Yugoslav student newspaper went so far as to publish an "obituary" for the Yugoslav economy, which, it asserted, had expired altogether in 1984.[15]

There is much room for discussion about the definitions of economic growth that are employed, the variations between rates of growth that are reported in different sources, the time span over which performance is calculated, and even the desirability, in itself, of economic growth. It is also possible to argue that the relevant basis of comparison may not be the earlier performance of these countries, but that of the industrialized West, which has been experiencing a serious and prolonged economic recession over the same period, accompanied by high and still rising levels of unemployment of a kind that the communist states have on the whole avoided. It is nonetheless difficult to dispute that the communist countries, taken as a whole, have experienced a major slowdown in their rates of economic growth; that this slowdown is a trend which is still continuing, although it may have stabilized temporarily in 1983 and 1984; and that it has exposed serious and deep-seated problems in the areas of technological innovation, utilization of scarce

[11] *Pravda*, January 29, 1984, p. 1, and January 25, 1985, p. 1.
[12] Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of Economic Statistics 1982* (Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O., 1982), 42-43.
[13] United Nations, *World Economic Survey 1984* (New York: United Nations, 1984), 87.
[14] Radio Free Europe Background Report: Eastern Europe No. 1, January 4, 1985; *Financial Times*, January 3, 1985, p. 2.
[15] Radio Free Europe Background Report: Yugoslavia, No. 79, May 16, 1984.

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resources (particularly energy), price levels, overcentralization, and the whole complex of issues that economists have associated with the transition from extensive to intensive growth. The communist regimes have found it difficult to cope with these problems, which may indeed not be readily resolvable within the parameters of "actually existing socialism." It is also clear that there is every reason, at least on the face of it, to expect this economic slowdown to have serious consequences for the social compact or for the the politico-economic equation upon which, it has been argued, the regimes' legitimacy is based.

The social compact involves the surrender of a wide range of political liberties, such as competitive elections and an independent press, in return for a range of socioeconomic benefits, such as comprehensive social security, full employment, stable prices, easygoing industrial discipline and steadily rising living standards. All of this is threatened, at least in principle, by the economic slowdown, which has led to a series of sharp price rises particularly for energy-related commodities, but also (in some cases) for foodstuffs, household goods, and public services. (In Poland—admittedly an exceptional case—food prices rose no less than 162 percent of 1982; very substantial rises have also occurred in Bulgaria and Hungary.)[16] There have also been serious shortages in many communist countries, accompanied by the introduction or extension of rationing and (inevitably) of profiteering. Attempts have been made to encourage firms to stiffen industrial discipline and shed labor, though not to reintroduce unemployment as such; career and social mobility have obviously suffered as well.[17]

Concurrent with the failure to catch up with or, in some cases, to keep pace with the Western economies, growing signs of a moral crisis or loss of faith in both public and private life have become evident. There has been an increasingly apparent alienation from the party and the official ideology; a turn toward more private preoccupations, such as religion, pop music, or the "second economy"; and a greater reported incidence of drug-taking, sexually transmitted diseases, juvenile delinquency, and alcoholism. Social problems such as poverty and the situation of the elderly have emerged or become more serious; there has been a reported fall in life expectancy and a rise in infant mortality in some of these countries.[18] In a few cases, despite the sanctions that the authorities

[16] United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1983* (New York: United Nations, 1984), 175.

[17] See Walker Connor, *Socialism, Politics and Equality* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

[18] On this last and somewhat controversial point, see, for instance, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O., 1983), II, pp. 193-96 and elsewhere.

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have at their disposal, an overt political opposition has developed—most conspicuously Solidarity in Poland, but also Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, the church-based peace movement in the G.D.R., and nationalist movements in Yugoslavia, particularly in Kosovo. The conclusion might appear to follow that the communist regimes, lacking formal or rational-legal legitimacy, have been placed in a serious—indeed perhaps critical—position by their increasing inability to provide the accustomed range of social and economic benefits to their citizens—or, in other words, to sustain their side of the social compact on which their legitimacy is founded.

III. The Economics and Politics of Legitimacy in Communist Systems

It is possible to take issue with this thesis in several ways. For instance, on the economic side of the equation, there have undoubtedly been difficulties in the communist countries in recent years. The regimes, nonetheless, have managed for the most part to sustain a growth rate of 3 to 4 percent in the early 1980s; this figure is respectable at least by Western standards, and is apparently sustainable for some time to come.[19] They have done so, moreover, while generally retaining full employment (except for Yugoslavia) and maintaining stable prices at least for basic commodities such as foodstuffs (although here there are more exceptions). Within the somewhat lower levels of economic growth they have been able to maintain, the communist leaders have had some freedom of maneuver in terms of the distribution of material rewards; in particular, they have been able to ensure that the social group that has benefited more than any other from economic growth is the industrial working class, upon whose continued support or acquiescence the regimes depend above all for their stability.[20]

With greater mobility and increased exchange of information, the citizens of communist countries can more readily compare their situation with that of their counterparts in the capitalist West; comparisons of this kind, however, are by no means entirely to the disadvantage of the communist regimes. Higher levels of violence and crime, massive and still rising unemployment, and the absence of a guaranteed (albeit modest) standard of living do not appeal greatly to populations whose historical experience has inclined them to conceive of rights for the most

[19] *World Economic Survey 1984* (fn. 13), 1, 87-88.

[20] See, for instance, Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati, eds., *Blue-collar Workers in Eastern Europe* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), esp. chap. 6.

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part in collective and economic rather than in individual and political terms.[21] Official toleration of forms of unorthodox economic activity, such as "colored markets" or the "second economy," may also help to absorb popular energies and to reduce dissatisfaction in areas such as tailoring, restaurants, and domestic repairs, in which central planning has always tended to perform inefficiently.

It nonetheless remains true that the slowdown in economic growth which the communist countries have experienced provides their leaders with perhaps the most serious challenge they have faced since industrialization; and the political management of that economic slowdown is an issue with serious implications for the stability or legitimacy of communist rule. I will argue, however, that the manner in which the political consequences of the economic slowdown in the communist countries has been posed—for instance by the writers quoted at the outset—requires some reconsideration. The relationship has generally been seen as one in which the economic factor is dominant and the political factor is the subordinate or dependent variable. I consider this to be an unduly determinist manner of conceiving that relationship; it sees the regimes as largely helpless in the face of a deterioration in their economic performance, and their legitimacy as almost exclusively a function of that performance. I intend to reassert the primacy of politics and to point to the ability of the regimes themselves to maneuver, to adjust, to coopt, and in one way or another to preempt the seemingly inevitable.

More particularly, I wish to suggest that an emphasis upon crisis in the communist systems is premature; and that the economic difficulties they face may be mediated by political action. Moreover, although they certainly lack procedural legitimacy of the kind conferred by competitive elections, other forms of linkage or "mechanisms of adaptation"[22] are available by which the governmental authorities in these countries can absorb and process demands, expand the consultative capacities of their systems, give a stake in the system to various sections of their populations, and perhaps preempt demands for more far-reaching and antisystemic change.

There is usually no obvious party or ideological interest in issues such as housing, transportation, youth, and women's questions with which the mass public in communist countries is apparently mainly concerned, and the regimes have generally little to lose and a great deal to gain by at least appearing to take popular preferences into account on such

[21] See Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1979).

[22] This term is taken from W.J.M. Mackenzie's work on political adaptivity; see his *Biological Ideas in Politics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), esp. chap. 6.

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matters. As the economic bases of legitimacy seem to decline in importance, it may prove possible to shift some of the burden of legitimation from purely economic performance to these other political or procedural bases. At least four such mechanisms are of particular importance in this connection.

IV. Mechanisms of Adaptation in Communist Systems

The first mechanism of adaptation is *electoral linkage*: that is, the increasing use by communist regimes of the electoral mechanism (and indeed of representative institutions themselves) to provide, if not a genuine choice, then at least a degree of *apparent* choice from among a range of officially sponsored candidates. Twenty years ago, anything other than a single-slate election was an isolated phenomenon in the communist countries. In the mid-1980s, some degree of choice is characteristic of more than half of the world's communist systems, and is still gaining ground.[23] Poland, in 1956, was one of the first to establish the practice of nominating more candidates than there were seats available, albeit by a "list" system with a heavy bias in favor of the approved candidates—who were placed at the top of the ballot.[24] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, this system afforded at least a modest degree of citizen involvement in the political process; the civil unrest of the early 1980s led, not to its suspension, but to its cautious extension in electoral arrangements for local and national elections in 1984 and 1985—which provided, for the first time, for the nomination of two candidates for each of the seats available. In the 1985 general election, for instance, two candidates were selected for each of the 410 popularly-elected seats, with a further 50 candidates selected for a separate and uncontested national list. The outcome was not entirely successful from the regime's point of view: in the 1984 local elections, candidates outnumbered voters at many pre-poll meetings, and in the October 1985 general election the level of turnout was no more than 78.9 percent (or 66 percent according to Solidarity)—much lower than the 1980 turnout of 98.8 percent or the normal figures for communist general elections. The exercise was nonetheless sufficiently satisfactory for the authorities to retain these procedures for future local and national elections.[25]

Some discussion of the extension of electoral choice took place in the

[23] See Stephen White, John Gardner, and George Schöpflin, *Communist Political Systems: An Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 76.

[24] A good general survey is available in George Sakwa and Martin Crouch, "Sejm Elections in Communist Poland: An Overview and a Reappraisal," *British Journal of Political Science* 8 (October 1978), 403-24.

[25] *Trybuna Ludu*, June 20, 1984, p. 1; "Elections to the People's Councils," *Poland Watch*,

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U.S.S.R. in the 1960s, but it had no impact upon established procedures and has not been continued.[26] In Bulgaria, the possibility of electoral choice was formally provided for in 1973, but has not as yet been brought into effect.[27] In Czechoslovakia, the electoral law of 1967, which provided for a degree of electoral choice, was rescinded in 1971 without having been implemented.[28] A list system is employed in the G.D.R., which secures the election, in all but exceptional circumstances, of the regime's approved candidates.[29] So far as is known, no reforms of this nature have at any time been suggested in Albania, which is one of the communist countries that claims no less than 100 percent electoral turnout and support for its single slate of candidates.[30] The general trend in most communist countries, however, is firmly in the direction of multiple candidacies.

In Romania, for instance, the 1975 elections were the first to take place with more candidates than seats available: 139 of the 349 constituencies offered two candidates for the single seat available in each, and there were several cases of two Central Committee members running against each other. In the 1980 and 1985 elections, these principles were taken further, with 151 and 145, respectively, of the 369 constituencies offering a choice of two candidates and a further 39 and 40, respectively, offering a choice of three.[31] In China, the new electoral law of 1979, which came into effect in 1980, made provision for the nomination of up to twice as many candidates as seats available at both the local and national level. A secret ballot has also been held for a regional party secretary, although the result required ratification by the Central Committee.[32]

Most remarkably of all, in Hungary the practice of multiple candidacies, first introduced in 1967, was made mandatory in 1983 for all

No. 6 (1984), 13-21; Radio Free Europe Situation Report: Poland, Nos. 11 and 13, June 15 and July 13, 1984, and No. 18, November 8, 1985.

[26] See Theodore H. Friedgut, *Political Participation in the USSR* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 145-47.

[27] See Rigby and Feher (fn. 1), 41.

[28] Otto Ulc, "Legislative Politics in Czechoslovakia," in Daniel Nelson and Stephen White, eds., *Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective* (New York: SUNY at Albany Press, 1982), 116.

[29] See C. Bradley Scharf, *Politics and Change in East Germany* (London: Pinter, 1984), 25-26.

[30] In the 1982 elections in that country, only one voter is reported to have failed to endorse the single slate of candidates; see *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1983* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1983), 237.

[31] Nelson and White (fn. 28), 87; *Scinteia*, March 11, 1980, p. 1, and March 19, 1985, p. 1.

[32] Cheng Zihua, "On China's Electoral Law," *Beijing Review* 22 (September 14, 1979), 15-18; *Guardian*, November 1984, p. 7. Also see Robert E. Bedeski, "Electoral Reform in China," paper presented to the XIII IPSA Congress, Paris, 1985 (mimeo).

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elections at the local and national levels from 1985 on. "For years there has been voting in Hungary," Imre Pozsgay, Secretary General of the People's Patriotic Front, told Radio Budapest; "now there will be an election." In the national elections that took place on June 8, 1985, 42 of the 352 contestable seats failed to return a single candidate with more than 50 percent of the votes (by-elections will be held in these constituencies), and 25 of the 71 independently nominated candidates were elected in place of candidates sponsored by the PPF. Of those who lost their seats, 54 were incumbents and 26 were present or former members of the party and/or state administration.[33] The same principles have been followed within the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, where the first competitive elections for a country-level party secretary took place in 1983, in the Academy of Sciences, in the trade unions, and on cooperative farms, where more than one-fifth of officially sponsored candidates have recently been voted down.[34]

No communist country has yet introduced a system of genuinely competitive elections, nor, perhaps, could such a system be established without resulting in the end of the leading role of the Communist Party and other distinguishing features of communist rule. Nonetheless, taken in conjunction with more active legislatures (particularly their committee systems) and with more active and authoritative local councils—both also general trends in communist countries[35]—the electoral mechanism appears to represent at least one means by which communist systems may seek to expand their political base, to strengthen their links with the population, and to increase the willingness of the latter to accept unpopular decisions because of their apparently greater influence upon the composition of those who make them. The regimes themselves, at least, appear to take this view: as the General Secretary of the Hungarian PPF put it in an interview, there was a need for "more democracy to help cope with the economic crisis."[36] In Hungary, as in most other communist countries, economic adversity has indeed been met by the cautious extension of the electoral principle in all areas of public life, not simply in elections to legislative bodies. It would be too much to suggest that electoral linkages in themselves offer a means by which

[33] Radio Free Europe Situation Report: Hungary, June 21, 1985.

[34] Radio Free Europe Background Report: Hungary, September 26, 1983; *The Times* (London) *Higher Education Supplement*, June 1, 1984, p. 8; Rudolf L. Tőkés, "Hungarian Reform Imperatives," *Problems of Communism* 33 (September-October 1984), 17.

[35] See Nelson and White (fn. 28), and Daniel N. Nelson, ed., *Local Politics in Communist Countries* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1980).

[36] Reported in *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1984* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), 336.

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communist regimes can avoid all the political consequences of their deteriorating economic performance. Nonetheless, in conjunction with other mechanisms, they may make at least a modest contribution to the acceptability or legitimacy of communist rule under economic circumstances that appear likely to become increasingly adverse.

A second mechanism of adaptation is *political incorporation*, particularly through membership of the ruling Communist Party. This may mean no more than an increase in the proportion of the population enrolled within the party's ranks, from about 3 to 4 percent in the 1950s to about 6 to 10 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, and a still higher proportion of those within the relevant age groups. In some cases, the rate of enrollment has been much more substantial (see Table 2); in the G.D.R. and in Romania, for instance, party membership has been extended to over 20 percent of all adults and to almost one-third of the economically active population—a very inclusive conception of membership for a political party that is supposed to be of the Leninist or "vanguard" type.[37] More important is the increase that has occurred in the working-class enrollment of the ruling parties, which has also been a feature of the politics of most communist countries since about the 1960s. In the U.S.S.R., for instance, workers (by social origin) accounted for just 32 percent of the party's members in 1957, but for 44.4 percent by 1984—the largest single social group among the total membership. Among candidate members, where the leadership's recruitment policies are more readily apparent, workers have accounted for almost 60 percent of the total in recent years. These are among the highest levels in the party's history.[38] The proportion of workers (by current occupation rather than social origin) has increased similarly in most of the East European parties (see Table 2). The Albanian, Bulgarian, Czech, East German, and Hungarian parties have all recorded substantial net increases. The Polish party presents a more uneven picture with a fluctuating working-class membership since the early 1960s, reaching a reported 46.2 percent in 1979, but falling to about 40 percent in 1984.[39] The Yugoslav party has also not generated a substantial increase, fluctuating at a level of about 30 percent since the 1960s. The Romanian party, however, presents the most dramatic picture of all: the proportion

[37] See Scharf (fn. 29), 43; *Scinteia*, March 27, 1984, p. 3.

[38] *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii 1984* [Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia] (Moscow: Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1984), 12; *Partiinaya zhizn'*, No. 15 (1983), 18.

[39] Radio Free Europe Situation Report: Poland, June 11, 1984. However, "nearly 50 percent" of current recruits are reported to be workers. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Eastern Europe 7662/C/3, June 6, 1984.

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TABLE 2
MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
(Percentage of total population and percentage of working class among total membership)

	Mid-1950s		*Mid-1960s*		*Mid-1970s*		*Mid-1980s*	
	Total	*Working class*	*Total*	*Working class*	*Total*	*Working class*	*Total*	*Working class*
Albania	3.5	19.8	3.5	32.9	4.2	37.5	5.2	38.4 (est.)
Bulgaria	6.4	34.1	7.2	38.4	8.9	41.4	9.2	42.7
Czechoslovakia	10.8	34.9	11.9	32.9	9.3	26.1	10.4	45.3
G.D.R.	8.5	33.8	10.5	45.6	11.3	56.1	13.2	57.7
Hungary	8.7	40.5	5.3	42.5	7.2	45.0	8.0	44.6
Poland	4.9	45.1	5.6	40.1	6.9	40.9	6.4	40.2
Romania	3.4	42.6	8.0	39.6	11.8	48.4	15.1	56.5
U.S.S.R.	3.6	32.0	5.1	37.8	5.9	41.6	6.7	44.4
Yugoslavia	3.6	28.3	5.2	36.0	6.1	30.2	9.7	30.6

Sources: Calculated from Paul S. Shoup, *The East European and Soviet Data Handbook: Political, Social and Developmental Indicators, 1945-1975* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs 1984* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1984); *Rocznik Statystyczny 1984* (Warsaw, 1984), 31; *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii 1984* (Moscow: Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1984), 12; *Pravda*, November 20, 1984, p. 4. Data on working-class composition refer to current occupation; in the U.S.S.R., they refer to social origin.

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of workers by current occupation has increased from 39.6 percent in 1965 to 56.5 percent in 1984; among new recruits, workers accounted for a staggering 80 percent of the total enrollment in the early 1980s.[40]

The picture, accordingly, is a varied one; moreover, the figures are ambiguous and reflect different definitions of what a "worker" might be, strong pressures to report totals that accord with current leadership priorities, and so forth. It is also difficult to argue that the industrial working class has been successfully "incorporated" in, for instance, Poland, where a rapid increase in the party's working-class membership in the 1970s coincided with an increasing degree of centralization of power within the party, and of party power within the political system generally. These circumstances, combined with substantial and widely resented privileges and inequalities at top levels in the party and elsewhere, encouraged workers to leave the PZPR almost as quickly as they had joined it earlier; the whole exercise may have tended to increase disillusionment and alienation within the political system rather than to reduce them.[41]

It would also be wrong to conceptualize greater working-class membership in the ruling parties as in some sense equivalent to a greater degree of working-class political authority within these organizations. The ruling parties remain democratic centralist in their operation, with little opportunity, in ordinary circumstances, for rank-and-file members to exert a significant degree of influence upon the decisions of executive committees or upon the composition of their membership. Nonetheless, taken in conjunction with, for instance, greater working-class representation on committees and in bureaus at all levels of the party,[42] and perhaps even exercises such as meetings of the party leadership in regional centers and "surprise" visits to the homes of ordinary workers (as has happened in Poland and to some extent in the U.S.S.R.),[43] membership in the ruling party does appear to represent a mechanism of adaptation of some significance; although always effective, it does at least provide some room for maneuver for the party leadership in di-

[40] Radio Free Europe Situation Report: Romania, No. 10, July 17, 1984; *Pravda*, November 20, 1984, p. 4.

[41] See David Mason, "The Polish Party in Crisis, 1980-1982," *Slavic Review* 43 (Spring 1984), 30-45; Z. Anthony Kruszewski, "The Communist Party during the 1980-81 Democratization of Poland," in Jack Bielasiak and Maurice Simon, eds., *Polish Politics: The Edge of the Abyss* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 241-67.

[42] In the Soviet case, for instance, the proportion of industrial workers on regional, territorial, and republican committees has increased from 27.8% in 1965-66 to 31.1% in 1980-81, with correspondingly higher numbers being recorded at lower levels of the party organization. See *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2 (1984), 4.

[43] *The Times* (London), January 22, 1985, p. 6; *Pravda*, April 18, 1985, p. 1.

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recting recruitment policy and in making use of enrollment to engage the members of particular social groups within the party's framework and to incorporate them within the political process.

A third and related mechanism of adaptation may be called *associational incorporation*—in other words, the role played by bodies such as the trade unions, people's control committees, and police auxiliaries in linking the population with the regime, channelling political energies within established institutions, and absorbing demands that might otherwise assume an antisystemic form. Since the 1960s, there has been much greater official emphasis upon the role of such associational groups, and serious attempts have been made to strengthen their leadership and to expand their formal powers at local and national levels. There are, of course, echoes of events in Poland in much of this, as in the more recent increases in working-class membership of the ruling parties. For instance, when the Soviet leadership replaced the head of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions, Aleksei Shibaev, in early 1982, the intention was in part to preempt the possibility of Polish-style developments. The new head is Stepan Shalaev, who until that point had been minister of the timber industry, and had been—most unusual in Soviet politics—a long-serving trade union official earlier in his career.[44]

Similarly, a new law on labor collectives, adopted in June 1983, provides for twice-yearly meetings of the work force in each enterprise and for more extensive powers for them to decide on, rather than simply to propose, changes concerning matters that fall within their competence.[45] Other bodies, such as the People's Control Committees, have been given new and expanded responsibilities. A law of 1979 represents (in the view of the leading Western student of these matters) a "sizable step forward for the People's Control Agency and its inspectors," and can be seen as part of a broader expansion of the role of citizen participation and of representative institutions in the post-Stalin period.[46]

In the somewhat unusual circumstances that currently exist in Poland, Solidarity has been dissolved, but there has been no reversion to the discredited pre-1980 system; new unions have been established which, while subject to overall party guidance and still regarded with some skepticism, by 1985 enrolled 5 million members (including 600,000 pensioners) out of the 17 million work force. The new unions have sought to demonstrate that they are not dominated by the party authorities;

[44] *Pravda*, March 6, 1982, p. 2.

[45] *Pravda*, June 19, 1983, pp. 1, 3.

[46] Jan S. Adams, "Citizen Participation in Community Decisions in the USSR," in Peter J. Potichnyj and Jan Shapiro Zacek, eds., *Politics and Participation under Communist Rule* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 178-95, at 188.

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they claim to have enrolled many former Solidarity activists within their ranks, and they firmly opposed the government-sponsored price rises introduced in early 1985.[47] There have been no comparable developments in Czechoslovakia, where ritual calls were made for the reactivation of the unions at the 1982 trade union congress, and in Romania, where trade unions have lost some formal powers and political representation.[48]

In most of the communist countries, however, trade unions and other associational bodies have been gaining rather than losing authority since at least the 1960s. This has clearly been the case in Hungary, for instance, where, under Sandor Gaspar (head of the Hungarian trade unions from 1965 until December 1983), unions have had a real, not just a formal, right of veto over management decisions that violate the collective contract. Unions also have substantial powers in relation to safety regulations, working conditions, and wages, as well as managerial appointments and dismissals. More generally, the unions' criticisms in Hungary have shifted from isolated incidents involving individual workers to direct criticism of government and party policy. What has been described as the "high point [of] trade union authority in communist states" occurred when the Hungarian National Trade Union Council was asked to comment on the party's guidelines for a forthcoming congress: the Trade Union Council openly attacked the guidelines on a number of points, including their failure to place the trade unions on the same level as the Communist Party and the state as an instrument of workers' power, and for underestimating the role of trade unions generally.[49] Even in Bulgaria, which is generally little influenced by reformist currents in the other communist states, major reforms in late 1984 have increased the role of labor collectives in social and economic life; the trade unions have been given a stronger leadership, and are at the same time being urged to improve their internal democracy and effectiveness.[50]

None of this should be taken to suggest that trade unions and other associations in communist systems have attained powers and authority comparable in degree or kind with those of their counterparts in the liberal democracies. The only sustained attempt to establish a genuinely independent and self-governing trade union in a communist country

[47] *Guardian*, November 26, 1984, p. 6; Radio Free Europe Background Report: Poland, No. 1, January 4, 1985; *The Times* (London), January 22, 1985, p. 6.

[48] Radio Free Europe Situation Reports: Czechoslovakia, April 28, 1982; Romania, September 16, 1983, and March 14, 1984.

[49] Richard C. Gripp, "Workers' Participation in Communist Politics," in Donald E. Schulz and Jan S. Adams, eds., *Political Participation in Communist Systems* (New York: Praeger, 1981), 137-62, at 142-43. See also Radio Free Europe Situation Reports: Hungary, January 12, 1984, December 21, 1983, and March 4, 1982.

[50] Radio Free Europe Background Report: Bulgaria, No. 15, November 7, 1984.

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that has so far been made—in Poland—was brought to an abrupt end in 1981. Strikes are virtually prohibited in these countries, with the significant exception of Yugoslavia, where several thousand have taken place since 1958. (The longest ever, lasting over 60 days, occurred in 1984.)[51] Nevertheless, the Hungarian experience in particular suggests that more active, influential trade unions and other associational bodies may represent a mechanism of adaptation of some importance. By acting as "lightning conductors," they provide a means through which complaints and problems can be dealt with at a subsystemic level and isolated from possible challenge to the regime, whose interests are not necessarily at stake in disputes over working conditions, overtime, grading, or the maintenance of public order. More generally, such institutions may serve as a further means by which the working class can be incorporated into the regime, bound to some extent to its purpose, and encouraged to promote its interests within the established framework rather than outside and possibly in opposition to it.

A fourth and final mechanism of adaptation is *letters* to the party, the state, and above all to the press. In the Soviet case this has been a development of the period since the 1960s; it found institutional expression with the establishment of a Letters Department in the CPSU Central Committee apparatus in 1978. In the early 1980s, the Central Committee received about half a million letters a year, and about 20,000 callers at its Moscow offices; it also prepared a flow of dossiers (about 60 in 1983) based upon these communications to the party leadership and other bodies.[52] The major Soviet daily newspapers receive about the same number of letters annually—a total of about 60 to 70 million for the national press as a whole (which represents one letter per year from every two or three adults). Citizens may also visit newspaper offices in the major cities. A few of the letters are published; many more are investigated directly by the papers' staff; and all are classified, with regular breakdowns being sent to party, state, trade unions, and other bodies. Sociological surveys suggest that, while there is some skepticism as to the effectiveness of communications of this kind, many people agree that the newspaper has helped them with a personal or social problem; Soviet citizens generally placed newspapers first among the means available to them to influence the actions of the authorities.[53]

Mechanisms of this kind have also been employed in other communist

[51] Radio Free Europe Background Reports: Yugoslavia, No. 128, July 20, 1984, and No. 180, September 21, 1984.

[52] *Pravda*, February 3, 1984, p. 2.

[53] See Stephen White, "Political Communications in the USSR: Letters to Party, State and Press," *Political Studies* 31 (January 1983), 43-60, at 51-57.

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countries, for instance in China. Particularly since 1978, more letters have been published in *People's Daily* and other newspapers than ever before, more letters have been received, the letters are more direct and critical in character, and they are more interrelated. The letters column in *People's Daily* is reported to have "come close to becoming a forum for public discussion."[54] In Romania, the Jiu valley miners' strike of 1977, in which 35,000 people were reportedly involved, led directly to a greater degree of attention to the role of citizens' complaints, suggestions, and observations. Directives issued in 1978 and extended in 1982 explained to Romanian party and state bodies how to deal with such communications; the number of letters is reported to have increased from about 1 million in 1965 to about 1.7 million in 1984, or about one for every eight or nine adult citizens.[55]

Again, there is no suggestion that in any communist country the press plays a genuinely independent role comparable with that in liberal democracies. Newspapers in the communist countries operate within a context of censorship, their editorial staffs are normally appointed with the approval of party officials, and they receive detailed guidance on the manner of their operation at regular briefing sessions in party offices. Letters to the papers may be ignored, they may be malicious or self-serving, or (as has happened in many cases) the complainant may be victimized by his immediate superiors even though the original criticism may have been justified. Nonetheless, communist leaders clearly see newspapers as playing an important role in conveying at least the impression that popular concerns are being brought into the open. A substantial flow of letters from ordinary citizens helps guard against the abuse of position, illegality, and incompetence of party and state officials at lower levels; it also alerts the leadership to major issues of public concern, allowing them to be dealt with before they assume a more substantial, unapproved, and perhaps even violent form. Most of the complaints that are received seem to concern isolated cases of maladministration: a family may not have received its proper housing entitlement, or the local public transport system may have broken down, or a supply of drinking water may have been cut off for an unduly long time. On more general issues, such as the food supply or the maintenance of law and order, the Soviet

[54] Godwin C. Chu and Leonard C. Chu, "Mass Media and Conflict Resolution: An Analysis of Letters to the Editor," in Godwin C. Chu and Francis L.K. Hsu, eds., *China's New Social Fabric* (London: Kegan Paul, 1983), 176-77, 214. The impact of such communications (for instance, on preventing the amalgamation of brigades of agricultural workers) is considered by John P. Burns, "Chinese Peasant Interest Articulation," in David S. Goodman, ed., *Groups and Politics in the People's Republic of China* (Cardiff: University College Press, 1984), 126-51, esp. 134-36.

[55] Radio Free Europe Situation Reports: Romania, June 14, 1984, and May 30, 1985.

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leadership appears to have received a very substantial volume of mail, much of it anonymous and expressed in very direct terms. Letters of this kind are not normally selected for publication in a newspaper or party journal, but only a foolish party leadership would entirely ignore such massive expressions of public opinion. The "food program" of 1982 and stronger measures against crime and corruption in more recent years suggest that this point has not been lost upon those who hold political authority in the U.S.S.R.[56]

V. Conclusion

It would be going too far to assume that the mechanisms of adaptation identified in this paper provide an unproblematic, universally applicable formula of government for party leaderships in communist countries. For complex historical and other reasons, the relationship between the population and the regime, and indeed the orientation toward the socialist system generally, is such that in some cases no forms of linkage or consultation are likely to be effective for very long, even when not compounded by insensitive and poorly presented governmental decisions such as the announcement, in Poland, of substantial price rises shortly before Christmas in 1970. There is also the possibility of "blow back":[57] the danger that forms of consultation originally promoted by the leadership may escape its control, be taken over by the population for its own ends, and ultimately become counterproductive from the point of view of the regime's original purposes. For example, in China, the opportunity to contest elections under the legislation of 1979 led, in 1980, to the election of candidates in Peking, Shanghai, and elsewhere who were not acceptable to the Chinese communist authorities. The elections involved had to be cancelled, presumably with deleterious effects on regime legitimation.[58] In Romania, the encouragement of workers' letters led to such a volume of complaints that in recent years a new emphasis has been placed upon the "constructive" character that is expected of such communications and upon the "power of positive thinking." As a consequence, even though the food supply was generally regarded as having deteriorated in 1983, the number of complaints received by the authorities in this connection was reported to have fallen by 32 percent.[59] In Poland, as noted earlier, the rapid enrollment of workers into the

[56] See White (fn. 53), 57-60.

[57] I owe this term to Peter Rutland of the University of Texas at Austin.

[58] Stuart R. Schram, *Ideology and Policy in China since the Third Plenum, 1978-84* (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1984), 24.

[59] *Scinteia*, March 31, 1983, and March 28, 1984.

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party in the 1970s, followed by their equally rapid withdrawal as they encountered an increasing degree of centralization of political authority within the party and blatant privilege and corruption at leading levels, may likewise have produced a different result from that which was presumably intended, increasing rather than reducing cynicism, alienation, and disenchantment.[60]

Clearly, then, forms of adaptation or linkage offer no panacea to ruling communist elites; yet they do offer at least some elements of a viable governing formula that party leaderships may employ, in a broadly "Kadarist" manner, to accommodate, propitiate, and incorporate the populations over which they rule. The economic difficulties that such regimes face are serious and likely to persist; but they can be mediated politically by leaderships that can maneuver and initiate, rather than simply respond helplessly to "inexorable" economic forces. It is surely more than a coincidence that those communist regimes which have most fully developed these various forms of linkage or adaptation have been, on the whole, most successful in maintaining political stability in the face of economic adversity. Hungary, for instance, has in recent years been widely regarded as politically the most stable state in Eastern Europe, despite economic difficulties that have necessitated significant price rises and other austerity measures. Yugoslavia has similarly managed to avoid at least generalized political instability in the late 1970s and early 1980s, despite the loss of a charismatic leader and despite economic difficulties perhaps greater than those that have been experienced in any other European country, East or West. (This combination of circumstances has been described as "the Yugoslav miracle.")[61]

It appears, in short, that—despite economic difficulties—the judicious use of the consultative or "feedback" capacities of their systems allows communist leaderships to reduce the risk that popular discontent will assume an explosive form. Mechanisms of adaptation such as those indicated in this paper may allow communist leaders to strengthen the political bases of their legitimacy even though the socioeconomic bases of their support lose some of their effectiveness. The result may not be morally admirable; but, in view of the economic adversity that the communist regimes appear likely to encounter in the remainder of the 1980s and beyond, such mechanisms of political legitimation are likely to acquire still greater significance within the combination of grounds in which their claim to exercise authority is based.

[60] Mason (fn. 41), esp. p. 35.
[61] Radio Free Europe Situation Report: Yugoslavia, No. 1, January 24, 1985.

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Review Article

EXPLAINING U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CARIBBEAN BASIN: Fixed and Emerging Images

By ROBERT A. PASTOR*

H. Michael Erisman and John D. Martz, eds., *Colossus Challenged: The Struggle for Caribbean Influence*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982.
Richard Fagen and Olga Pellicer, eds., *The Future of Central America: Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983.
Richard Feinberg, ed., *Central America: International Dimensions of the Crisis*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982.
Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1983.
William J. Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984.
Lester Langley, *The U.S. and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1982.
Robert S. Leiken, ed., *Central America: Anatomy of Conflict*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Pergamon Press, 1984.
PACCA (Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America), *Changing Course: Blueprint for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean*. Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1984.
The Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (Kissinger Commission). New York: Macmillan, 1984.
Robert Wesson, ed., *U.S. Influence in Latin America*. New York: Praeger, 1982.

I. Introduction

SCHOLARS generally see themselves as scanning the forest of long-term issues; they usually view the government as lost among the trees, reacting to the urgent rather than contemplating the important. This image was colorfully captured by John Maynard Keynes, who also reassured scholars that their ideas subconsciously governed bureaucrats: "Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their

* This article was written while I was on the faculty of the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland. I gratefully acknowledge the cogent and useful criticism of earlier drafts by Jorge Dominguez, Richard Bloomfield, George Quester, Richard Feinberg, and Bruce Bagley. They deserve credit for improvements in the article; I accept responsibility for any remaining flaws.

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frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back." But the agenda of today's academic scribbler is, to a remarkable extent, set by those same "madmen in authority" or, to use the vernacular, policy makers. One only has to consider the proliferation of books on human rights spawned by the Carter years and the explosion of research on the Caribbean Basin detonated by the Reagan administration.[1] "Probably more has been written about Central America in the last three years than in the previous thirty," wrote two Central Americans three years ago. (Isaac Cohen and Gert Rosenthal, "The Dimensions of Economic Policy Space in Central America," in Fagen-Pellicer, 15.) If anything, interest has grown since then.

Five years ago, one was hard pressed to find any conceptual roadmap to understand the region's problems; today, one needs a roadmap through the literature. That is one purpose of this review essay: to review, organize, and critique the literature according to how it interprets U.S. policy toward the region. A second purpose is to outline an alternative theoretical approach—an interactive perspective—for explaining U.S. policy, by fusing insights emerging from the literature.

One first needs to define the region. The "Caribbean Basin" is a relatively new term by which to define a region—the nations and dependencies in and around the Caribbean—that the United States has long considered as a unit. Historically, U.S. foreign policy textbooks have defined the entire area as "Middle America" or simply "the Caribbean."[2] Since the 1960s, however, the number of independent islands in the Caribbean has increased from three to thirteen; the new English-speaking nations have become a critical mass, distinct from the old Latin Caribbean and intent on appropriating the term "Caribbean" to apply to their community. Thus, when U.S. attention returned to the region in the late 1970s, a new term was needed to recognize that Central America and the Caribbean were different, with few connections and less affinity, as well as the same, posing similar strategic problems for the United States because of their proximity, vulnerability, and chronic instability. Ergo, the "Caribbean Basin."[3]

[1] For a review of the human rights literature, see Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 34 (July 1982), 574-95. One author dubbed human rights "a minor growth industry." The literature on human rights, like that on U.S. policy toward the Caribbean Basin, is primarily composed of edited volumes.

[2] See, for example, Wilfrid Hardy Callcott, *The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 1890-1920* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1942); Dexter Perkins, *The United States and the Caribbean* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947); and Dana G. Munro, *The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921-33* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). All three books cover Central America as well as the Caribbean.

[3] For a discussion of the concept of a "Caribbean Basin" and the similarities and differences between the nations of the region, see Robert Pastor, "Sinking in the Caribbean Basin," *Foreign Affairs* 60 (Summer 1982), 1038-58.

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II. Images Past and Present

"To exist is one thing," Lord Berkeley once observed, "to be perceived is another." Bill Klem, the famous American League umpire, restated Berkeley's thought in the American idiom: "It ain't nothing till I call it." Public opinion polls in the United States suggest that the most widely held image of developments in the Caribbean Basin is one of confusion. Less than 10 percent of the American public even know which side the United States supports in the civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador; most Americans can't tell the "terrorists" in Central America from the "freedom fighters."[4]

Confusion is not an unnatural reaction to the complexity and diversity of the region. There are 36 separate political entities in the Caribbean Basin—with different economics and politics, with varying cultures, and with four official languages (not counting the many Indian languages). Each nation demands respect and asserts its independence. The politics of most of the countries is conflictive and often difficult for the U.S. to interpret. Some groups decry U.S. intervention while other groups condemn the U.S. for not intervening enough.

Different images or perspectives explain developments in the region, and the U.S. response. In a review essay on the literature on the Alliance for Progress in 1973-1974, for example, Abraham F. Lowenthal identified three images—the majority liberal, an emerging radical, and a bureaucratic image that borrowed insights from the other two. Four years later, in a more comprehensive review of the literature on inter-American relations, Jorge Dominguez found that these three images had been superseded by five others: organizational ideology, presidential politics, the U.S. political system, a strategic perspective, and unorthodox dependency.[5]

[4] Adam Clymer, "Poll Finds Americans Don't Know U.S. Positions on Central America," *New York Times*, July 1, 1983, p. A1. In a nationwide poll in 1983, only 25% knew the administration supported the government in El Salvador; 13% knew it sided with the rebels in Nicaragua; and only 8% knew both. In April 1984, a *New York Times* poll showed that 19% knew the administration supported the rebels in Nicaragua; by June 1985, after numerous efforts by President Reagan to focus American public opinion on Nicaragua, still only 26% knew the U.S. supported the rebels. To put it another way, three out of four Americans still did not know which side the U.S. was supporting in Nicaragua. (Adam Clymer, "Most Americans in Survey Oppose Aid for Overthrow of Sandinistas," *New York Times*, June 5, 1985, p. A8.) A poll taken in the Washington area and its suburbs in 1983 found that *fewer than half* of those surveyed said they had "heard or read anything about the Reagan administration's policy toward Nicaragua and Central America." In a nationwide poll, the same questions provided approximately the same results. (Cited in Daniel Rapoport, "What They Don't Know," *National Journal*, June 18, 1983, p. 1289.) In a statement warning that the U.S. could "lose Central America," Senator John P. East (R-N.C.) admitted: "I hate to say it, but the average American doesn't know the difference between a contra and a caterpillar, or between a Sandinista and a sardine" (*New York Times*, October 12, 1984).

[5] Lowenthal, " 'Liberal,' 'Radical,' and 'Bureaucratic' Perspectives on U.S. Latin American

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Compared to the literature of the 1960s and 1970s, recent work appears more passionate and argumentative, and less historical and theoretical. Indeed, there have been few attempts to build on the previous literature. The emphasis is on current policy, and history is used selectively, often for advocacy purposes. Although earlier works were reasonably well distributed over a broad political spectrum, recent literature appears to be almost magnetically repelled from one theoretical pole or attracted to another. The first pole, represented by the security thesis, is the theoretical foundation of the Reagan administration's policy; it is abused and practically an orphan in the literature, described and analyzed mostly by its critics. The second, a neodependency antithesis, which was just beginning to emerge in the early 1970s when Lowenthal wrote his review, clearly has become the dominant theoretical approach today.

The perspectives can be defined by the way the writers using each perspective would answer the following questions:

(1) *Origin*. What is the origin of the region's crisis? Is gradual reform possible? Is there a "middle"?
(2) *History*. Has U.S. involvement in the region historically been beneficial or harmful to the region?
(3) *Distribution of benefits*. Is U.S. trade and investment mutually beneficial or exploitative?
(4) *Interests*. Is the United States motivated by economic, strategic, bureaucratic, or political interests? Are U.S. interests vital?
(5) *Prescription*. What should U.S. policy be?
(6) *Consequences*. What are the consequences of not accepting the recommendations for U.S. policy that are offered in answer to the previous question?

Other questions could be asked, but the above are adequate to construct an image with which to explain and even predict a range of phenomena related to the region. These images, which are the sum of the answers to the above questions, are evident in the three kinds of works reviewed in this essay. First, a few books on U.S. policy toward the region by a single author—most notably those of Langley and LaFeber—have attempted to offer a broad explanation of U.S. policy.[6]

Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Retrospect," in Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen, eds., *Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1974), 212-37. Dominguez, "Consensus and Divergence: The State of the Literature on Inter-American Relations in the 1970s," *Latin American Research Review* 13 (1978), 87-126.

[6] There are also several books by journalists, including James Chace, *Endless War: How We Got Involved in Central America and What Can Be Done* (New York: Vintage/Random House, 1984), and Tom Buckley, *Violent Neighbors: El Salvador, Central America and the United States* (New York: Times Books, 1984).

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Second, there have been numerous edited books of uneven scholarship, representing specialists of different countries or issues. The diversity and the richness of their micro-analyses is both the strength and the weakness of the edited volumes. These books include some chapters that buttress or enrich the neodependency antithesis, and others that sidestep the theoretical debate and delve below the stereotypes for a penetrating view of the region's crisis and of the U.S. response to it. A third genre is represented in six reports with policy recommendations for the U.S. government by groups ranging across the political spectrum from the Kissinger Commission to a group organized under the auspices of the Institute for Policy Studies.

First, I will describe and critique the security thesis and the neodependency antithesis. After a review of the new counterconventional literature, I will attempt to synthesize some of its insights as a basis for sketching the outlines of an "interactive perspective," an approach that takes into account the Caribbean Basin as an actor—or rather, actors—seeking to influence the U.S. even as the U.S. influences it.

III. The Security Thesis

The security perspective was implicit in the classic studies of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean by Samuel F. Bemis and Dana G. Munro. A few recent works have approached the subject from a similar perspective, though not with the skill, detachment, or scholarship of the classics.[7] But no one has articulated the security thesis on U.S. policy toward the Caribbean with more clarity or precision than President Ronald Reagan and officials in his administration. In commenting on the origins of the crisis, President Reagan told a press conference that "the trouble that is going on down there comes from outside the area; [it] is revolution exported from the Soviet Union and

[7] For the classics, see Bemis, *Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943), and two volumes by Munro: *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), and *The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921-1933* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). For more recent, argumentative works using the strategic perspective, see Jeane Kirkpatrick's two articles in *Commentary*, "Dictatorships and Double Standards" (November 1979), and "U.S. Security and Latin America" (January 1981); Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 117-40; The Committee of Santa Fe, *A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties* (Washington, DC: Council for Inter-American Security, 1980); Edward Luttwak, "The Nature of the Crisis," and James Michel, "Defending Democracy," both in Joseph Cirincione, ed., *Central America and the Western Alliance* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985); and Irving Kristol, "Should Europe Be Concerned About Central America?" in Andrew Pierre, ed., *Third World Instability: Central America as a European-American Issue* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985).

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from Cuba and from others of their allies." In a later statement, he was more succinct, describing the crisis as "a Soviet-Cuban power play—pure and simple."[8]

U.S. interests are logically defined as commensurate with the nature and the intensity of the threat: "The national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America," President Reagan declared in an address to the nation on April 27, 1983. Proximity ("El Salvador is nearer to Texas than Texas is to Massachusetts"), a potential Soviet base, the vital sea lanes ("two-thirds of all our foreign trade and petroleum pass through the Panama Canal and the Caribbean"), migration ("a tidal wave of refugees—and this time, they'll be 'feet people' and not boat people—swarming into our country seeking a safe haven from communist repression")—all these interests make the region "vital" to the United States.[9] There is also the psychological dimension. As President Reagan noted: "If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put in jeopardy."[10]

Along with this image, the United States perceives itself as having played a generous and helpful role historically. U.S. trade and investment have created jobs and promoted development. The U.S. has protected the countries from outside threats, defended democracy and human rights, and been "a good neighbor." If Washington erred, it was "due more to the fear of European domination than to any desire to increase the areas of our territory," or to assist U.S. business.[11] But, "no matter how good our intentions were," President Reagan admitted in a speech to the Organization of American States, "our very size may have made it seem that we were exercising a kind of paternalism."[12]

According to the security image, U.S. policy is motivated by a strategic imperative and a humanitarian impulse. Policy reflects a rational decision to prevent hostile groups from coming to power and to promote human rights and democracy. Finally, the prescription for U.S. policy is to "draw the line," to contain and if possible roll back communism, and to assist the nations of the region to address the causes of social and economic

[8] Reagan press conference, *New York Times*, July 27, 1983, p. A10; Francis X. Clines, "Reagan Calls Salvador Aid Foes Naive," *New York Times*, March 20, 1984, p. A3.

[9] Presidential address, *New York Times*, April 28, 1983; on 'feet people,' see Lou Cannon, "A Latin Axis Could Take Central America, Reagan Says," *Washington Post*, July 21, 1983, p. A1, cited in Leonel Gomez, in Leiken, 219.

[10] Presidential address (fn. 9).

[11] Address by Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, cited in Bemis (fn. 7), 167.

[12] Presidential address on "Caribbean Basin Initiative," *New York Times*, February 26, 1982.

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instability. The consequences of not acting are dire: "the threat that 100 million people from Panama to the open border on our south could come under the control of pro-Soviet regimes."[13]

To summarize, those who use the security thesis assert that: (1) the crisis originates in communist subversion, and gradual reform is possible; (2) the United States has historically played a positive role in the region; (3) U.S. investment and trade are of mutual benefit; (4) U.S. strategic interests are vital, and moral motives are important; (5) "all means are necessary" to contain communism; and (6) failure could jeopardize U.S. national security. In its essence, the security thesis bears a strong resemblance to the initial postwar consensus on U.S. foreign policy, which George Quester succinctly defined as "the U.S. is better than other countries"; it acts for moral reasons to defend, and occasionally advance, freedom.[14]

IV. The Neodependency Antithesis

The literature on U.S. policy toward the Caribbean Basin has grown top-heavy with articles and books that use, or rather modify, a dependency framework. The most notable use of the theory to explain U.S. policy is by Walter LaFeber, in *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*. Referring to dependency theory as "the most important and provocative method of interpreting U.S.-Latin American relations," LaFeber defines it

> as a way of looking at Latin American development, not in isolation, but as part of an international system in which the leading powers (and since 1945, the United States in particular) have used their economic strength to make Latin American development dependent on—and subordinate to—the interests of the leading powers.

Dependence skews the nations' economics—"by forcing their economies to rely on one or two main export crops"—and their politics, which are controlled by and for local elites and foreign investors (pp. 16-17).

LaFeber apparently equates dependency *solely* with *economic* domination. Since he considers the United States to have secured the dependence of Central America with military intervention and political coercion as well as with "economic strength," LaFeber prefers to call

[13] Statement by President Reagan, *New York Times*, May 10, 1984, p. A16.

[14] Quester, in *American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus* (New York: Praeger, 1982), argues that Vietnam fractured the old consensus so completely that a new approach swung to the opposite extreme, claiming that the U.S. was "worse than other nations." With the Reagan administration, the pendulum apparently has swung back.

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his model "neodependency" (p. 18); I will use that term to describe the new dependency literature, recognizing that each author varies in his or her interpretation of the basic dependency thesis.[15] LaFeber modifies the dependency framework in other ways. For example, he sidesteps the issue of whether capitalism or national security is the principal motive of U.S. policy, by simply asserting that they "formed two sides of the same policy" (p. 15). And, while arguing that "in nearly every instance, the interests of the State Department and North American business coincided," he acknowledges that, when interests clashed, the individual company was forced to give way, "as indeed it had to do if a *system* was to be maintained" (pp. 80-81; emphasis in original). But he accepts the broad outlines of the dependency framework—that the system of trade and investment is shaped to exploit the region for the benefit of the United States.

LaFeber's thesis is that, ironically, the U.S. system, which "was not designed accidentally or without well-considered policies" causes revolutions in Central America even while Washington is determined to prevent them (pp. 13, 18). As to a prescription for U.S. policy, he writes that "the only choice" for future U.S. policy makers is to "work with those revolutionaries to achieve a more orderly and equitable society, or . . . try to cap the upheavals until the pressure built again to blow the societies apart with even greater force" (p. 16).

In the volume edited by Fagen and Pellicer, several authors use similar arguments. Thus, Luis Maira attributes the crisis in Central America to "prolonged support [which] U.S. governments have given to authoritarian regimes" (p. 71). Piero Gleijeses is convinced that the future is with the left, and "Washington has only two alternatives": to support rightist government repression or to "accept the increased likelihood of a guerilla victory." A "centrist alternative" is considered to be an illusion (p. 209).

LaFeber makes the case for "revolution" rather than testing the theory of neodependency. While he describes in considerable detail the shameful manner in which U.S. power has been used, he never systematically analyzes the motives of U.S. policy, or even the aim—except to suggest that it is to dominate the region. One is therefore left uncertain whether the United States is capable of changing its policy, and if so, how.

In addition, he fails to define key terms, such as "system" and "rev-

[15] Part of the difficulty of testing the dependency theory systematically stems from its many variations. As one study put it, "the number of different [dependency] theorists only slightly exceeds the number of distinct strands of theory." Steven Jackson, Bruce Russett, Duncan Snidal, and David Sylvan, "An Assessment of Empirical Research on Dependencia," *Latin American Research Review* 14 (No. 3, 1979), 7.

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olution." At one point, he describes revolutions as "virtually the only method of transferring power" in Central Ameria, and thus compares them to elections in the United States (p. 15). Such a definition, which would include every coup d'état in the region—most of which the U.S. accepted, and some of which it encouraged—is contradicted by LaFeber's thesis that the U.S. fears and resists all revolutions in the area. One is therefore forced to conclude that the "revolutions," which are inevitable, are restricted to violent upheavals in which power is transferred across classes. Although LaFeber predicts revolution everywhere, he does not explain why, in the last 50 years, it has occurred in only two countries—Cuba and Nicaragua. Moreover, these two cases disprove his thesis that the U.S. and its "bourgeois lackeys" reflexively resist revolutions. In fact, the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions succeeded in large part because the middle class supported them, and the United States did not forcefully resist them. *Instead of asking why revolutions are inevitable, it might be more fruitful to ask why they are exceptional.*[16]

LaFeber also neglects to explore what revolutions would bring to the region; he assumes that merely sweeping away the debris of the past would be sufficient reward. Instead of *assuming* that revolutionary movements represent the path to utopia, it might be worth asking whether they represent the continuation of a violent past.[17]

To summarize, adherents of the neodependency perspective assert that (1) the crisis originates in the poverty and injustice in the region, which is due to the U.S. fostering a system of dependence; gradual reform is not possible; (2) the United States has played a central and malign role historically; (3) trade and investment in the region serve the

[16] T. H. Wintringham asked a similar question after studying military revolutions from ancient times to the 20th century. "The puzzle becomes not why did the mutiny occur, but why did men, for years or generations, endure the torments against which in the end they revolted." See Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 2d ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 61.

[17] LaFeber's book also contains a number of factual errors. He states (p. 231) that the U.S. considered providing military aid to Somoza in 1977 covertly and then provided $2.5 million openly, but neither assertion is correct. Evidently to support his point that Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski tended to see third-world problems in exclusively East-West terms, LaFeber cites Brzezinski's *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technotronic Era* (New York: Viking Press, 1970), 210, n. 324. However, that reference disproves LaFeber's point: Brzezinski argued (p. 288) that the U.S. should abandon the Monroe Doctrine and the "special relationship" with Latin America, place U.S. relations with the region "on the same level as its relations with the rest of the world," and approach revolutionary change in "the developing countries with a great deal of patience." LaFeber's suggestion that the U.S. looked "suspiciously" at a large Venezuelan investment in Honduras as a possible loss of control reinforces his thesis that the U.S. aimed at exclusive control of its Central American system, but it has no basis in fact (p. 218). In practice, most administrations since Kennedy's have encouraged Europeans, Japanese, and Latin Americans to invest in friendly Latin American countries to supplement U.S. efforts to promote economic development.

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interests of only the U.S., and to a lesser extent, local business; (4) U.S. economic interests are central to U.S. policy (though some, like LaFeber, believe economic and security interests coincide); (5) the answer to the region's crisis is revolution; and (6) if revolutions are prevented, they will only erupt later in worse form.

V. A Plague on Both Your Theses

The strength of both the security and the neodependency images is their clarity; they can explain and predict a wide range of phenomena with ease and elegance, if not with accuracy. For example, the elections in El Salvador for a Constituent Assembly in 1982 and a President in 1984 were viewed by those holding the security image as crucial turning points for Salvadoran democracy, and as either misleading or fraudulent by those holding the neodependency image; the characterizations were reversed in describing the election in Nicaragua on November 4, 1984. The descriptions were aimed at influencing public opinion rather than at evaluating the elections, all three of which represented a step forward from the perspective of both nations' histories, but, by Western standards of free elections, a very small step. In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, the counting of the votes was apparently fair; the problem was that political parties representing an important slice of the political spectrum (center-left in El Salvador; center-right in Nicaragua) were not able to participate.[18]

Both images have contributed insights to understanding inter-American relations. The security perspective looks at the region as most U.S. decision makers have historically viewed it—as integrally related to global security concerns. The neodependency perspective has helped analysts to recognize the economic causes and consequences of non-economic relationships and the structural obstacles to development and more balanced relations.[19] Although the images are accurate summaries

[18] On the varying interpretations of the elections in El Salvador in March 1982, see William LeoGrande (pp. 109-10, in Fagen-Pellicer); on the elections in Nicaragua in November 1984, see "Report of the Latin American Studies Association Delegation to Observe the Nicaraguan General Elections of November 4, 1984," in *LASA Forum* 15 (Winter 1985), 9-43.

[19] In some ways, the gap between the two images reflects the gap between the perspectives of many social scientists in the U.S. and Latin America. For instance, one of the most influential books on economic development published in the U.S. in 1960 shows how the third world could and should follow in the steps of the industrialized countries; the most influential development books published in Latin America stress the structural barriers to development and the dependency conditions imposed on the periphery by the core countries. See W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1960); Fernando H. Cardozo and Enzo Faletto, *Dependence and Development in Latin America*, written between 1965 and 1967, first published

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of the administration's position and of the leading intellectual critiques, they almost appear to be caricatures or straw men. This is not necessarily a negative interpretation, since the clarity of the images has stimulated a lively debate and permitted scholars to identify and impugn key assumptions and develop new insights. Ironically, that may be the most useful contribution of the two images. Through a dialectical process, scholars and policy makers (primarily in Congress and on commissions) have dissected elements in both images; the results of their work permit a new synthesis—in both policy and theory.

In U.S. politics and policy, there is almost a gravitational pull—conditioned by history, the Constitution, and political culture—away from extreme policies and images, and toward the center. In the next section, I will explore how this centrist impulse affects policy and then examine the scholarly critiques of the two images and the new insights that transcend their polarity.

A. POLICY ALTERNATIVES: CONGRESS AND THE COMMISSIONS

While the popular perception of events in the region may be confused, public opinion affects policy by setting the boundaries within which the debate on that policy occurs. Polls have demonstrated that Americans care less about shaping developments in the region that they do about avoiding two outcomes: U.S. intervention and the expansion of communism.[20] Within these limits, the debate proceeds.

Congress has increasingly played the central role in forcing the administration's policy to the center; it has been the great compensator, pressing the administration to give greater weight to neglected interests. Congress pushed the Carter administration to the center from the left by attaching security considerations on aid to Nicaragua, and it pushed the Reagan administration to the center from the right by insisting on greater emphasis on human rights, land reform, and diplomacy in El Salvador.

The same tendency toward centrism is evident in the many nongovernmental reports issued in the past two years urging changes in U.S. policy toward the region.[21] All the reports occupy the space between

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in 1971 as *Dependencia y Desarrollo en America Latina* (Mexico: Siglo Veinteino, S.A., 1971). More recently, many North American social scientists have adopted the dependency model—reflecting, in some ways, the academic equivalent of traditional State Department "clientelism."

[20] William Schneider, "Public Still Rejects Reagan's 'Vital Interest' Argument on El Salvador," *National Journal*, May 21, 1983, pp. 1082-83; William LeoGrande, "Public Opinion on Central America, U.S. Senate Democratic Party Committee, August 4, 1983.

[21] PACCA; *The Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America* (Kissinger Commission); James R. Greene and Brent Scowcroft, eds., *Western Interests and U.S. Options in the Caribbean Basin: Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the*

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the two images; the Kissinger Commission and the Miami Report are close to the security image; the Institute for Policy Studies' PACCA Report is near the neodependency image; and the Inter-American Dialogue, the Atlantic Council study, and the Aspen Report tug both images toward the center. All the reports argue for pursuing the full range of U.S. interests: security (preventing Soviet-Cuban expansion in the region), democracy and human rights, development and reform, and diplomacy.

Those leaning toward the security pole see the Soviet-Cuban threat more intensely and give higher priority to dealing with the security problem by military means. "The Soviet-Cuban threat is real," the Kissinger Commission warns (p. 4). At the other end of the spectrum, the PACCA report deems this threat "negligible," "remote," and "a distraction from more basic concerns" (pp. 44-45). "The real crisis," according to PACCA, "is in the inability of the U.S. to respond appropriately to profound changes in Central America which this nation cannot prevent without damaging our own democratic institutions, our economy, and our national security" (p. 12). Still, the PACCA report does not deny that the United States has a security interest in keeping the Soviets out of the region; indeed, it considers that a "prime objective of U.S. foreign policy." It argues, however, that the best way to achieve this objective is to facilitate revolutions, or at least to stop fighting them (p. 13).

On the issues of democracy, development, and respect for human rights, the differences between the various reports do not *appear* significant. (Indeed, the untrained eye might detect no difference.) Each failure to manage revolutionary change in the region forces the U.S. to reconsider its central objective and to address the underlying causes of instability. This means that while preventing a negative (communism), Washington also feels compelled to promote a positive—democracy, development, and peaceful, moderate change. The key distinction among the reports—and, more importantly, among policy makers along different points on the political spectrum—rests on the perception of the nature and the intensity of the security threat. Those who see a compelling threat are more likely to view the nonsecurity interests as a

Caribbean Basin (Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1984); Viron W. Vaky, ed., *Governance in the Western Hemisphere* (New York: Praeger, 1984); Ambler H. Moss, Jr. and Jaime Suchlicki, eds., *The Miami Report: Recommendations on United States Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, 1984). Also see two reports of the Inter-American Dialogue, *The Americas at a Crossroads* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, April 1983), and *The Americas in 1984: A Year for Decisions* (Washington, DC: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, May 1984).

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(diplomatic or domestic political) means to a security end. Those who are more relaxed about the threat are likely to give more serious consideration to the nonsecurity interests, but may not be willing to devote the needed resources to pursuing those interests.

The Inter-American Dialogue (a group of leaders from the United States and Latin America, chaired by Sol Linowitz, co-negotiator of the Panama Canal Treaties, and Galo Plaza, former Secretary General of the O.A.S.) recognizes the potential security threat stemming from communist support of guerrillas in El Salvador and the possibility of Soviet bases in the region, but argues that the region's problems are "domestic," not external. "Even though there is a military dimension to the conflict, the solution ultimately lies in economic and social development and in political dialogue. . . ."[22]

The Dialogue proposes a new approach to an old strategic dilemma: the United States should draw lines between different levels of security concerns—allowing revolutions, but preventing them from being used by the Soviet Union. This is theoretically neat, and is an advisable strategy if a revolution has already succeeded. However, it is easier and less costly to preclude a hostile group from coming to power than it is to stop an unfriendly government from defending itself. That is why the U.S. has historically aimed at preventing Marxist rebels from coming to power by violence. A second problem with the Dialogue's security formula is its failure to address the contradiction between two of its key recommendations: first, that the U.S. should be prepared to use force to limit Latin America's relationship with the Soviet Union and Cuba, and second, that the U.S. should make an "unequivocally clear commitment to respect national sovereignty."[23] The Dialogue also includes recommendations to promote human rights, democracy, development, inter-American cooperation, and Contadora diplomacy. The real contribution of the reports is that they represent a consensus among leaders from throughout the region.

Taken together, the various reports parallel the debate between Congress and the Executive. All of them insist that no U.S. interest should be neglected, but the conservative reports give greater weight to the Soviet threat and less to human rights and development; the radical report reverses the emphasis, and the moderate reports suggest the need for a balanced approach. The fact that the moderate recommendations sometimes appear to fall halfway between the conservative and the radical approaches should not be interpreted as just splitting the dif-

[22] *Ibid.*, 7.
[23] *The Americas at a Crossroads* (fn. 21), 41-43.

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ference. It often means that the group believes both approaches have some validity but are extreme in their conclusions.

In their shared assumptions, the various reports suggest a continuity in U.S. foreign policy that ties diverse administrations together and constrains all of them. This thread is woven into the fabric of the U.S. political culture, and is manifested when presidents fifty years apart respond to similar crises in similar ways.[24] In their differences, the reports suggest the choices available to U.S. policy makers and the opportunities for changing direction.

B. SCHOLARLY UNDERCURRENTS

The premises underlying the security and neodependency images have been impugned by much of the recent scholarship. Taken together, the conclusions, while still lacking a theoretical foundation, may provide a basis on which to build.

Of the books reviewed here, Lester Langley's is the only one by a single author that covers U.S. policy toward the entire Caribbean Basin throughout the 20th century. Instead of judging all U.S. policy by contemporary norms, Langley places policy in its contemporary context and judges it with balance and detachment. "The United States in 1898," he writes, "was not considered, nor did it consider itself, an imperial power" (p. 4). In a "world of competing empires," U.S. policy then as well as during the protectorate era (1900-1921, the period of most frequent interventions), was mild and modest—although by today's standards it was reprehensible. Langley describes U.S. interventions, the mainstay of the dependency thesis, but he also describes the factionalism and chronic instability in the region, which were more the cause than the consequence of U.S. action. Instead of seeing the Central American Treaties of 1907 undermined solely by the U.S., as LaFeber does (p. 39), he recognizes the role of nationalistic rivalries. He chronicles the repeated use of Platt-style amendments as legal bases to intervene in the internal affairs of Cuba and other countries in the region, but he also describes in some detail the decline of U.S. interventionism, beginning at the end of the First World War when U.S. power in the region was at its height.

While LaFeber sees U.S. investment in Central America as exploit-

[24] For two excellent analyses of the impact of political culture on U.S. foreign policy, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and American Character," *Foreign Affairs* 62 (Fall 1983), 1-16, and Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), Part II, 87-175. For an attempt to apply theories of political culture and decision making to a specific case, see Robert Pastor, "Continuity and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: Carter and Reagan on El Salvador," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 3 (No. 2, 1984), 175-90.

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ative and most Americans see it as promoting development, Langley acknowledges some validity to both interpretations. The size of the investment at the turn of the century was a powerful stimulus for economic growth, but also an irresistible opportunity for governmental corruption.

Langley's thesis is that the United States has not had a strategy, but "the American mind" had a vision at the turn of the century of a "Caribbean empire without colonies . . . of small republics with honest governments and stable economies." Since this vision did not square with reality, the U.S. found itself engaged "on occasion, for genuinely unselfish, and at other times, for blatantly selfish motives [to] impose political order, economic tutelage, and civic morality" (pp. 13-14). Over time, however, as the nations progressed socially, economically, and politically, and as the U.S. recognized the inconsistency of its actions with its ideals, Washington gradually accepted the self-determination of the nations. The road was not straight; Langley permits the reader to see the choices faced by U.S. policy makers and to recognize the contradictions and ambiguities in U.S. policy as well as in his thesis. Langley's treatment of the contemporary period exhibits the same judiciousness as the rest of the book, but less knowledge.

For a more thorough treatment of the contemporary period, we must examine the numerous edited books that have been published in recent years. The new literature's contribution is clearest in its development of three subjects: (1) how U.S. policy influences, or fails to influence, certain institutions in the region; (2) how other foreign policies in the area affect U.S. foreign policy; and (3) how U.S. policy interacts with the region's new actors.

1. *Institutional resilience.* The volume edited by Robert Leiken contributes the largest number of essays that question the assumptions of the security and the neodependency theses. Christopher Dickey's chapter, "Obedezco Pero No Cumplo" (I Obey But I Do Not Comply), is a good point of departure. The author confronts the thesis that developments in Central America are determined by U.S. decisions, and concludes that the opposite is more nearly the case. Dickey contributes a historical analysis of the Central American "habitual response to what it sees as foreign dictates and ideas: accepting them on the surface but ignoring their substance" (p. 34). Central America is less a domino like Cambodia or Laos than a bamboo like Thailand, which bends with the prevailing wind and snaps back when it has passed.

Dickey's chapter, while a useful antidote to the security and dependency theses of U.S. omnipotence, carries the argument of U.S. impotence

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and Central American immobility too far. His counterthesis fails to explain, for example, the implementation of land reform in El Salvador and the gradual strengthening of the middle around Napoleon Duarte—both important objectives of the Carter administration; nor does it account for the acceptance of modern counterinsurgency tactics and free elections by the Salvadoran military—both priority goals of the Reagan administration. True, Salvadorans made those decisions and implemented them, but they would have been blocked by other Salvadorans had it not been for pressure from the United States. Nonetheless, Dickey contributes an important point, often overlooked in the literature, about the intrinsic power of local institutions to resist outsiders.

Richard Millett's analysis, in Leiken, of the premier institution in Central America—the military—is similarly path-breaking. Millett effectively demolishes the argument that the military is trained to serve the oligarchy and the Pentagon. He describes the military as independent with its own mission and world-view, "one of the most modern institutions in each nation ... strongly nationalistic and even xenophobic" (p. 69). With the partial exception of Guatemala, members of the armed forces in Central America are hardly the children of the ruling class. In most countries where avenues to advancement in important institutions are blocked to ambitious children of the lower middle class, the military is the one institution where these youths can enter and rise.

Millett also compares and contrasts the military establishments of each nation in a way that helps to explain how their impact on politics differs in each country. The Honduran military, for example, receives some popular support—in contrast to the rest of Central America. That is partly because there have been no significant insurgencies and relatively fewer human rights violations, but mostly because the military has a genuine defense mission against two historically aggressive neighbors—Nicaragua and El Salvador. Honduran officers therefore discipline *excessive* corruption or brutality, whereas Salvadoran officers conceal it. Millett's analysis helps to explain the downfall of Honduran General Gustavo Alvarez, who as Chief of Staff until March 1984 had accumulated so much power that Leiken and others thought he was on the verge of creating a "Somocista-style" dynasty (p. 13). Millet's analysis can also explain why the Salvadoran military was able to break with the oligarchy to implement the land reforms, but has been reluctant to stop the death squads. Briefly, the Salvadoran military recognized that to preserve its institution, it had to sever its alliance with the oligarchy, but efforts to control the death squads which were associated with the security forces could divide it.

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The Reagan administration views the guerrillas in El Salvador as united and determined to impose a Leninist solution by force, much as the Bolsheviks did in the U.S.S.R. and the Viet Cong did in Vietnam.[25] Leiken leaves international analogies aside and instead undertakes an in-depth analysis of the left in El Salvador. Rather than being a unified, disciplined Soviet lackey, the left appears to suffer from an acute case of the Central American political disease of factionalism. Under three distinct umbrella organizations, there are at least five guerrilla groups, five popular organizations, and four civilian parties. Most of the guerrilla groups originally broke from the Salvadoran Communist Party for reasons ranging from personality clashes to antipathy of the Soviet Union. Disputes over leadership have sometimes been resolved by fratricide. While all leftist groups agree on the need for a revolution, many of the leftist civilian parties fear a violent revolution or a military victory by their side because that could entrench a leftist military dictatorship. Their objective is something less utopian than a total revolution, achieved by negotiations.

Leiken argues that not all the leftist groups are pro-Soviet. Deep hostility to the United States, however, might blur that distinction, and a sustained belligerent response by the U.S. might erase it, as the leftists are drawn to a closer relationship with the Soviets in order to defend themselves. Nonetheless, the key point of Leiken's analysis is that the left is not united; its members differ by philosophy or "tendency," and they divide by personality. Opportunities for negotiation and cross-ideological coalitions exist.

Several essays explore the neodependency assumptions that the current crisis can be attributed to poverty, injustice, and stagnation, and that the U.S. has historically tried to block social and economic change in the region. They point out that these assumptions ignore the classic theory that revolutions are more often caused by growth and change than by poverty and stagnation. This is true of Central America. Rather than resulting from *lack* of change, the crisis appears to have been caused by its *unevenness*—with population expansion, economic growth, and enhanced health and educational opportunities colliding with immobile political-military structures.[26]

[25] For example, Undersecretary of Defense Fred Iklé said: "We can no more negotiate an acceptable political solution with these people [Salvadoran leftists] than the social democrats in revolutionary Russia could have talked Lenin into giving up totalitarian Bolshevism." Public Affairs Office, Department of Defense, remarks to Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, September 12, 1983.

[26] Eric Hoffer wrote: "We are usually told that revolutions are set in motion to realize radical changes. Actually, it is drastic change which sets the stage for revolution. . . . Where things have not changed at all, there is the least likelihood of revolution." Cited in Johnson

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Two other important neodependency assumptions are examined elsewhere. In contrast to LaFeber's argument that the United States has always blocked serious reforms in Central America, Rosenthal and Cohen (in Fagen-Pellicer) show that the U.S. placed its weight on the side of social change unless it believed that communists could exploit that change. Even this assertion seems inadequate in the case of land reform in El Salvador, where the U.S. has supported such reforms as a device for denying the communists an issue. Second, while neodependency scholars maintain that trade has been used by the U.S. to exacerbate the region's dependence, a closer analysis of the impact of trade on development suggests that it has been the region's principal engine of growth and diversification. Within Central America, trade increased thirty-fold in 18 years—from $32 million in 1960 to over $900 million in 1978, with manufactures accounting for 95 percent of the total. In 1950, a single commodity export from each Central American country generated on the average about 70 percent of its foreign exchange; that dependence declined to 36 percent by 1970. (Feinberg and Pastor in Leiken, 194-95.)

2. *Other policies: The emergence of middle powers and voices.* While the security perspective tends to see the struggle in Central America as one between the United States and the Soviet Union (and its allies), and the neodependency perspective tends to see it as one between national liberation groups and the U.S. (and its lackeys), the new literature has been mapping how the geopolitical landscape of the Caribbean Basin has been transformed during the last 25 years by four developments. First, the hallowed Monroe Doctrine was made hollow by the revolution of Fidel Castro and his subsequent alliance with the Soviet Union. Second, when the Caribbean polities expanded from three to sixteen states, the new nations were mostly democratic, with intelligent and articulate leaders who were determined to take full advantage of the United Nations principle that all states and peoples are juridically equal. Third, states such as Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia became "middle powers" by virtue of their stability and relative wealth; they evolved from being objects of the foreign policies of others to actors projecting their own national interests into the region.[27]

(fn. 16), 61. For a review of the literature on revolutions, see Johnson; Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1952). On Central America, see Feinberg and Pastor (Leiken, 194-202).

[27] For a description of the foreign policies of many of these new actors, see Elizabeth G. Ferris and Jennie K. Lincoln, eds., *The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); Heraldo Muñoz and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., *Latin American*

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Finally, the region again became—as it had been in the 17th and 18th centuries—a theater for many of the world's rivalries. Today, within the Caribbean Basin, Israel counters the P.L.O. and Libya; East and West Germany compete; ambassadors from the People's Republic of China shadow their Soviet counterparts; and the Socialist International and the Christian Democratic International assist their members to attain power. The United States and Europe, while aiming to contain the Soviet Union on the European continent, pursue different strategies in the Caribbean Basin. (Wolf Grabendorff, "Western European Perceptions of the Central American Turmoil," in Feinberg.)[28]

Though the security image presents the Soviets as directing Caribbean Basin revolutions, a closer analysis of Soviet foeign policy suggests that it is less of an actor in the Caribbean Basin than a resource. The Soviet Union failed to anticipate the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions, and indeed initially supported the wrong groups; moreover, it was slow to take advantage of them after they occurred. (Morris Rothenberg, "The Soviets and Central America," in Leiken; Jiri Valenta, "Soviet and Cuban Responses to New Opportunities in Central America," in Feinberg.)[29] Soviet resources, however, provide the capability for Cuba to project its considerable power and influence in the region and outside, and the region's revolutionaries receive assistance through Cuba. It must be remembered, however, that rebels do not confront the U.S. because they are told to do so, but because they identify the U.S. with the status quo they are determined to change.

The relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba does not lend itself to a simple appellation like "surrogate" or "ally"; clearly, the Cubans are extremely dependent on the U.S.S.R., but they are also zealous revolutionaries. Cuba pursues objectives that are compatible with Soviet aims, but in its own style, and perhaps more aggressively than the Soviets might prefer. Because of Fidel Castro and his effective defiance of the United States, Cuba has a stature among leftists and revolutionaries in the region that permits it to play a role that the Soviets simply cannot play.[30]

Nations in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); Richard Millett and W. Marvin Will, eds., *The Restless Caribbean: Changing Patterns of International Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1979); see also Feinberg, Erisman-Martz, and Fagen-Pellicer.

[28] Also see Joseph Cirincione, ed., *Central America and the Western Alliance* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985).

[29] Also see Robert Leiken, *Soviet Strategy in Latin America, The Washington Papers No. 93* (New York: Praeger, 1982); Cole Blasier, *The Giant's Rival: The U.S.S.R. and Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983).

[30] For an excellent discussion on Cuban foreign policy, see Jorge I. Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Fall 1978); for the best short essay on U.S.-Cuban

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Most of the region falls somewhere between U.S. and Soviet-Cuban policy, seeking greater autonomy and unwilling to pay the price of defiance or reap the rewards of subservience. The smaller nations have voices, and several play important roles in world bodies: Costa Rica on issues of human rights, and Jamaica on North-South and Law of the Sea issues. Panama took its case for new Canal treaties to every forum in the world in a successful effort to press the United States to negotiate.

Over time, and in subtle ways, many of the nations in the region have accumulated influence to the point that, perhaps unbeknownst to them, their views and policies can act to constrain or restrain the United States. In certain cases of unanimity, they have exerted an effective veto. At an O.A.S. meeting on Nicaragua in June 1979, the U.S. proposed an Inter-American Peace Force to oversee a cease-fire between the Sandinistas and the National Guard after the departure of Anastasio Somoza. When the "middle powers" rejected the proposal, it was inconceivable that the U.S. would act alone.

Two nations—Venezuela and Mexico—are central to understanding how the U.S. has to relate to the region today. Both have recently begun to project themselves outside their borders, largely for defensive reasons—not unlike those that brought the U.S. into the region at the turn of the century. Venezuela's assertiveness in foreign policy coincided with the restoration of democracy in 1958 and President Romulo Betancourt's conviction that democracy could not survive in a sea of dictatorships. Betancourt promoted democracy primarily through his diplomatic doctrine of nonrecognition, but he was not averse to pursuing this objective by force, as he did in supporting the rebels against Dominican strongman Rafael Trujillo in June 1959. (On Venezuelan foreign policy, see Robert D. Bond, "Venezuelan Policy in the Caribbean Basin," in Feinberg, 191; John D. Martz, "Ideology and Oil: Venezuela in the Circum-Caribbean," in Erisman-Martz.)[31]

If democracy gave Venezuela legitimacy in foreign policy, oil gave it capability. When oil prices rose in the 1970s, Venezuela's reach extended into international forums (OPEC, North-South negotiations) and into the Caribbean and Central America. As early as December 1974, Venezuela began to subsidize the sale of its oil to its Central American and

relations, see John Plank, "The United States and Cuba: Cooperation, Coexistence, or Conflict?" in Millett and Will (fn. 27); on Cuban-Soviet relations, see Robert Pastor, "Cuba and the Soviet Union: Does Cuba Act Alone?" in Barry Levine, ed., *The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); on all of the above, see that volume in its entirety.

[31] Also see Winfield J. Burggraaff, "Oil and Caribbean Influence: The Role of Venezuela," in Millett and Will (fn. 27).

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Caribbean neighbors, and invited leaders of all the nations to Caracas for state visits. By 1980, Venezuela coaxed Mexico into a joint agreement—the San José Pact—to subsidize oil sales to nine Central American and Caribbean countries. It was not long before both states expected their generosity to be reciprocated, at least with gratitude. As the Sandinista revolution turned to Cuba and away from Venezuela and Mexico, Nicaragua was forced to find new sources of oil; by 1984, the Soviet Union had replaced Mexico as its largest source of petroleum imports.[32]

Compared to Venezuela, Mexico made the transition to a more assertive foreign policy more slowly, reluctantly, and indeed, equivocally; for example, it maintained that its oil shipments were reduced only because Nicaragua could not meet its payments.[33] This was to be expected, as Mexico's foreign policy has been conditioned by a different history—by its revolution and its deeply ingrained fears and suspicions of the United States. Mexico's reliance on international organizations and the twin principles of nonintervention and self-determination reflect its central objective of trying to contain the U.S. But, as Edward Williams points out, there is a "solid strain of inconsistency" in its application of the principles (Erisman-Martz, 153). Having used the celebrated Estrada Doctrine (which asserts the neutrality of diplomatic relations) to reject U.S. pressure to break relations with Cuba in the early 1960s, Mexico broke relations with Chile in 1973 and with Somoza's Nicaragua in May 1979. Some Mexican scholars are beginning to ask questions about the gap between principles and policy. Adolfo Aguilar, for example, examines Mexican policy toward Guatemala and concludes, with considerable courage and self-awareness: "In many ways, we are to Guatemala what the U.S. is to us" (Fagen-Pellicer, 161).

As it did for Venezuela's, oil played a role for Mexico's foreign policy; it has broadened Mexico's horizon and provided the capability to project its policy internationally. Ojeda (in Fagen–Pellicer) posits a rather direct connection between Mexico's assertiveness and its oil revenues. As revenues increased in the late 1970s, so did the confidence of Mexican foreign policy. Written at the time when the demand for energy was

[32] Robert J. McCartney, "Managua Gets Bulk of Oil from Soviets," *Washington Post*, August 16, 1984, p. 1. In the fourth renewal of the San José Pact, on August 3, 1984, Mexico and Venezuela added a condition that would suspend the shipment of subsidized oil to any recipient engaged in "warlike actions" against its neighbors. This was their first public condition on aid. By then, ten countries were benefiting by receiving credits (at 8% for 6 years) for 20% of their oil bills. "New Terms Set by Venezuela, Mexico on Oil," *Washington Post*, August 4, 1984, p. A17.

[33] William J. Orme, Jr., "Mexico Terms 4th Session of U.S.-Nicaraguan Talks 'Substantive': Hosts Rebut Reports of Coolness Toward Sandinistas," *Washington Post*, August 18, 1984, p. A26.

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peaking, Ojeda's analysis was prescient. Both Mexico's and Venezuela's foreign policies have become more restrained as oil prices declined and the debt burden increased.

Contributors to the Fagen-Pellicer volume make a convincing case for cooperation between the United States and Mexico in approaching the problems of Central America. While accusing the U.S. of ignoring Mexico and dictating outcomes to the region, however, the authors are not at all inhibited about issuing instructions to Washington. In comparison, with the exception of Aguilar, they are silent on what the Mexican government could do. Some of the authors recommend that the U.S. follow the Mexican strategy of supporting revolution in the area; they are more sympathetic with the Mexican approach of negotiation and cooptation than with the U.S. tendency toward confrontation. Others argue that Mexico understands Central America better. That is debatable, however: Mexico has had less trade and contact with the region than the United States, and the first Mexican President ever to visit Central America was Gustavo Díaz Ordaz in 1966. (Edward J. Williams in Erisman-Martz, 151; Neale J. Pearson, in Erisman-Martz, 191, points out that Mexico's political, economic, and military relations with Central America are trivial compared with those of the U.S. and Central America.)[34]

For the purpose of this essay, the key question relates to the impact that Mexico, Venezuela, and other nations have had on U.S. foreign policy. When Mexico joined Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama in January 1983 to begin a negotiating process in Central America known as the Contadora initiative, their motives were preventive, to preclude Soviet-Cuban expansionism and U.S. intervention. The United States and the world paid lip service to the Contadora group because of its legitimacy as a predominantly democratic and autonomous Latin American effort. Officials in the Mexican government have indicated that they consider the Contadora initiative effective, if for no other reason than that U.S. intervention has not occurred. Whether or not Contadora deserves the credit, it is clear that the group serves as a powerful restraint on the range of options the U.S. might consider in Central America.

Although U.S. intervention in Grenada might appear to confirm the traditional hegemonic role of U.S. power, closer analysis suggests that it bears out the opposite point: the veto power of regional states. Rather

[34] It should be recalled that Mexico has a history of intervention in Central America in the 19th century which many Central Americans remember with the bitterness with which Mexico remembers the U.S.-Mexican war.

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than ask why the U.S. intervened in October 1983, it is more interesting to inquire why it did not intervene before then. The hostility of the Reagan administration toward the Grenadian revolutionary government was never concealed. President Reagan told a nationwide audience in March 1983 that the airport being constructed in Grenada was a security threat to the U.S. In the summer of 1981, the U.S. held a military exercise off Puerto Rico called "Amber and the Amberdines," which, according to the commanding officer, was meant to send a signal to the Grenadian government. The United States probably did not intervene earlier because Grenada's neighbors found it unacceptable, though they also disliked the Bishop regime. Only after Prime Minister Bishop and several of his Cabinet were killed in the revolution did regional views change, and the tacit veto on intervention was transformed into an invitation.

3. *Interaction of U.S. and Caribbean Basin policies*. Recent theoretical advances in the study of U.S. foreign policy have concentrated on the foreign policy process, trying to explain how foreign policy is first segmented and then assembled by government bureaus, Congress, or interest groups. Some theories have helped to explain how the behavior of these actors and groups is shaped by their institutional interests as well as by ideological preconceptions or psychological misperceptions. Scholars of U.S. policy toward the Caribbean Basin have drawn some interesting conclusions using these perspectives. Examining Congress as the instrument through which the principal debate on foreign policy occurs, I. M. Destler (in Leiken) shows why any policy in the region is likely to look confused and to generate controversy, but is also likely to restrain the Executive. Viron Vaky and Tom Farer (both in Leiken) each do effective dissections of the ideological assumptions and psychological misperceptions that shape the Reagan administration's approach to the region.

The existing studies on the policy process are limited in that they tend to view policy as an end product rather than as a means or an instrument for advancing U.S. interests as they relate to a country or problem. There are important exceptions, of course. Cole Blasier has written one of the best analyses of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, focusing on the pivotal but recurrent issue of how the United States has responded to revolutionary movements and governments. He concludes that Washington has been more effective when it has been patient, but he also recognizes that much depends on the response of revolutionary governments and movements to U.S. policy. In its analysis

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of the interaction of U.S. and Latin American policies, his book makes a unique contribution to our understanding of U.S. policy toward a key set of issues.[35]

Four other studies are notable for looking beyond the U.S. policy process to its effectiveness and its interaction with other policies. In an article (in Leiken) on the evolution of Sandinista foreign policy, Arturo Cruz, a former Sandinista official, tries to break out of the longstanding debate over whether the U.S. pushed the Nicaraguans (or the Cubans, or the Grenadians) into the arms of the Soviet Union (as radicals contend), or whether the Nicaraguans were embraced by the Russian bear (as conservatives believe). He looks instead to the interaction of key actors within the U.S. and Nicaragua, and between the two countries. Longstanding distrust between Reagan administration officials and hard-line Sandinistas strengthened the more intransigent officials on both sides. "A symbiotic relationship eventually developed between the hard-liners of the National Directorate and the ideologues of the Reagan administration," writes Cruz. "The actions of one side were used to justify the actions of the other." He rejects the argument that the Reagan administration is solely to blame for the Nicaraguan alliance with Moscow and Havana, but he believes that the administration forced

> a premature radicalization of the revolutionary process. The administration's excessive rhetoric and logistical support for the counterrevolution gave the [hard-line] commandantes the opportunity to justify their radical inclinations, thereby transforming U.S. concerns into a self-fulfilling prophecy (Leiken, 106).

Robert Wesson's volume attempts to chart the degree and kinds of influence that the U.S. has exerted on a number of Latin American nations. Various contributors to the book recognize that the relationship between the United States and the countries of the region is characterized by great disparities in wealth and power, which in turn create a sharp divergence in perspectives. Whereas the U.S. tends to see the limits on its ability to influence developments in the region, most Latin American states see the limits on their independence. The U.S. therefore often debates whether it will exercise its will or aim for balanced, mutually respectful relations; the debate in Latin America is often over how to reduce dependency on the U.S.

In no bilateral relationship is the divergence in perspective greater than between the United States and Mexico. In a masterful study, George Grayson recognizes and interprets the "smoke from dozens of sources

[35] Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979).

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[that] obscures the view of influence patterns."[36] Influence is clearly exercised in both directions, but one interesting conclusion drawn by Grayson is that many opportunities to influence the other side are lost because of cultural and psychological impediments rather than because of reasons of power.

Another bridge for connecting divergent perspectives is available in *Panama Odyssey* by William J. Jorden, who was the U.S. Ambassador to Panama from 1974 to 1978. With unique access to classified material in the United States and to all the central actors in the U.S. and Panamanian governments, Jorden's is the first diplomatic memoir that approaches its subject—the fifteen-year negotiations for new Panama Canal Treaties—from both national perspectives. Jorden meticulously reconstructs the negotiating positions of both sides; then, based on interviews after the treaties were ratified, he describes how each side perceived (and misperceived) the positions of the other. He describes the bureaucratic, personal, and national pressures that shaped the negotiations in a way that permits the reader to see how precarious these negotiations were and how difficult it was for the two states to surmount the many real and perceived barriers in order to begin communicating with one another.

What is striking about the negotiating history is the parallel behavior of the North Americans and the Panamanians from the beginning to the end. The riots of 1964 were the result of a chauvinistic reaction by Panamanian students to a chauvinistic act by U.S. high school students, who raised an American flag in the Canal Zone in violation of the Governor's rule. The negotiating postures and positions of both sides were determined largely by internal factors even at the moment when one side most wanted to influence the other. For example, Torrijos changed his negotiators as the U.S. did; neither side gave much consideration to the effect of these changes on negotiations. Moreover, Torrijos replaced Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd after his first meeting with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance merely because Boyd looked as if he might upstage Torrijos. The meetings had been fruitful, but after the dismissal of Boyd, the Americans were left wondering whether Torrijos was serious—certainly not the message Torrijos intended to send at that time.

Because the Panama Canal was embedded in the consciousness of both states, Jorden does not limit himself to writing a diplomatic memoir; instead, he describes the national debate in each country as well as the

[36] Grayson, *The United States and Mexico: Patterns of Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 193.

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convergence and occasional collision of the two debates. The book is not without its weaknesses. It is excessively detailed and sometimes pedantic, and the players in the drama are easily distinguished as the good guys who supported the treaties and the bad ones who opposed them. But its strengths eclipse those drawbacks. While most of the other books ignore the Canal Treaties—a more controversial issue for the American public than Nicaragua, Grenada, or Chile—Jorden's volume provides a definitive chronicle of the key events surrounding the negotiations. Moreover, the book provides more raw material for understanding how U.S. foreign policy is made and how it adjusts to Latin American reality than any of the other studies reviewed in this essay.

VI. Between Dependency and Free Will: An Interactive Perspective

While most recent foreign policy analyses have focused on the domestic sources and context of U.S. foreign policy, the signal contribution of the counterconventional literature has been in deepening the understanding of the way the United States has related to a changing environment in the Caribbean Basin—to modern institutions and new actors and voices. Compared to the richness of some of the recent scholarship, the security and neodependency perspectives seem poor and pale. In considering ways to synthesize some of the insights of the new literature into an alternative theoretical perspective, it is useful to contrast the older schools of thought.

The two perspectives share several points of departure, but they reflect opposing images. Both agree that the cause of the crisis is external, but the security advocates blame it on the communists, and the neodependency advocates on the United States. Both agree that U.S. interests are vital, although their hierarchies of interests differ. Both agree that U.S. involvement in the region has been substantial, but they disagree on whether it has served only U.S. interests or also those of the region. Both agree that there have been considerable dividends from trade and investment in the region; but the security perspective tends to give credence to the Ricardian theory that both sides gain from trade and investment while the neodependency perspective tends to view trade and investment as inherently exploitative, serving only the interests of U.S. capitalists. Finally, the security thesis prescribes a strategy for preventing the expansion of communism, predicting disastrous consequences if the plan is rejected, while the neodependency thesis insists

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on the necessity of accepting revolutions lest even more hostile ones occur in the future.

Both theses see the region as the object of U.S. policy; they see the problem in North American terms. *The United States is the actor; the region, the object*. The following critique of U.S. policy illustrates this point: "Despite United States pretense of consultation and negotiation, Latin Americans [repeatedly] find themselves victims of unilateral decisions taken in the United States."[37] Even in Fagen and Pellicer's *Policy Choices for the U.S. and Mexico*, almost all of the recommendations are directed at Washington.

The interactive perspective presumes that the region is composed of actors—nations, groups, leaders—not of victims or objects. These actors try to influence the U.S. even as they are influenced by it. Of course, all actors are not equal. The interactive perspective recognizes the vast disparity in power and wealth that separates the U.S. from the region, but it does not assume that such power automatically translates into influence or control.[38] Indeed, such power is reversible, with leaders or groups in the region trying to use the U.S. to further their own political or economic ends.

Some have found this role reversal difficult to interpret. For example, in summarizing U.S.-Nicaraguan relations over a forty-year period, LaFeber concludes: "As every President after Hoover knew, [the] Somozas did as they were told" (p. 230). It is true that, in order to strengthen their internal position, the Somozas cultivated the myth that they were working for the U.S., but it was only a myth. The Somozas were no one's fools or servants. On the contrary, they tried and to varying degrees succeeded in manipulating every President from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter. The Somozas cooperated with the U.S. when it was in their interest to do so. They were eager to help the U.S. overthrow

[37] Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Ronald Reagan and Latin America: Coping with Hegemony in Decline," in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983), 321. That critique of U.S. policy for treating Latin America as an object is ironic, not just because it unites both security and neodependency perspectives, but because its author would find both perspectives ill-fitting. Indeed, he argues that the U.S. and Latin America ought to treat each other with mutual respect, even though the above quote implies that Latin Americans cannot pursue their interests unless the U.S. permits them to.

[38] The interactive perspective builds on the concept of asymmetric interdependence developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). For an application of the Keohane-Nye model to U.S.-Mexican relations, see Bruce M. Bagley, "The Politics of Asymmetrical Interdependence: U.S.-Mexican Relations in the 1980s," in H. Michael Erisman, ed., *The Caribbean Challenge* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

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Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 and Cuban President Fidel Castro in 1961, but they also wanted to eliminate Costa Rican President Jose Figueres, despite vigorous efforts by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to stop them.[39]

In other instances, the U.S. applied considerable pressure on Anastasio Somoza Garcia—for example, in 1936 and 1945-1947, to discourage him from running for the Presidency—but he resisted successfully.[40] Efforts by the Carter administration to pressure his son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, to accept a peaceful political transition in 1978-1979 were also unsuccessful. Eventually, as the Nicaraguan state developed, Somoza's myth backfired, antagonizing the nationalistic sensibilities of independent-minded people in Nicaragua and the rest of Latin America. Indeed, the Sandinistas have found it useful to use the mirror image of Somoza's myth—the United States as a hostile colossus—as a device to establish their nationalist credentials and to mobilize youthful support for their regime. To explain U.S.-Nicaraguan relations, or, for that matter, U.S. policy toward the region, one should start by puncturing the myths, diagnosing the convoluted psychology, and looking at the region on its own terms.

If we reverse the conventional perspective and examine the Caribbean Basin from the inside out rather than from the perspective of the superpowers exploiting targets of opportunity, we see a region struggling with underdevelopment and chronic political instability, determined to widen its scope for self-determination. Surveying the history, Carlos Rangel, a Venezuelan journalist, has noted that "peace and democracy have been fragile curiosities; our norms are tyranny or civil war."[41] Poverty and recurring political crises were pervasive before the U.S. turned its attention and power to the area at the beginning of the century. Those who argue that U.S. involvement in the 20th century has stunted the region's economy and politics should compare the area's development in the 20th century with that in the 19th.

The word "revolution" has long been used in the region to describe virtually every attempt to change a government by force. Ambrose Bierce, who had some experience in Latin America, and a sharp eye for a misnomer, defined "revolution" in his *Devil's Dictionary* as "an abrupt

[39] U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54* (Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1983), 1387-90.

[40] Richard Millett, *Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S.-Created Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1977), 201-15.

[41] Rangel, "Is Democracy Possible in Latin America?" in *Democracy and Dictatorship in Latin America* (New York: Foundation for the Study of Independent Social Ideas, no date), 73.

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change in the form of misgovernment." Perhaps a more accurate term would be "crisis of political succession." Such crises were standard conditions in transferring power from one group to another. The transfer across social classes was the exception. Even the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions really began as crises of political succession, and indeed prevailed mainly because that was what most people expected. Only later did the new government evolve into a revolutionary government. (The Mexican Revolution also began as a broad movement, led by Francisco Madero who insisted on "no reelection" for Porfirio Díaz.) Those countries that have established legitimate frameworks for transferring power—Costa Rica, Venezuela, Mexico, and most of the Caribbean—have been the most successful in avoiding serious instability and resisting foreign interference.

However, if one cannot understand political change in the Caribbean Basin by focusing on U.S. policy alone, one also cannot conclude one's analysis by focusing on the region alone. It is necessary to integrate the two perspectives. A common reaction to a problem that is shared but difficult to solve is to underestimate one's own power and to exaggerate that of one's partner. For example, the United States tends to believe that drug trafficking can be ended only by preventing drug production, while source countries like Jamaica and Colombia believe the problem exists because of the demand in the U.S. Leaders from small, open countries believe that their nations' economic decisions are made elsewhere, while many in the U.S. think that underdevelopment has more to do with a "state of mind" than with the international economic order.[42] It is natural for certain perceptions to diverge; it is unusual for both sides to recognize this.

An important step in understanding U.S. policy toward the region is the recognition that certain kinds of perceptions and behavior patterns are not unique to the Caribbean Basin or to the United States. Sometimes, as in the case of the Canal negotiations, the perceptions mirror each other. Several studies of U.S.-Puerto Rican relations have found a similar pattern, with North Americans often accusing Puerto Ricans of errors they themselves were making.[43] It is a frustrating and fruitless task to

[42] For an eloquent statement on how small countries are controlled and exploited by an unfair international economic order, see Michael Manley, *Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery* (London: Third World Media Limited, 1982); and for a contrasting approach on the development possibilities of small countries, see Lawrence E. Harrison, *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind: The Latin American Case* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1985).

[43] See Raymond Carr, *Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment* (New York: New York University Press, 1984), and Arturo Morales Carrion, *Puerto Rico: A Political and Cultural Odyssey* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984).

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assign exclusive blame for the ambiguity of the relationship either to the U.S. or to Puerto Rico. More likely, divisions within Puerto Rico inhibit U.S. decisions on the island's status, and these reinforce the Puerto Rican divisions. The circular path of this interaction offers some clues for inter-American relations.

Misperceptions also are often mutually reinforcing, although in more perilous ways. Withholding U.S. aid from an unfriendly regime can strengthen its hostile elements, who in turn can take actions that confirm the worst suspicions of hard-liners in the U.S. government.

The utility of the interactive perspective can also be seen in an analysis of how and why an internal crisis becomes internationalized. Conservatives argue that the Soviets orchestrate crises, and radicals suggest that the U.S. injects the East-West conflict to mask its rejection of change. The interactive perspective recognizes that the countries concerned are small, open, and integrated in the world cultural-economy. Because the groups within each country represent fractions—sometimes minute ones—of the national interest, each group seeks outside help to survive and to prevail. Businessmen reach out to Latin American Chambers of Commerce; some labor unions reach out to the AFL-CIO, others to communist unions; Christian Democratic and Social Democratic leaders reach out to their internationals; leftists seek help from Cuba, and perhaps also from the Soviet Union; rightists, from neighboring military governments or from the Pentagon. Every group within the region has a counterpart outside it.

Because the nations are small, most of the literature views the direction of influence as coming from the outside. More often, however, the actors in the region invite outside involvement instead of responding to outside instructions. Unless a nation has a mechanism that all groups judge to be legitimate as a way to permit peaceful political change, internationalization of its succession crises is unavoidable. Outside involvement is thus an inherent part of the problem.

While there is no disputing the preponderant influence of the United States on the region's politics, one should not underestimate the guile or the manipulative skills of local actors, the strengths of some institutions like the military, and the pride and intransigence of regional attitudes in efforts to resist too intimate an encroachment by the U.S. Moreover, national actors in the region have a powerful equalizer: they are playing on their own turf, and they have new and more diverse options in terms of international alliances. The capacity to ignore U.S. pressure increases as a nation develops and expands its international choices.

To summarize, using the six questions that frame an image, the

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interactive perspective may be characterized as follows: (1) It evaluates the crisis in the region on its own terms, recognizing that internationalization of crises of political succession cannot be resolved until all local parties accept a mechanism for peaceful political change. (2) The U.S. role in the region has been important but not central; it has sometimes been beneficial; other times, not. (3) The benefits of trade and investment are distributed to both sides, but not in equal amounts. (4) U.S. interests are inclusive, ranging from security to democracy and development, and including the construction of a regional framework that respects (and provides space for) national autonomy. (5) A variety of strategies flow from these assumptions; most give priority to multilateral cooperation, diplomacy, and economic development. (6) Finally, this perspective would discount the eschatological language of political change and predict that real changes will almost never be as dramatic as promised—or threatened.

Glimmers of self-awareness and understanding are discernible in the region as well as in the United States. Octavio Paz, the Mexican philosopher, has recently stated that Latin Americans need to accept their responsibility for political instability even while North Americans should accept theirs:

> It is true that the fragmentation of our countries, our civil wars, militarism, and dictatorships were not the invention of the U.S. But that country has a fundamental responsibility for this state of affairs, because it has taken advantage of it to materially improve its own situation and to dominate. It has fomented the division among countries, parties, and leaders. . . .[44]

Sir Eric Williams makes a similar point in arguing that the history of Latin America and the Caribbean should be viewed as a "quest for identity and self-realization":

> A too-long history of colonialism seems to have crippled Caribbean self-confidence and Caribbean self-reliance, and a vicious circle has been set up: psychological dependence leads to an ever-growing economic and cultural dependence on the outside world. Fragmentation is intensified in the process. And the greater degree of dependence and fragmentation further reduces local self-confidence.[45]

The literature reviewed in this essay demonstrates that, like Paz and Williams, some North American scholars are willing to discard old assumptions and shibboleths in order to better understand U.S. policy

[44] Paz, "Latin America and Democracy," in *Democracy and Dictatorship in Latin America* (fn. 41), 9.

[45] Williams, *From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984; originally published 1970), 502-04.

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toward the Caribbean Basin. The interactive perspective, which is the sum of the various insights gleaned from this new counterconventional literature, posits that U.S. policy toward the region can only be understood by looking at it from the region as well as from the United States.

Sizable gaps in our understanding remain. To the extent that the interactive perspective is viewed as a helpful beginning in explaining U.S. foreign policy toward the Caribbean Basin, future research might explore the following areas: (1) institutionalization in the region—how some groups coalesce and why others fail to do so; (2) foreign policies of Caribbean Basin nations, particularly toward the United States; (3) case studies of international crises or issues in the region, concentrating on how perceptions influence behavior; and (4) the influence of foreign policies on internal politics, and vice versa. In brief, future research on U.S. foreign policy would benefit from less emphasis on how Americans relate to one another in the course of making policy and more on how Americans interact with those at whom the policy is directed.

U.S. policy toward the Caribbean Basin is often described as fluctuating between neglect of the region and panic when events seem to veer in an adverse direction.[46] This cycle is consistent with the view that U.S. motives are primarily strategic rather than economic or political: the United States does not seek to control political systems or to exploit economies, but rather to *avoid* the possible emergence of hostile governments or policies. For this reason, the U.S. does not act until the situation becomes grave.

The characterization of the policy as a neglect-panic cycle also tells us something about the convoluted psychology of U.S.-Caribbean relations. "Neglect" is an inappropriate charge as it presumes a certain tutelary responsibility, which is obviously inconsistent with the region's clear demands for independence and autonomy. But the psychological twists are more pervasive. National leaders want independence, but they also want to rely on the United States. They want sustained help from the U.S., but they also resent the dependence this represents.

The U.S., too, is a prisoner of this self-contradictory psychology. Washington does not want to dominate the countries, but it also cannot remain passive either to instabililty or to radical trends. It is caught, as it has been since the turn of the century, between the Teller Resolution, denying U.S. intent to annex Cuba, and the Platt Amendment, giving the U.S. the right to intervene in Cuba's affairs. The U.S. might not

[46] For a good, succinct summary of this cycle, see Virginia R. and Jorge I. Dominguez, *The Caribbean* (New York: Foreign Policy Association Headline Series 253, 1981), 64-77.

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want to control, but it also does not want to allow events to get *out* of control.

If one adds these matching contradictions to the disparity in power and wealth, one has begun to try to understand U.S. policy toward the region. In order to proceed, one needs a healthy skepticism of the two most prevalent images, a willingness to question the myths that have obscured the view of events, and an interest in using an interactive perspective—in seeing the problem as the U.S. and the Caribbean Basin see *each other*.

The barriers to communication and understanding are formidable, but not insurmountable. In an article denouncing the drift toward imperialism in the United States at the turn of the century, Mark Twain compared the U.S. (and Christendom) to a stately but besmirched matron, and advised:

> Give her the glass [a mirror]; it may from error free her,
> When she shall see herself as others see her.

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

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

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

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